

CHAPTER EIGHT

INDISPENSABLE GODS

We have progressed so far from the early chapters of this book that a review of them is probably needed, a final commentary on the divine succession and historical religions. Historical religions conserve the memory of a certain time when the world was created and humans came into being. None says that mankind always existed, or that he evolved mechanically by random association of particles. A purposeful act took place at a certain time. Most religions say that mankind was subsequently destroyed and recreated. Almost always the extermination of humanity stops short at a surviving couple or the equivalent. The subsequent homologue of the first chaos is a subsequent set of catastrophes by flood, fire, wind, and earth movements.

To preserve the memory of the first time of creation is a function of rituals, liturgy, anniversaries, and sacrifices. Many religions have strenuously sought to reproduce, short of deliberately re-annihilating themselves, the exact circumstances of chaos and creation. They have obsessively kept forms, practices, and words that go back to the beginnings of all religion and the first experience with the gods.

All historical religions are therefore highly conservative and weaken their foundations as soon as they admit deviations. The function of inescapable and exactly repetitive practices and symbols is to relieve the massive anxiety stored from the earliest times by confessing what happened in those times and reliving them successfully.

What appears to be radical in religious history is reactionary. Practitioners of the religion, wrought up beyond sufferance, find even the rigid rites of their church insufficient to recapture

the moments of chaos and creation. Prophets, apostates, evangelizers, and orgiasts arise. So do whirling dervishes and berserkers. They are chiliast or millennialists. They proclaim the end of the world while demanding that everyone acknowledge the full and immediate meaning of the creation of the world. They prepare to die and be saved in the recapitulation of the original catastrophic times.

All historical religions are based upon punitive gods, are self-punitive and are punitive towards others. Gods are adjudged good to the degree to which they refrain from destroying their creatures. Humans exist by divine tolerance. A common word for a good person in most religions is “god-fearing”. Personal merit through skills, altruism, and dogmatic belief and practice is sometimes, but more often not, a guarantee to a greater or lesser extent of the gods’ benevolence; never is merit a perfect or universal guarantee. This belief in the denial to merit of its due is not, therefore, as some think, a connivance of religion with the envious mob.

Sacrifices are forms of punishment of the self and others to forestall, and therefore to control, a punishment from Heaven. The concept of representation effectively lets a partial sacrifice stand for a full sacrifice and a sacrifice of others stand for a sacrifice of oneself. Sacrifices are said to be gifts freely given; yet it is acknowledged that withholding sacrifices will be followed by divine retribution. The more valuable the sacrifice, and the more strict the rules under which sacrifice and all other kinds of punishment occur, the more pleasing to the gods.

Guilt is self--punishment. It is the refusal of pleasure to some negative degree. We often know it in its late and rather pragmatic sense: guilt is what makes a fickle creature responsible; without guilt, personal and social discipline would be impossible. To get relief from guilt, one follows religious directives or some secularized substitute such as warring for one’s country or pursuing “the work ethic.”

But primeval guilt originated from the terror of “the other self,” the terror produced out of the minute systemic delay of

instinctive impulses. At the same time, the heavens were turbulent and terrifying. To control one's unbalanced self, one signaled the gods to arbitrate; and the gods responded, saying, "Your soul is a struggle of good and evil. We, with your cooperation, will take care that the good dominates you. You are not sick. Be hopeful. Help is on its way." This formula, although it can be called delusion, was a great invention. Granted the essential incurability of human schizotypality, it alone could lead to a manageable psychic world.

Important anniversaries or holy days are celebrations of divine destruction and near escape from destruction. Every truly religious anniversary celebration is therefore ambivalently tragic and joyful. Anniversary excesses and orgies, at both extremes of somberness and exuberance, are nevertheless occasions for the relief of tragic memory, more or less deeply suppressed. Anniversaries cluster around the great cycles of the ages, which give evidence of having been common to most of the world's cultures. Calendar diversions, not psychological changes, have driven apart the anniversaries of different cultures; they are farther apart in days than they are in mind. The end of the year inspires saturnalia in many cultures. Also thus, Roman Catholic and Greek churches mark a different Easter holiday for unessential reasons. Anniversaries sometimes are pulled together in a given culture by their original proximity during a cycle such as a solar year and by their psychological resemblance. Thus, Venus (perhaps at -3437 B.P., where Before Present =1984 A.D.) and Mars catastrophes (perhaps in -2671) occurred around March 23, close to the Spring equinox; the holidays were merged ultimately, and are submerged at Easter time in Christendom and comparable holidays in other cultures.

Sublimation, like ritual, is universal in religion; it pacifies, dissembles, represents, and rationalizes the strict conditions of the fatal times. Sublimation becomes more secular and pragmatic with the evaporation of stored anxiety over long periods of prosperity and peace. Disaster, deprivation, and frustration raise anxiety levels; they cause reactions against secular sublimation occurring in the artistic, social, political and

religious spheres; these activities are attacked as irrelevant and blasphemous.

Furthermore, all religions incorporate directives for every aspect of life -- work, sex, property, power, relations, health, and knowledge. Humanity was created and made deistic at the same time; the human mind is not logical, but it is wholly occupied by a way of looking at the world as a supernatural creation. The question of separating special values and calling these "the province of religion" has no meaning to a mind that was originally formed with every value at stake.

Religious practices are basically similar everywhere and have been from the start. Permutations of practices are innumerable. The new humans executed religious observances among their first acts. In this sense, all the world's religions came from one religion, that of the first and only band of humans. Then different experiences befell the different peoples. Some were non-catastrophic experiences and these brought many minor changes. Other experiences were catastrophic -- global and intense -- and these reinforced the basic resemblances of religions while at the same time prompting many minor variations. Thus ultimately, history came to witness a similar succession of great gods ruling amidst a congeries of ethnic religions.

One god has been replaced by another on various occasions. Almost always, the replacements successful because of unconscious techniques of cross-identification and rationalization. Sometimes men sought to replace gods by deliberate choice, with or without the help of events such as cultural amalgamation; invariably then compulsion and heavy propaganda were employed. Such occurred when Hinduism moved over Southeast Asia, when Christianity came to dominate the Roman World, and when Islam moved across Asia and Africa.

The replacement of all gods by materialistic and atheistic ideology is a special case, discoverable, in non-catastrophic times, among philosophical schools such as the ancient cynics, among

scientists and humanists of the post--enlightenment, and among communists.

Invariably secular replacers have argued the lack of empirical proof of the existence of gods; they have also stressed the contradictions of ruthlessness and mercy in the concepts of god; and they have attacked the behavior of religious establishments. As alternative behavior they have recommended principles of brotherly love, cooperation, and mental health, among humans, or principles of an ideally organized state that provides enough goods to satisfy people's needs without recourse to supernatural agents.

The major proof that such ideologies might succeed is based upon the waning of the gods when societies possess a pragmatically optimistic morale and are materially prosperous or believed to be potentially so, as recently. Then the gods have seemed remote and unneeded; considerations of logic and efficiency would appear to dictate their abandonment, removal, and forgetting.

Even under optimal conditions of prosperity, secular morale, compulsion and propaganda, the replacement has proceeded slowly and painfully. At the peak of their success, the ungodly ideologies have been undermined by new gods (e.g., Christianity in the Roman Empire), resisted successfully by the masses (e.g., communist Poland, 1945--1983 A.D.), transformed into secular religions of temporary duration (e.g., Roman Emperor worship, *der Fuhrer* Hitler, Comrade Lenin), or transformed into pseudo--scientific therapeutic or philosophical sects employing substitute semi--divine agents (e.g., gurus, anthroposophists).

The fundamental obstacle to ungodliness has been the construction of the human mind. Inasmuch as the events of creation that split the hominid character introduced the splitters as gods, humans become god-seekers as part of becoming human. The particular manner in which the universe was seen for the first time implied perforce the instrumentality of

divinity. Self-awareness, formed a nature which was unceasingly prone to discover gods.

Far from being an afterthought, the gods were a first thought. To excise this thought, after thousands of years of experience with it, was not only most difficult pragmatically; it was structurally impossible, at least as long as the origins, function, and mental structure of religion were not understood.

To forget the gods is impossible; the memory deck can only be reshuffled. To retain self-awareness without schizotypality is a contradiction in terms. Human creation involved a basic reconstruction of mammalian mind; to extinguish this essential schizotypality would restore man as an instinctive mammal, but is in any event now physiologically and psychologically impossible. Symbolism as the effect of the split self, flows naturally and cannot be obliterated. By the same logic and dynamics, treating symbolically with both the "other self" and the "outsider-others" must inevitably result in projectional thought, that is, treating the "outside other" with the same mechanism and feeling that the self utilizes in dealing with its "own other."

All of this process is transactional and the transaction is of the essence of human being. Therefore a group mode of projection, a group communication, is inherent in the individual-social complex. Thence, naturally, whatever is unanswered and questionable becomes a matter for resort to authority -- that is, a prevailing, preponderant group opinion. Since the group is forever under historical and existential stress, it is forever seeking authority and incapable of receiving satisfactory answers to its questions without a symbolic, abstract and animate referent that provides solution. Thus it happens that, if humans exist, god exists. God is the closing of the circle -- both question and answer. But so inextricable are the question and answer that only logical artifice can distinguish and designate the two.

Man's need to control the terrible and the terror causes him to invent gods. Nowadays, if one were asked how to control or

stop an advancing comet, he would dismiss the possibility, and say that we must await it. He is not prepared to undertake all the actions that ancient man had ready just for such approaching catastrophes -- propitiation, sacrifice, ritual, saturnalia, "going on the warpath." Nevertheless, as catastrophe approaches, at first slowly and then rapidly, and then hysterically, the modern human will act like his ancestors, including the excesses of guilt for not having foreseen the deserved end of all folly. He will draw upon the dwindling and remaining reserves of the "old time religion."

If the fossil voices telling us of the nature of the gods and of the rules for man's behavior respecting the gods are distorted and incorrect, and though they are not valid and reliable guides, yet these voices have told us things of positive value. They have given us foundations of history. They have recounted the basic facts of existence repeatedly. They have conjured existences differing from ours. They have in effect performed innumerable experiments with the allegedly divine from which we can learn what not to do religiously, and to a lesser extent what to do.

Perhaps the greatest lesson they have taught us (by negative inference) is that the religion of today and tomorrow should not be sought in the religion of the past: that humans, until they reach some certain level of perfection cannot be trusted to have known and arrived at the nature of the gods. Whenever historical man has said "Let us change our religion," (even if he does so in the name of preserving the old religion) he is saying "We were wrong about god and religion and it is up to us now to find a new way to god and a new religion."

The gods have retired into new forms, but they still operate through the busy humans whom the poet Rilke called "the bees of the invisible." The gods are still everywhere and are not as remote as our scientific texts would have us believe. They are in astrology, in magic, in fortune--telling; they fly to the scenes of disaster; they augment the forces of authority; they heal and console; they scare; they make anxious; they set the rituals for a multitude as they have done since the times of Ouranos.

They assume their own negation: for they argue with themselves in Natural Law, Bureaucracy, in Dogmatic Materialism, in Reified Words, in Mummified Heroes, in Times and Worlds without End. They let themselves be molded into One and the One obliges his necessities by becoming Many. Beyond all else, they stand at ease waiting for Armageddon and the Day of Judgment. Then they will don their armor and gather their hosts.

Although they have retired it still takes rare courage to contemplate all of their continuing manifestations and to resist the invention of new negations. There is yet nowhere else to go and few who would follow.

By skimming along on the thin ice of the cerebral cortex or by mathematical astrophysics or metaphysics or another such exercise, the gods can be sublimated. Dumb bestiality may be equally functional. We think that of all ways of facing them, the best is to look at them everywhere, contemplate their every manifestation, anticipate their reappearance, but do no more. If there is any question of human madness, it is erased when one pretends to be divine. Our human destiny is an open question. We deny our humanity if we try to close it. We belittle ourselves if we plead with the gods to answer the question at any cost.

Whenever gods and religious practices have been abandoned, put aside, forgotten, changed consciously or unconsciously, those who made such changes are saying to us their descendants, "Do not think that our ancestors, or us, or even you, will have the answer. There will be New Testaments without end." We the present generation are told that we are not the first, nor the last, but a truth-seeking figure in the series of forevers until the day when somehow, somewhere, we shall be perfect. At which time, we might, if we dared, claim omniscience, omnipotence, and the fullness of virtue.

In hastening to accuse traditional religion of claiming falsely absolute truth and morality, we often fail to see in the seeming absoluteness its inherent self--confessed contradiction. Just as

psychiatry has proven that excesses of anger, self-destructiveness and aggression have ordinarily come out of self-doubt and self-hatred, so we can see in the madness and excesses of historical religious behavior the same psychological sources of self-doubt and self-hatred transformed into dogma, authority, bigotry, punishment and guilt in the name of absolute achievement and arrival at the nirvana of perfection. Yet even while civilizations and peoples are being destroyed in the name of absolute truth, newly arrived at, a class of readers or priests of the absolute are contradicting the behavior in gushes of explanations and interpretations of the ways of the gods. As the Hindu Brahmin calculates, the warrior slays. As Anselm seeks proof, King Arthur crusades.

The most important question of religion is not how to eradicate gods, but to establish gods at one with humanity and the human soul. For there can be no logical or moral objection to the concept of and belief in gods in themselves; again the human being, insofar as he knows any happiness, has known it in activities of a sublime sort that are inextricable from the divine. A formula and model is required, which is physically possible, and which will forego conflicts of the self, among humans, and between devils and gods. Specifications are: a) sufficient relief from fearful stress to permit the search for a new formula; b) a search for physico-chemical change agents (whether mutational or continuously operative) that would eliminate terroristic memories, with all that subtends from such in the way of self-destructiveness and other-destructiveness without damaging, and optimally while promoting, the affectional and inventive facilities of humans; c) and, while the search goes on, and anticipating that the search may be unsuccessful, the invention of social strategies (therapies and institutions) that will hold the conflicts in abeyance indefinitely.

Secularism is a negative counterattack against religion, justifiable as a restraint against malpractices known to everyone. Generally, however, humankind is not in a state to abandon religion and the gods. At best it is capable of achieving a concerted view of an overall divinity and the sacredness of existence. It can borrow from and encroach upon science. Great

good would ensue, provided that the concerted belief could work its way into the aims and practices of myriad rituals of human lives.

Part Two

THEOTROPY

Whatever its failings, past and present, mankind continues to pursue religion. Even when most intent upon relieving himself of its falsehoods, constraints, and burdens, he exudes the divine and the supernatural, and these coagulate into habits and practices definably religious.

There are three causes of this incessant and probably inevitable theotropy. One lies in the delusional structure of the human mind, which must exist in the supernatural no matter how it may transform its perception into operations of abstractions and logic.

A second cause of religion rests with the potent limitations of mankind, who has learned that much more than himself and his activities occupies the universe, a something that may be unmeasurably greater in its goals and influence.

The third cause of theotropy is the human's need to expand his sphere of inquiry. One cannot rest where one is; one must forever seek to expand -- in effect, then, to divinize oneself. No ending in defeat is allowable, no surrender to entropy. Theotropy, as much or more than entropy, is the rule of the universe.

In this inescapable commitment to religion there is little which connects to the problems of ordinary ethics. Goods and bads are the bickerings of passengers on a train rushing through the night. And the consolations of religion are the resolutions of these bickerings in all the compartments of all the classes of all the cars. Religion here is peaceful accommodation which rarely succeeds, and never fully succeeds.

The real religion, or call it theotropy, does less for one than one longs for, but ever more for one and one's kind towards an indeterminate destination. We do not know where we are going, but we are making better speed.

CHAPTER NINE

SACRAL VS. SECULAR MAN

Any old religion is likely to have a complete life-program, guaranteed to give satisfaction. It will include answers to all problems that arise, with a counseling service from birth to death. This is no mean achievement, but rather a work of unceasing genius characterizing all ages and all cultures, and therefore thousands of designs and operative systems. Our admiration of the astronomical universe pales in the light of universal religiousness. Indeed, if one is hungry for proofs of the existence of ultimate design and intelligent gods, here is fertile ground to plow.

But why, out of all this experience has there not occurred one religion of all times and places for all people such that a model human being would lead a happy life? Why should not one formula have been discovered? Why all the changes, conflicts, misery? In replacing the instinctive existence of other creatures, why could not man rapidly invent just that proper set of behaviors that would satisfy the respective and combined needs of his human mechanisms and culminate in expressions of satisfactory existence? Is there some practical impossibility, the fault of the external world? Or is there some inherent contradiction of the mechanisms of human nature?

Let us set up a model of religious citizen (not a leader) and inquire whether he should be happy, and, if not, why not. We call him "sacral man." not because he is sacred, but because he believes a great many phenomena and actions are sacred. He sacralizes.

A thorough moral defense of religion from the standpoint of its expression through sacral man has not appealed to modern

writers. Such old and religiously circumscribed works as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* will hardly do for these days, when the field instruments of sociology, biology, psychology, economics and political science need to be orchestrated for the purpose. Available are negative critiques of ritual and assaults upon the supernatural. But where are the moral scientific (as opposed to merely sociological) studies of the Baptist and the Secularist living on the same street, multiplied a thousandfold to cover the world scene?

The ideal sacral person is born of religious parents, is baptized at an early age, and attends schools whose curriculum and teachers are of same belief. He or she hears of the gods, and experiences religious rituals, at an early age, so that by the time of receiving catechism he is already identified with supernatural beings and is pleased to learn that they have played the most important role in all major and many minor events of the history of his culture. Well before receiving formal religious instruction, he has been rewarded and punished in the name of the gods, and (he is convinced) by them directly. He knows this latter to be true, because he has had indirect and accidental rewards and punishments at the hands of what "must have been god." He has a fairly concrete impression of at least one god, the Great God, anthropomorphic but dressed in ritual clothing. He knows of many instances in which God has intervened in the current lives of persons dear or near to him, and to many others that have been the objects of his affection or the attention of his closely identified mentors.

Following upon years of catechism, he can explain events by himself to the satisfaction of members of his religion, and possesses a general history of his group and of mankind from their earliest creation by his gods. He can sacralize readily, that is, impute sacred meaning to any event, natural or human, consistent with his religion. His religious mentors have long since informed him of the political climate of his larger culture respecting his religion, so that he can know what to expect from strangers in and outside of his culture.

He knows how to invoke the gods by prayers and rites, even only by mentation and, perhaps with a poor sense of statistics, believes his score of successes far outnumbers his score of failures. He enjoys a logic that employs heavily the formula, "This follows That because God willed it;" "God must have willed This" (where 'This' is an event with significance and within the expected scope of God's actions -- love--death, etc., or so unusual as to be the work of God); "This other cannot be, because God would not will it."

He questions authority, since he is early forewarned of its religious untrustworthiness. He pursues a line of secular work regularly and responsibly, as an offshoot of religious ritual behavior. He understands readily the news of the larger world, for there is a general correlation between his political and religious friends and enemies. By virtue of his early training in displacement and projection, he can readily conceive of the larger society, even the whole world's people, within the sphere of and dependent upon his gods. His sources of mundane authority, if not religious, partake of the respect, authenticity, and reliability granted religious authority.

Births, marriages, accidents, careers, illnesses, and deaths of all with whom he identifies -- who are part of him -- are handled by old, well--known procedures. He is probably better able to confront a personal disaster by appropriate sacred explanations, instead of trying to cope with it independently as for instance, does the character Charlotte, in Joan Didion's novel, *A Book of Common Prayer*, who, highly secularized but also fearful of self--examination, slips into catatonic denial and mourning when it develops that her daughter was pursuing another life, an *alter ego*, of political criminality. For sacral man, ways and limits of mourning are well-set. Reactions and decisions are pre-fabricated.

He can feel secure that all happens as part of a sacred history, elevated to celestial levels of meaning, and contemplates and suffers his own death in the same frame of mind. Since he identifies with gods, his time scales for personal achievement and for the expected future history of the world, including even rewards and punishments for actors on the present scene, are

celestial as well as according to the secular calendar. He is confident of indirect and unknown measures being taken on his behalf by supernatural agencies.

From early childhood, he has been god--fearing. By satisfying the gods, he is exempted from much fear of men and accidents: "If I please God, God will take care of me;" "When God calls, I am ready to go." He realizes very early in life that he has problems of self--control; he projects the unruly selves onto the deities, and thus can "bargain with them at arm's length. Self--hate becomes devil-hate. When his psychic system becomes well established, he acquires self-confidence.

He has several persisting problems. Some are due to his inherent structure as a human being. Others are owing to his uniqueness when confronted by what must, after all, be a general formula of his religion for handling all humans. There occur also conflictful features of his larger culture, and accidents and natural disasters. Thus his religion, so holy to him, may be disliked by other groups with whom he must deal. He (and his group) may have such consistently bad luck with nature that active punitive measures are continually taken -- prayers, sacrifices, guilt, fasting and abstentions. Aggressive behavior against outsiders is sometimes called for by prophecy and divination: "God needs help in punishing his enemies."

Furthermore, he may be genetically a "difficult character" for his religious institutions, a "nervous type" uncontrollably impatient with ritual, a person whose parents were a little deviant and unwittingly made him more deviant from the religious norms of belief and behavior. Guilt--feelings, self-destructiveness, suspiciousness, extravagant behavior (aggressiveness, asceticism, etc.) may result.

Finally his modes of logic may interfere with what he wants to do with himself and the world. If the gods manage so much, he is left to cope with little, and may see little need for pragmatic learning. He may, by continuous resort to his religious logic, become stupid and retarded in contributing to and gaining from the larger culture, where different logics are called for, such as

“This cannot occur without That” or “To obtain, That, do This and no more.” He may suffer from a great many floating opinions, unanchored to mundane cause and effect, good for ritual, useless for practical life, whether dealing with people or tools.

Regarding these issues as a whole, one large risk seems to confront model religious citizens. The near impossibility of a general religious system being all things to all people all the time causes universal individual problems within the religion. It also causes divisions into priesthood and parishioners, mystics and ritualists, managers and managed, and so on, which aggravate the insecurities of all affected by the divisions, that is, of all believers. Ritual resembles instinctive behavior and may cover most aspects of life except revelation. No religion exists without a place for mystic revelation. Yet revelation is the opposite of ritual. Somehow every church must give birth to and nurture this hero (or assassin).

In addition, every religion exists within at least a partially secularized society; even in the most simple tribal society, where all seems to be definitively sacralized, there is an everyday need to confront and exploit nature, to use tools variously, to deal with outsiders. Conditions change; religion is conditioned; religions change. Every ritual change is a slap in the face of the religion, and face-saving tactics are numerous.

I am not taking present Western European society as typical of religious settings, for this would be too easy. Change and secularization are rampant. I am trying here, as elsewhere in this study, to employ the most conservative type of analysis, and to avoid taking advantage of the many loop-holes of speculation and illustrations that religious history and philosophy ordinarily profit from.

I am asking consideration of relatively changeless culture, while asserting that there is never a state of changelessness. And so, within and outside the model citizen, change is happening and causes him lifetime anxieties which the religion cannot possibly control by scripture or rites.

A calculus of felicity is not difficult to imagine. The greater the stresses within the church and in the relations (direct and indirectly effective) between the church and the environment, the greater become the anxieties and uncontrollable outbursts of our model citizen; the greater then the changes within his groups as well.

In none of this discussion have we spoken of the moral values of the activity, except we have presumed a kind of *dolce vita religiosa* for the citizen. We have not asked how many orphans has he sheltered, how many cannibal feasts has he enjoyed, or how productive has he been, nor have we made any quantitative gauges of his feelings of nearness to god.

It seems that we must always come up to the point where we are saying “What his religion happens to say is good, is in fact good.” whereas we know “in our hearts and minds” that this cannot be. There has to be more than this to justify a religion on moral grounds. Is there some metaphysical morality that can weed out bad from good religions, bad from good citizens?

Or, perhaps, a model of secular man can reveal, by way of contrast, a morality overshadowing religious morality. Let us see. As with sacral man, we shall be taking an optimistic view of his development; the model is optimistically biased. Here now the person we have in mind begins life as the child of parents and in a group who disbelieve in the supernatural and practice no rites in the name of gods or spirits. They point out to the infant actions and persons whose effects are good or bad. The child is taught that nothing exists unless it can be experienced by himself and proven to his authorities, for he has these, too, in his parents and attendants. He is trained to reason pragmatically rather than to practice religious rituals or seek revelations.

He is ritualized, but in the name of necessary training to achieve good or logically necessary effects. By reward and punishment he is taught to seek or avoid objects, persons and activities that he is likely to encounter. He is discharged from training when

his own sense of right and wrong appears to rule him adequately.

He learns that his society is benign in its intentions toward him, behaves justly toward him and others, and protects him from himself, potential assailants, and foreign enemies. If he participates voluntarily in his own training, he will acquire skills that the economic system and the governments will welcome and pay him to use.

Ritualized or routine training is justified in terms of its consequences. As the British Statesman Gladstone put it (1876) in the years when the concept was becoming current, “The Secularist.... does not of necessity assert anything but the positive and exclusive claims of the purposes, the enjoyments, and the needs, presented to us in the world of sight and experience.”

There is only body, not soul (except metaphorically), and no afterlife to look forward to or worry about. He may enjoy fictional stories about the supernatural; he may pretend “for fun” that any phenomenon is unreal. He observes a number of secular holidays arising out of political, social, and heroic events.

His respect for scientific method (empiricism, facts, logic, experiment, control of the environment) is high; he claims to believe only in its application and findings, whether in the human or the natural realm. He expects a continuous upgrading of his life, partly because of a general upsurge in health and living standards. His feelings are not rigid nor profound. He expects every person to do his duty, and does not accept authority without explanation in material, empirical, and logical terms. He seeks generally to belong to groups whose leaders are elective.

What will be our felicity calculus for such a model citizen? He may be on the whole as “happy” as the religious citizen. The word “happy” would mean a usual mild euphoria, which, we must admit, may come genetically, or as a result of brute

affection generously granted the infant being. Still, this affection may be tendered by his identification with “Infant Jesus” in certain cultures, which would therefore allow an intrusion of religion even into the recesses of infancy.

What he loses of the security in the perceived protection of the gods, he makes up for by an increase of security owing to the perceived way in which changing explanations go along with changing events. His defenses stop at the grave, but his hopes of increased beneficial effects of science for himself and his human identifiees are greater.

He has fewer judges of his actions, and perceives fewer entities to please. He will, however, be more frequently and poignantly disappointed with humans, because their conduct is not mediated through his gods, and strikes him directly and rudely. His only hope is other humans. This increases his load of fear and anxiety, and probably this will be heavier than the fear--load of religious man.

His temperament may also be more mercurial. On one hand, his life offers less inspiration and may be insipid, while on the other hand he may strain for sensory stimuli and orgiastic behavior. He is not likely to be less aggressive or less vicious than religious man.

His morality is no more explainable than that of religious man. He simply holds it on natural grounds: “That is the way people behave when they are not driven by superstition or authority.”

The secularization of modern times may well have had its likenesses at certain times and among certain groups of the Golden Age of Saturn, the Confucian period of China, the Middle Bronze Age in the Near East, the Classical age of Greece, the pagan Roman Empire, the Renaissance, and other eras. The clash between the religious and the secular is prominently displayed. We have an idea that a large section of the elite, at least, in these eras was a disbeliever, a shopper for ideas, luxuriating in freedoms of choice among supernatural views and between cultism and materialism.

Here may be the difference -- freedom of choice against a bound--up cosmos, not secularism *versus* supernaturalism or religion or sacralism. We cannot be certain at all that the secular man has ever been really secular, rather than merely a disintegrated sacred man.

The modern secular man was emerging in the Renaissance. Machiavelli was living at the same time as Saint Ignatius of Loyola (1491--1556), founder of the Jesuit order. Loyola, unlike the author of the *Prince*, who moved fully and confidently into the modern disintegrated secular society, was seized by the need to keep the total image of Jesus under control and in mind, and to capture and reintegrate any escaping impressions and thoughts. Roland Barthes has grasped the essence of Loyola's mission and procedures, as spelled out in Loyola's book of *Spiritual Exercises*.

“The obsessional character of the *Exercises* blazes forth in the accounting passion transmitted to the exercitant: as soon as an object, intellectual or imaginary, appears, it is broken up, divided, numbered. The accountancy is obsessional not only because it is infinite, but above all because it engenders its own errors... [Every failure induces, requires, more accounting.] Everything is immediately divided, sub--divided, classified, numbered off in annotations, meditations, weeks, points, exercises, mysteries, etc. [That is,] *The Exercises* can be conceived as a desperate struggle against the dispersal of images which psychologically, they say, marks mental experience and over which -- every religion agrees -- only an extremely rigorous method can triumph.”

The whole aim and process is a totalitarian domination of the mind for the purpose of putting oneself into a position to ask God questions and to receive passively the answers. All vagaries were returned to the Source. There is no denying the social impact of the Jesuit method and practice. Allowing that traditional Catholicism continued inertially, Jesuitry become a great active sword that held much of secularism at bay while causing it to involute.

Evidence abounds that secular man is actually a form of sacral man with Jesuitical control. What is sacred possesses for its experiencer an aura of the holy, of awe, of fear, of divine arbitrariness, of supernatural animation. Sacral man in his extreme expression sees the cosmos and all its details as sacred; there are few of such men, of course. The extremely secular man sees everything as void of the supernatural and fully accessible to the senses; there are very few of such men, too.

Let us provide some categories of behavior that might be regarded as sacred or at least non-sensible, to which most so-called secular men adhere. For one thing, they believe in many myths, myths of their descent and families, of their country, of the history of their locale, of wars and voyages. More, and now we make a few specific allusions applying to some, by way of illustration, they hold myths about GM, GE, IBM, their President and political leaders, Albert Einstein, Hollywood, the Mafia, the flag (“Old Glory”), Harvard University, the “Spirit of Saint Louis,” the Philadelphia Eagles Football Team, Bellevue Hospital, the “Monopolies,” “Justice,” “free will,” “reason,” “truth,” “nature,” snakes, elephants, diets, and so on and on.

What do we mean by associating such people first with myth, then with the supernatural, hence with the sacred? The myth has in common with the sacred a non-empirical aura of “emotion” or feeling attaching itself to a non-existent or otherwise psychologically incomplete perception such that, whatever it is, it would not recognizably exist unless it were mythified. International Business Machines (IBM) does not exist as entity, but only as hundreds of millions of mental and physical operations of people, partly related to machines. But “it” is “mighty,” “global,” “venerable,” “rich,” “progressive,” “losing money this year,” “in need of revitalization,” and so on. One is “loyal” to it, “depends” upon it, “accepts its policies,” “questions its sincerity,” “sues it,” tries to “break it up,” “ignores its complaints” and so on. Lawyers hop around on “its giant body like fleas on an elephant,” “defending it,” “justifying it,” and of course “living off of it.”

A great many people derive a feeling of the supernatural and sacred form when functioning in the corporate ambience. The Chief Executive of the great Schlumberger multinational enterprise said recently that a corporation nowadays must learn from the Japanese that “we have the responsibility that religion used to have.”

Are these behaviors and beliefs any less religious, say, than the behavior of believers in a volcano religion? The typical secularist worships a dozen such volcanoes; he is polytheistic; he believes in the supernatural and practices rites in regard to it. I do not argue here the consequences: this mythicized aggregate produces millions of hard objects for people; what does the religious aggregate produce but “useless objects” such as church buildings and a superabundant “software?”

We cannot maintain that secular man is less superstitious than sacral man. Does he more often believe “13 is an unlucky number” or carry a rabbit’s foot for luck? Encyclopedias of false beliefs and superstitions are available, but they do not speak to this issue. Superstition is sacralization gone wild, uncontrolled by formal religious authority or science. There is very little difference, too, between superstition and the “false cause” of an anxiety; worrying over the number 13 is not much different in cause and effect than worrying that the airplane in which one is sitting will plunge to earth. Secular man has a plethora of both types of illnesses.

Inseparable from myth in practice are symbols and fictions. Language is but the greatest set of all fictions. That it is magical is provable in the behavior of humans in regard to it from their beginnings up to the present. Words lead a life of their own, in the world of words, distinct in part from the objects to which they ordinarily refer. Modern secularists use words freely; a candy is “divine;” every accident is a “catastrophe.” No matter; that the world turns with an energy of 10^{37} ergs of energy does not deny to a leaf wafting down from a tree its own erg. What we have in secularism is a disintegration of the sacred cosmos into infinite particularistic ergs of the supernatural, but at the same time a denial of the cosmic supernatural.

Words merge into symbols, which may be words, pictures, displays, but also contain the impact of sets of words, without integration with the grammar of the language. A symbol contains a stimulus to arrive at an attitude or predisposition of mind or behavior. The symbol of the cross has been found throughout the world from the time of the earliest gods up to the present, denoting the chief god or a reference and extension of the god. Wherever a cross occurs, the supernatural does as well; in the ancient world, stones of Hermes were put up at crossroads. Many symbols are likewise ancient. Some of them, like the cross, find their way into the secular crests of noble families, secular institutions, the trademarks of modern corporations, and the escutcheons of government agencies.

Such modern references are very weak, it is said; this is true, and art designers and public relations experts will invent trademarks and other symbols for a price, using scientific techniques for determining how readily the public will recognize and accept the symbol. Still, unauthorized use of the trademark can incite a law-suit for millions of dollars; something sacred must be conveyed. It contains more than a single erg of the supernatural.

So it is with fictions, which are of several kinds, including the words, myths and symbols referred to already. We need only to mention that others remain, and also contain qualities of the supernatural, and they are continuously and necessarily employed by the secular mind. The “average” is one of the most useful concepts of science, but it does not exist. Very often sought, like the Golden Fleece, once found, it leads to marvelous gains. That “everyone knows the law” is a fiction treated as fact in a court of law; “ignorance of the law is no excuse for an offense.”

Science, law, literature, drama, and music constitute a veritable fictional world that no amount of secularism can eradicate. Secular man can only claim that these are all piecemeal tools, that he “uses” them, that they do not make him a believer in the supernatural, and that he can understand me when I tell him that

these are unreal. But this must be a very special secular man, not an ordinary one, for the ordinary one does not see the dizzying use of hundreds of tools; he is used by them, attaches all kinds of fleeting supernatural associations to them, and does not understand well at all when I speak of them as unreal.

So the ideal, extreme, purely secular man will try to squeeze out of life all that is fictional, we suppose, if it ever ended in anything but the most mad hermeticism, with various rituals for exorcising fictions, in a direct confrontation of the real. Pure secularism would be a life of instinctive stimulus-response: wordless, thoughtless, myopic, and solitary. Wrung out of existence would be the arts, politics, law, the market-place, love, human relations, and science itself, including both the conception of all these and all of their ritual accompaniments.

Since he must himself employ the supernatural and its rituals, secular man, we see, does not so much want to destroy religion as he does to particularize it, to make it pantheistic and kaleidoscopic. He wants to keep all his options. He wants full freedom to pick up and lay down any iota of the supernatural or any practice connected with it. He is like the sophisticated Roman of 2000 years ago who also wanted to pick up and lay down any god or rite as he pleased. He does not wish to be part of an all-embracing and integrated cosmic religious system, not even to be reminded that everything in the world and in culture is tied to everything else, even secularly, if not sacrally.

Religion as such threatens his options. He wants to freely disperse his affects and attentions. He wants to be free to change them. He admires the composer who builds idiosyncratic tonal works or the sculptor whose "Composition in plastic, number 18" pretends to communicate with nothing or nobody. Just so, he wants individually to compose and recompose the vignettes of his life.

There is accordingly a strong trend toward the disintegration of morality. Morality, too, is piecemeal in secularism. Each item is judged right or wrong by itself. We note this in pragmatism where the consequences of an act determine its morality. We

note it in American law where social consequences tend to be the measure of a crime and its punishment. We note it in the press, where instantaneity and shocks push aside moral priorities. We note it in democratic politics, where the politicians must, and willingly do, fix the plight of whoever is complaining most, generally ignoring the “good of the whole,” scales of values, or long--term considerations: “The wheel that squeaks gets the grease.”

Still, the supernatural of everyday life in modern society is not enough religion for a great many secularists and they solicit new religions, inventing them, so they think, actually “reinventing the wheel” time and time again. These are by no means to be dismissed; they are heroic endeavors to join science and traditional religion, to worship the Divine and the Good without reference to the succession of gods, to build peaceful humanistic communities, to make contact with presumably intelligent beings in outer space, to achieve sacred communities with new rituals that dignify rather than abase their members, and to build a satisfying non-materialistic life around ideals. To ridicule them is by implication to ridicule ourselves. (To ridicule ourselves, on the other hand, is not far from our minds, as we mistake one turn of the road after another; we feel always on the brink of absurdity, that the whole enterprise of penetrating and ordering religion is surreal.)

We hear of physical therapy communities, where diet, exercise, and love build new souls, and of group therapy communities where, in one case, one learns to love oneself and, in another case, to give up selfish love of oneself to love others. We learn of astrological networks of believers who adjust their lives to the elaborated meaning of planetary motions and conjunctions.

There are communities and networks of *haute couture*, work, skills, fraternity, “rock and roll,” sexual practices, diet, outer space communications, sports, and many other special areas that go far beyond occasional meetings and informational exchanges into the dense supernatural and ritual affairs of religious cults. They are voluntary. Participation may be brief

and intense; it is for that period sacred, supernatural and ritualistic.

We begin to see an overall pattern of the people of a secular society; they live amidst many intense but sporadic religious episodes, where their minds are fully occupied in recapitulating birth, baptism, initiation, marriage, priesthood and death in brief compass, and in between these episodes, they float and paddle in a swirling world of secular symbols, legends, myths, and fictions. Are they happy? Have they found Truth and Morality? Once again, I would warn against a hasty denial. What is “happy”? Who is happy in this world? “Happy” may be a little thing, quite evasive, quite accidental and lucky, though subjectively grand in its effects.

As for “moral”, that, too, may be the accident of a soul that is bumped and tossed about like flotsam, until finally jettisoned onto the shores of goodness.

CHAPTER TEN

ETHICS AND THE SUPERNATURAL

After a brief military campaign in the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in 1982, memorial services for the dead of Great Britain and Argentina were held at the Cathedral of Canterbury, England. To some of the British, the idea of memorializing the Argentine dead was already irksome. Then going beyond ceremony, the Archbishop in his sermon deplored warfare, asserting that it proved the failure of a foreign policy. Whereupon he was verbally chastised by Prime Minister Thatcher and like-minded representatives of English jingoism for not having made it clear to the assembly that the British were righteous and victorious in the eyes of The God of the Established Church of England. Reasonably the one party might complain, of what use is the State Church if it does not support the State's wars? Just as reasonably, the Archbishop might say: Of what use is a religion if it cannot teach peace to politicians?

The peacemakers often go unblest by the religions, too. Mirza Ahmad Sohrab, in his grand tome, *The Bible of Mankind*, compares the great world religions to the strings of a single harp each of which gives forth its own dominant note, while the harmonious blending of all produces a symphony of music. The dominant note of Hinduism is *the divine presence pervading nature*; of Buddhism, *remuneration*; of Zoroastrianism, *purity*; of Confucianism, *filial piety*; of Taoism, *the path to reason*; of Judaism, *righteousness*; of Christianity, *love*; of Islam, *submission*, and of the Bahai Cause, *universality*, "In their efforts to admit and confess all humanistic doctrines of religions, the Bahai have been frequently persecuted by god-fearing believers, and, even while the British were wrestling with Christian "love," the Bahai were being dispossessed and

killed, allegedly for religious and statal treason , by Iranian Muslim practicing “submission” to Allah.

Secularists frequently pronounce religious slogans for lack of a substantial ethics of their own. Moral issues often intimidate secularists, too. There is a sacredness about them, a confusion, a threat, a secret, a god buried somewhere among them, a priest ready to pull one in like a fish if one takes the smallest bait.

There used to be a major area of study called “the moral sciences.” It is defunct. In turn, every field of the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities has tried to extricate itself from moral responsibility and qualify for the name of science. Even practical schools of business, medicine, dentistry, law, agriculture, engineering, architecture, nursing, social welfare, etc., claim to provide an objective education; they have achieved the logically impossible feat of inculcating in their students an abundance of the best ways of doing things, while pretending not to consider good from bad, right from wrong.

We know this to be nonsense. All applied science most exhibit preferences for lines of conduct. Scientific method is itself a moral system. And just think of the vast proportion of alumni of schools who confess, with a quaver in their voices, to all that they know and owe to their alma mater. Somebody is teaching somebody something in the way of morals! What is happening?

Is this hypocrisy? Are the schools and students, the society and its people, claiming one thing and practicing another? Yes. They are using a technique that places upon an unreachable, untouchable level certain problems such as god, religion, and the supernatural, along with the associated problem of the ultimate sources of morality and their justification; they take up all other problems as only of instrumental importance, as problems of means, not ends, as problems whose solutions can be taught to burghers, brigands, and beggars alike.

Whereupon a society becomes secular, segmentalized and instrumental (hence exploitative) in its behavior as well as its morals. From many a segment are cast many grappling hooks

for the larger morality, some of which catch hold and from here and there spring the many varieties of religious practices characteristic of the secularized society.

Where there is not a grappling for religion there is often a contradictory pair of behaviors: the one a specialized nose-to-the-ground empiricism, the other a hopelessly dispersed attention. The former was discussed in the last chapter as an aspect of secularism and occurs again for treatment in the next; the latter requires a few more words here. Religion generally focuses attention onto a few, high-priority objects of value; secularism dissipates attention.

Attention is itself a value imposed on whatever is attended to. It is a preference for its object, selected out of all potential substitutes as objects of attention. Attention is instinctively determined in non--human creatures and modified by parental and group training in many species; the ambient force impinging on the creature also helps to determine the objects of its attention. As with other creatures, man's attention in part is a valuing of the object, elementary, without training, without justification.

Very few persons will even admit that their valuational life is already half described when their attention spectrum is drawn up. But so it is, pathetic as it may be.

They would like to believe that attention is a real, natural, automatic experience, about which they promptly cogitate. This is Cartesian rationalism, for does he not offer as a first principle of his *Discourse on Method*, *cogito ergo sum*, "I sense that I perceive, therefore I am," and, further, "I perceive because I want, and therefore am."

So, straightaway with birth, we fix the infant, if he had a mind to wander, upon the right, proper, goods things -- the nipple, the nurse, the movements of the nurse, her voice, his bowels moving, his eyes lightening, his muscles flexing, all following after the not so good things -- his wonderment at himself, a loss

of his boundaries, a panicky feeling of loss of his warm pool, stunned dissolution exposed into infinite space.

Suppose his family to be church-goers. He is habituated to church as soon as he can be counted upon to be quiet most of the time there. Time passes, and one day, when he hears, "We are getting ready for church," he displays a mind of his own. "Why?" "Because..." "Because of what?" "Because it's Sunday." "Why do we go to church on Sunday?" "To worship God." And so on. It is almost entirely a morality of means, that carries him from one step to the next, not "really explaining."

Sometimes this begins, or he is catechized, even if he asks no questions. "Why should I worship God?" "God gives us our blessings in life." "Like ice--cream?" "Yes." And like your mother, and father, and bed to sleep in, and food to eat, to train him properly, the trainer is usually clever enough to number only things which the trainee likes. But there is small pay-off for the trainer unless he slips into the list of blessings things that he, the trainer likes. So they go to church to assure the blessings that each wants. They already have different religions, in a sense.

Still later on, the child has a habit of church--going, as a result of which, his authorities are happy to observe, he feels better with himself, when he attends, and guilty if he misses church. He knows people there, and may even enjoy an occasional service. Unfortunately for his educators, he now changes, we presume. He is bored and fidgety in church; people scowl at him. He does not get the blessings he especially wants. He is drawn to television, and wants to play baseball with the kids who do not go to church. Here are better rewards in his mind; though he has no doubt of God, God's command to "Worship Me in My House," does not get to him forcefully enough. He begins an argument with his educators that will go on for years.

What can be said of morality in this simple story? There is a great deal of moral training and moral response. The church and its religion are part of, and will always be part of the child's life. Unless he undergoes heavy secularization he will posses

hundreds of ethical views that are connected directly and indirectly with his religion. Almost none of them has come about through autonomous action, reasonable analysis, a survey of cases. The morals collect upon him like fuzz upon a rubbed glass rod.

I am saying merely what dozens of writers have said before me. With regard to practically all those who have practiced religion throughout history and today, the whole of religion may be regarded as a generally effective machine to structure a collection of behaviors and bring about their enforcement. The key to the ramshackle edifice is the reduction of cosmic, existential self-fear.

For all that religion has dominated the human world from its beginnings, its ethical results have been paltry. The one thing that is supposed to justify religion is precisely the thing that religion does worst, making the human a satisfactory ethical creature.

But it must be said that religion has forever assumed the most difficult of all tasks: supplying human existence with an objective morality. The problem is multiplex: how to deal with oneself, one's inner relations; how to deal with others; how to treat with the animate and inanimate world of nature. In the end, one is supposed to be able to say "ought" confidently, to live according to the same "ought," and to be happy. In all of this, one's morality ought to be consonant with the real world and its operating principles, science, that is. Hence, morality is the governance of behavior by rules for preferring and achieving certain human and natural relations and states of being.

Unfortunately the simplest, most general rules crack under the stress of psychology and anthropology. "Don't drive while drunk" is a reasonable rule. It should readily illustrate what Emmanuel Kant meant when he propounded his famous dictum: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

Yet Kant's rule, though it might work to his personal satisfaction, might bring about continual disasters if it were allowed to justify others, such as many suicidal and dying persons who would be pleased to have the whole world die with them. Even the drunk may a) deny that he cannot drive safely, b) suggest that everyone should enjoy a drunken drive from time to time, or c) suggest that drunken driving is a good way to play the necessary game of half-wishing self-destruction. If he does not express such ideas, it may be because he realizes that the police make no distinction between common drunks and drunk philosophers. But now we speak of authority, not Kantian rationalism.

If we ask what functions are performed by an ethical judgment, we get a more lively sense of this feeling. Feeling ethical, one praises or reprimands, one rewards and punishes another. This sometimes changes the behavior of the targets of such feelings in the direction desired by the moralist. More broadly, then, one exhibits a preference in order to arouse enthusiasm or indignation, to rally support. One raises an ethical feeling in order to determine a policy, and to get on with affairs in an orderly organized way. None of this would be done without our or someone's expression of value.

Subjectively, too, the very power to make an ethical judgment is a satisfaction in itself, which often is sufficient unto itself, regardless of consequences. To express one's feelings is in fact synonymous with giving vent to ethical judgments.

Alongside all of these functions is the one which religions stress but which very few people feel regularly, that is, to carry out the will of the gods or of the supernatural or fate or nature, because an ordinary resort to this function floods the sluiceways of personal and collective action; it is usually blocked very early in its manifestation. However, it can be the most powerful of all functions of ethical judgments, as we see in the Crusades, the Islamic conquests, or nowadays the rule over Iran by Khomeini.

We can agree. These are the functions of words. Man is irretrievably consigned to a life crowded with them. Morals are now a heap of functions as well as forces.

Thousands of unsuccessful moral philosophers attest to the frustrations abounding in the pursuit of morals. Voyaging to the Moon is less difficult than the problems of morally justifying the effort involved in the accomplishment. Nonetheless, all humans behave morally and always have. By moral behavior we mean acting one way rather than another because, among other reasons, one feels that it is right and good, and that not acting that way would be wrong and bad. This “feeling” is a “real” thing, physiologically compelling, with physical disturbance and mental states called frustration, indignation, anger, humiliation, and anxiety if the moral act is not performed and euphoria, satisfaction, and physical and mental relaxation if it is performed.

The easiest way to “solve” the moral question is to deny it, that is, to assert that people feel moral or immoral, right or wrong, in consequence of a heap of experience, commands, forces, and natural traits. There would be found in this heap no specific independent moral quality. Morality then is no more than what is in the definition above, “among other reasons.”

The only fault that I can find with this idea is that I do not like the way people behave, and I feel that I am not alone in this regard, so I wish to change people. But how do I extricate a moral principle from the heap? Why should anyone else care what I like or what I do not like, unless I had power to force compliance with my morals and they would do well to obey my rules, or else -- “lest you die ...” as Yahweh might say.

So I must search for “justification” of my morality (call it M). What is meant by justification?

- 1) What so appeals to those I wish to change (adopt my preference) that they change their a) attitude b) behavior c) both. That is, I manipulate them. Nothing here can be considered the satisfying “justification” which I seek. I

have, after all, used completely knowable means to warp their wills and minds (“applied social science”).

The forms of manipulation include: a) force; b) bribes; c) persuasion by symbols and propaganda, by example, by citing god, priests, scriptures; d) proof of advantages they derive *for* and *by themselves* (“ ‘x’ or ‘y’ is good for you”). They will feel better, look better, etc.; e) ‘logical’ proof (“If you want ‘x’ do ‘m’”).

But in all of this (M) remains unjustified (except the *word of God*, but which they dispute, hence, is unjustified); that is, I have no right to inflict (M), that is, to change others.

2) So I examine myself. How does it happen that I a) do not like their behavior (M), b) want to change it (M) and I find many causes (reasons) for a) and many causes for b) which boil down to material benefits, property, convenience, and control. All of these are without validity so I must go on. I also feel embarrassment, guilt at *their* behavior.

3) Why am I guilty when *they* behave so.

a. Identification: I feel that I am part of them and hence suffer their effects.

b. Projection: I feel that their motives are my own.

c. Self--punition: I feel guilt for them.

For all of this, I change them.

But why do I feel guilt?

a) Because I am trained to feel guilt.

b) Because I want to behave like them or did once and was punished or harmed.

c) Because of experience (e.g. “I let my younger brother behave so, and look at him now!”)

So none of these justify either!

4) I listen to *My god*, and don’t let them interpret god their way, and get support to suppress them.

But now my insight (still active) tells me I may be wrong re god.

Is there any other means of justification?

5) Can I now say, "What I want is what I want, and it is, at least, 'good' in that if I get it, I satisfy whatever it is that makes me want it."

Now what is it that I am satisfying?

- a) A psycho--physiological process of which there are several, viz.: damping of fear, extension of control (over self, over others), displacement of affect, identification, obsession (repetition), ambivalence;
- b) possessing one or more of, more wealth (things); affection; power; well--being (safety, health, strength); respect; skill (knowledge).

Thus everything said of 1) to 4) beforehand may in fact be the superstructure of 5) here.

6) The only way I can budge from this position of 5) which has established *my Basic Morality* is *by changing myself* so that another different or an altered want takes the place of (M). But, if M2 is substituted for M1 (no matter how little time or how long it takes) then I am changed and have *a different morality*.

7) What can cause this different morality (M₂)?

- a) Failure by resistance; b) accident; c) internal change (metabolism goes down, illness, different glandular flow, etc.)

8) Then I repeat M₂ with respect to the group of people whose actions I did not like before and go through 1) to 7) again.

9) Now is M₂ better than M₁ and will M₃ be better than M₂...M_n?

How would one know?

10) Suppose M_x has these subsequences or consequences? It is significantly easier to run through the process. Further, no change occurs when it is achieved in me, i.e.

$M_x = M_n$, the final value of morality.

11) Therefore, I settle upon M_x and practice M_x and all closely analogous $M_{x_{a..n}}$. This becomes in effect *my moral system* in regards to the class of behaviors we are discussing.

12) We note:

a) M_x is mine, but also other's moral system because we are effectively transacting within its rules!

b) The system is both *egoistic* and species-racial (social). It works. It can be mythicized, religified, philosophized.

In the sequence of events, 1) to 12) it will be noticed that all processes are explained in natural terms, as instances of well known and common psychological and social dynamics. The supernatural is involved on the level of such fictions, concepts, perceptions, and illusions as are usually encountered in human psychic and social transactions.

Moral demands, moral behavior, and moral struggle are occurring. Ethical resolutions and principles are evolving. But it is all happening without resort to a moral source existing and coming from beyond the act and process themselves.

Let us consider the choices of a typical person, Abel. We assume that he makes an average of 140 choices a day, and therefore roughly 50,000 in a year. They range in significance, for example, from deciding whether to brush one's teeth quickly or thoroughly, to whether or not to begin setting aside \$3000 a year towards the college education of a child. If it is argued that brushing teeth is hardly a moral or ethical issue, one can either argue in rebuttal or simply raise the threshold of a moral question by some criteria of significance that excludes brushing the teeth.

Where this latter point would commence is not easy to define. Perhaps it should be an issue which, whatever its subject, involves conscience, that is, a slight or larger factor of anxiety and guilt pursuant to an uncertain decision (if it were to be uncertain). Since we are being so speculative, we can presume to estimate also that 10% of the decisions will have such a guilt factor, giving a total number of about 4000 moral decisions per year, or about 13 per day.

Thus, one would count as containing the guilt factor: a choice of watching a television entertainment or doing school homework; drinking a second glass of whiskey or not; deciding how much money to put in the church collection box; whether or not to eat a gourmet garlic sauce before going on a blind date; slapping a child; etc. We shall not attempt a fine mathematical analysis of our typical citizen, Able, but merely assign him categories and percentages, basing the categories on the kinds of mentation occurring as the decision is made. (The classification is obviously slap--dash.)

*TYPES OF MORAL MENTATION BY HYPOTHETICAL
TYPICAL CITIZEN
(On Annual Basis)*

A. Practically automatic	40%	2000
B. Conscious, sloganized	20%	1000
C. Rationalized gibberish	15%	800
D. Carefully calculated	1%	50
E. Passionate, intuitive	5%	250
F. Troubled by aware internal conflicts	5%	250
G. Troubled by aware social conflict	6%	300
H. Flights of fancy, fantasy, solipsism	<u>7%</u>	<u>350</u>
	100%	5000

Thus, imagining one certain day in his life, Abel might make the following ethical choices:

<u>Moral Action</u>	<u>Type of Mentation Involved</u>
Withholding a child's allowance	F
Giving a seat to an elderly lady on the bus	A
Overcharging a tiresome client	E
Working a little overtime on his job	A
Fantasying adultery with an attractive woman	H
Buying a lottery ticket	A
Absorbing news of a friend's death	C
Angered by a newspaper article on crime	A
Explaining his preference for a politician	B
Commenting on an office quarrel	F
Wondering whether to bring home a cake	B
Deciding to be "sick" and not work one day next week	D
Signing a negative report on an employee	G

It happens, we say, that each of these decisions gave Abel a moral twinge; the other 117 moral choices did not. Other people will have different numbers, types, and intensities of moral action in a day's time. If one reads James Joyce's *Ulysses*, a fictional masterpiece on a day in the life of Leopold Bloom in Dublin, Ireland, taking up some hundreds of pages of print, we realize that we are probably greatly underestimating the profusion of ethical choices in a 24 hour period.

Yet I have no idea of the range, average, or typical kinds of moral actions in a day's time. People are called by those who know them "conscientious," "unconcerned," "busy--body," etc., words that must refer to the extent and types of their moral behavior, but the appropriate sample survey with what happens in moral discourse of the self with itself and others has very little resemblance to the kinds of problems analyzed by philosophers and imagined by most preachers and teachers. Bloom, the character, had, I guess, an unusually active mind and more conflicts to resolve by the nature of his background, romantic wife,

advertising work, avidity for many things in life, and continuous movement about the city.

Still, we have enough of exemplary material and a frame of reference to allow suggesting several points about moral mentation and action. The average life presents a great abundance of moral choices. The form of mentation employed before, after, and in the course of acting morally is largely absurd. What happens in moral discourse of the self with itself and others has very little resemblance to the kinds of problems analyzed by philosophers and imagined by most preachers and teachers. Only a small portion of it is related to science or theory except indirectly. Only a tiny percentage of a modernized population spends much moral energy on the divine, or on methodical calculation (unless it is one's paid job to do so).

In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Sigmund Freud points out the commonly known problem of ethics:

“that ill-luck -- that is, external frustration -- so greatly enhances the power of the conscience in the super-ego. As long as things go well with a man, his conscience is lenient and lets the ego do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls him, he searches his soul, acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances. Whole peoples have behaved in this way, and still do.”

He calls this an “original infantile state of conscience.”

“fate is regarded as a substitute for the parental agency. If a man is unfortunate, it means that he is no longer loved by this highest power; and, threatened by such a loss of love, he once more bows to the parental representative in his super--ego ---- a representation whom, in his days of good fortune, he was ready to neglect.”

Fate is looked upon as an expression of Divine Will. Fatalism is very strong in early religions and ethics. Why? The authorities and experts say: because primitive man was at the mercy of

savage natural forces. Still, if man were to be of the same ideological cast today, he would also be fatalistic because obviously, when one think of it, very little real control has been exercised over the immense and infinite area of difficulties besetting us. Rather, the change of attitude has come about as a result of changed ideology, *weltanschauung*, and this has changed because of a fairly long calm condition of the Earth and the skies, and the development of a progressive, free-will, uniformitarian (self-contradictory) philosophy. Perhaps the distinction between traditional sacral and modern secular man is that the former has not forgotten his primeval scenarios, whereas the latter has suppressed them very deeply and become overtly pragmatic.

John C. Caldwell wrote a memorandum, not formally published, on the Sahelian Drought of the 1970's. We take leave to quote him lengthily:

Fatalism

Fatalism is an unsuitable term because it can be used in two ways: to mean the rational acceptance by those living in a traditional society that they have little control over the forces affecting their lives; and to mean such a reluctance to attempt any control that they are more battered by such forces than need be the case.

The acceptance of the blows of fate is often so great in traditional society that it is difficult to measure the personal impact of disaster or even to discuss it properly. Often technical aiders give up the attempt and go to talk to other technical aiders who seem to speak the same language, and thereby sustain the conventional wisdom and often lose all chance of adding to worthwhile knowledge about the situation. Sometimes they wonder if they have been entirely misled about the reality of the position. In one of the few honest reports ever written on this question, a transport expert working intimately with the truck drivers bringing food relief in the recent Sahelian drought and having substantial contact with the rural population reported that at first none of the local population seemed ever to have heard of the drought; later he concluded that they felt it deeply and were taking rational steps to

minimize the hurt in ways they had known all their lives...In Yelwa, northwest Nigeria, it was reported that, "The Emir of Yauri and the Divisional Officer, head of the Local Administration, held that drought did not occur in Yelwa and that no problem with shortage of rains was extant". Even the farmers talked of locusts, weeds and lack of good lands as much as drought.

There are many reasons for this kind of reaction. One is that the matter is irrelevant to the outsiders, whose lives are demonstrably not affected by the climatic conditions. Another is a belief, held also by the outsiders, that nothing can be done to alter the weather. Actually this view is usually more rational still -- a feeling that the bad years are as much part of the totality of what must be experienced as the good years and that the lot of man is to bend with each wind. Such attitudes are embedded deep in the culture; they find religious expression and are reinforced by religion. In much of the savannah and desert of Africa, people take drought to be a necessary divine warning that religious and moral standards are slipping and that a revival is due. Drought provides assurance that Providence is paying attention and is still concerned. It indicates a need for religious leaders to intercede with God. If the drought is long and severe, resort will also be made to age-old methods, long predating Islam, for encouraging rain... From the Western Shael to Somalia drought and religious observations are deeply linked.. In profane literature and oral tradition references, the need for water [is] equally pervasive. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the common man is somewhat apprehensive about recalling the last drought or predicting the next one. The Yelwa survey reported that, although there was clear agreement about the nature and seriousness of drought, there was complete disagreement in the farmers' responses as to when the last one occurred and three-quarters did not wish to encourage bad luck (or to trespass into the domain of Allah) by suggesting that one would ever again occur...

Not only is the origin of drought either divine or in any case not to be influenced by Man, but so is death -- a proposition that is still true over most of the Shael most of the time. Western doctors working in the drought refugee camps were disturbed when the mothers of dying children seemed to be more concerned about obtaining cloth to serve as shrouds for their dead or dying babies than they

appeared to be about the fact of death itself. Their reaction were partly explained by the fact that the babies had symptoms which have always presaged death in the savannah. Part, too, was the religious conviction that the babies were being called away and had been destined at this time to leave the world (the Fulani express it as the child wanting to go.) These are not societies in which determined efforts are likely to be made to counter the condition of an apparently dying child or indeed to prevent the births of children. Urbanization and other types of economic modernization ultimately lower child mortality both by providing greater health services and by convincing people that one can and should intercede with the forces that determine children's sickness and death.

We see how sacral man confronts secular problems and converts them into forms amenable to sacred solutions.

The thousands of cultures existing in historical time and space have given us a fair sample of the ideal and practical ethical capabilities of religion. The experience on the whole has been unimpressive to one looking for a happy human way of life. The more one trusts to religion, it seems, the less good one can obtain from science and politics. On the other hand, science in itself (that is, science which is entirely positive and empirical) is quite helpless to address the moral perplexities of man.

Politics, moreover, has, if anything, a poorer record than religion, speaking now of politics as a secular approach to human issues; for politics tends by itself to depend upon sheer physical force to order a population, and systematic violence is hardly an improvement upon whatever chicanery and delusions historical religions employ to rule a people. Would one have preferred to be governed by the barons or by the monks of the European Middle Ages, by the warlords or by the Shinto and Buddhist priests of Old China, by the shaman or by the priest, by Aaron or by Joshua? And, today in America, if the lawyers, lobbyists, and military contractors were replaced in the ruling circles and representative assemblies of the country by ministers, priests, and the religiously devout, would the country be better governed, its people more peaceable, mentally healthy,

and prosperous? Would one prefer to be governed by the Shah of Iran or the Ayatollah Khomeini?

The questions are difficult, enormously complicated, and perhaps biased. Still they are worth considering if only as a means of suggesting that ethical progress in a society is not to be identified with its secularization. The key to good governance is an ethical system beyond facile contrivance. Neither religion nor secularism, as such, promises success.

Even though it may be true that our morals come in a tangled concatenation, the human could scarcely accept the fact. One whose overriding aim is self-control and control over the world will refuse to recognize in a garbage pile his towering morality. This in itself would seem to prove him a moral failure -- shifty, gutless, inconsistent, contradictory (all that he really is, someone might comment). He feels that there must be an absolute, pure source of right conduct somewhere, and is all too ready to find and proclaim one, even an impostor.

Yet occasionally the human becomes ashamed of living a lie and hates himself and hates his religion and gods for having created his dependency upon delusions. He admires the "honesty" of the bear, the trout, the dog; they are not of two minds and forked tongue. Why cannot his morality be so straightforward?

Blame part of it upon his obsession with history, his compulsion to repeat his worst experiences. He demands that his morality today be that of five thousand years ago. He demands that it be of the highest order: We know what that means; it must come from Heaven. Further he demands that all people share in an ecumenical morality. The logical and sociological impossibility of both demands will not deter him. He is implacable. He will not pluck his morals from a garbage heap.

What can the scientist counsel? Try as they might, the anatomist and physiologist cannot separate a pig and a man far enough for comfort. The biologist, try as he may, cannot

worship an arrangement derangeable by an unseen particle, and a lucky hit out of hundreds of millions of spermatozoa. Try if he would, the anthropologist could not work up an agitation over adulterous intercourse and let the commandment be written down by the hand of a god. Nor can the geologist see in an awful blasted out crater more than a crashing meteoroid. Nor the astronomer see more than a vast number of worlds in just that, a vast number of worlds: it seems that the gods, too, have a compulsion to repeat. No, the scientists cannot appease their consciences and man's sacrality with any consistency.

Besides providing people with morality, it is said, religion puts them directly in touch with the supernatural realm. For the mass of people this is untrue, just as it is that their religion gives them some special ethical competence. A few practitioners must enjoy the facilities for communion with the spiritual universe which churches and temples provide. The mass media (motion pictures especially) and drugs, as T. Leary has eloquently argued along with others, and, too, many gurus, seances, and non--church rites provide this type of communion.

The supernatural is hard to distinguish from political illusions and fictions. To the practitioners of scientific method, a devotee of astrology and a political fascist share several features. Both analyze the present state of world and personal affairs, and gain confidence and make predictions on the basis of their beliefs. Knowing that a person is an astrologist or, on the other hand, a fascist, enables the social psychologist to assert and predict with high probability that each will possess certain attitudes. The fascist believes in his leader as the possessor of semi--divine qualities, a superman. He has a warped conception of history and the future (according to our scientists). The astrologist believes his astrologer has access to supernatural knowledge; he, too, has a warped conception of the path of history and the future. Both types are paranoiac in believing that a great deal of what is really happening in the world is concealed by the establishment or conspiratorial powers.

The far departure from reality in both cases may have little to do with their success in life. General knowledge and matter-of-

factness are only loosely connected with achievement in society. The belief of both the astrologist and the fascist in the supernatural lends each a confidence denied to less convinced persons; self-confidence is in many life situations more of an asset than knowledge of the situation. Whereas the ordinary human is only schizotypical, these two tend more towards the schizophrenic.

We seem to be at an impasse, owing to my downgrading of the creative moral and spiritual functions of historical religion. Supernaturalism appears to be all manner of anti-scientific folly. Morality exists concerning countless particulars in human activities, even while neither religion nor secularism can justify its source, hence their application.

We see no easy solution, perhaps none at all. Later on, we may offer some grounds to justify a relatively absolute" morality, meaning by this verbal barbarism some unchanging moral propositions that are themselves changing. If one might conceive of a religion that is an integrated whole, accommodates change easily, and that does not fundamentally and continuously violate the controls and benefits supplied by science, then this religion may not only be superior but also popular.

Does this mean that morality is human and mundane, part of an endless process going on in millions of transactions every day everywhere? Yes. Does it mean that the supernatural, the divine, the gods are not the source of morality, that ethics exists without religion? Yes. Does it mean that mankind is morally sui generis and autonomous? Yes.

Does it mean that humans are "immoral" and "wicked," with no means of setting ethical standards? No. Does it mean that the supernatural, all that is divine and sacred, has no effect upon ethical behavior? No.

The supernatural, as non--knowledge, is knowledge of a sort. Those who transact or seek to transact with the supernatural in order to think upon the divine, engage in an ideational relation

with the divine, and are affected by the knowledge which we possess of the divine. They will behave differently than those who deny the supernatural and avoid it.

Religion, to put it in commonplace language, can make people better. It should be the “right” kind of religion, and, of course, this would be the form we are here advocating: self--aware, open, relativistic, non--historical, connected with the sciences of natural and socio--psychological processes, non--anthropomorphic morphologically, anthropomorphic structurally. Let us see what science is doing that is religiously relevant and can be adapted to religion.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN SCIENCE

Out of religion came politics and then science, each reacting upon the others while going its own way. Science is a set of interests that is religiously, socio--politically, and autonomously determined. Science struggles to conform to a scientific method in whatever it does. The struggle lends it its distinction, providing it with its social character. Without the method, it is useless to speak of science. The method is applied to whatsoever extension of the senses is of interest and controls such extension; both operations sometimes fail but also often succeed in our day.

A scientific procedure typically puts forth a hypothesis about what is measurably expected to occur under certain conditions, and, by finding or producing the conditions, finds or produces the event. Wherever conditions permit, these are produced under controls; wherever they occur naturally, they are overseen as strictly as possible. No place is allowed in theory for supernatural conditions or supernatural effects, that is, for the intervention so factors that are undefinable in material terms, or of an external ungovernable will.

As Alexander Hamilton quipped, when Benjamin Franklin suggested prayer at an impasse while composing the American Constitution in 1787, we should not call upon the help of a foreign power. Hamilton, intending for politics what Franklin had already practiced in electrical experiments, had in mind a republic whose behavior might be predictable when certain regular operating conditions were established by its structure.

The incident reminds us that science includes social as well as natural science. Humans are a material factor in the one, if not

in the other; they are a contaminating factor in both. The human factor has so continually disturbed the scientific method in its application to natural phenomena that, in a sense, all science becomes social science, especially as the material conditions of study become more difficult and less amenable to continuous ordinary sense observation. We cannot go here into the progressive discoveries of the intervention of anthropo--sociology and especially psychology in the workings of natural science, citing the works of P.W. Bridgman and others, but we can, without fear of rebuttal, warn of the inevitable effects upon experimenters and researchers of their psychological as well as physical presence amidst the supposedly materially and logically observer -- proof conditions of scientific work.

Already, then we have to be on the alert, in all that passes as science--applying--scientific--method, so as to detect the interest that inspires the work and to discern the sometimes exceedingly subtle intervention of the mind in the process of discovery, proof, and disproof. The "interest" in a scientific task may range from the most banal, obvious, and limited (e.g. to polish better a lens so as to see stars more clearly; to adjust the angle of a spade to bite the ground with less energy input) to the general and ideological, that is, unconscious (e.g. to validate evolution by setting up hypotheses implying or excluding neo--darwinian evolution; to calculate pre--historical sky charts by retrocalculating or presumptively modifying present motions of the Earth and Solar system).

The aggregation of "outside" interests creates a continual uneasiness in scientific work; like barnacles on a fine yacht, it keeps science from being "clean;" but the barnacles are part of life at sea: no barnacles, no sailing. We may sympathize with scientists who call up their psychic mechanisms of unconscious denial by indignation at the idea that they may be skirting the supernatural, or, worse, serving the supernatural, or by backing up into ever narrow slips of material phenomena where it is hoped that none can say that anything but sense data are implicated in their work. The search for a body of pure science, however, like the search for the Golden Fleece, eventuates in taking aboard a witch with the long--sought prize, and Jason

and his Argonauts must move on evermore in unrelenting adventure.

The main theories of astronomy are as remote from experience as to be spooky. Astronomers walk on a tightrope between science and religion, depending upon a few principles that are empirically formulated to keep the field aloft as a science. The most that astronomers can say empirically is that much of the universe, including fortunately most of the solar system, exhibits some large uniformities of behavior. As soon as they retroject or project by thousands of years they become vulnerable, that is, unbelievable.

The theories include largely a set of Newtonian laws that are fading fast and may soon be abrogated, and which serve to fire projectiles from the Earth in the direction of objects in space, such that, by deft *ad hoc* maneuvering, arrive on target. Otherwise, they boast La Place's mathematical explanations, which La Place himself declared to be dependent upon uniformitarian premises. Then there occur various ways of measuring brilliance, heat, distance, chemistry, speed, and chronology of heavenly bodies, which are hopeful speculations, thanklessly spared from all but an iota of factual proof, leaning upon one another for support but also begging each other's question.

So great, however is faith in the one "law of falling bodies" that all else passes as science simply because, as I said, the proof of science is the scientific method, and all of astronomy, by this time, has become couched in scientific form. That some of the more famous astronomers and related scientists of these decades -- Urey, Hoyle, Wickramasinghe, Crick, T. Gold, and Sagan, the name only several, have toyed with bizarre theories impermissible to laymen, acknowledges the essential fragility and defensive posture of the field.

Nowadays an astronomer, provided that he has an appropriate university degree, can profess the Doppler Effect, Bode's Law, intelligence in other worlds, the "Big Bang", the La Place theorems, empty space, straight lines, exact solar time and motions, and a dozen other mostly conventional concepts. Whatever the

mix, it is apparently unsystematic, unreliable, ad hoc, and temporary. If scientists lay claim to authority on grounds that such a mix is true and fully representative of reality, they can deny a “union card” to whoever disturbs the mix. If, however, they place claims of authority in the procedures of scientific method, then they must give a respectful hearing to any educated person who seeks to establish an identity for Plato’s “divine animal” in the universe or to prove empirically any number of such hypotheses.

The same kind of reasoning can be directed at biology and geology. Basic conventional theories in both of these areas of study are weak and straining at the point of collapse into disintegration, if not supernaturalism. No more than physics can define energy other than by fiction, operations and hypothesis, can biology define life. Fringe life forms are several, with subatomic behavior, crystals, and viruses providing initial confusion, and sending practitioners to more comfortable empirical fields to work. Ethology is rampant in the fields distinguishing among animals. Evolutionary theory is a shambles; “natural selection” is invoked as often as God in the Bible, but it is an embarrassment to do so.

The Earth Sciences, like the other fields, are making many advances to which the name “revolutionary” is increasingly applied with some pride. Yet two of their greatest operational concepts -- that of time and that of uniformitarian change -- are in peril. They invest much hope in radiochronometry to preserve long time spans and therefore smooth out curves of change, but, as I have explained elsewhere, radiochronometry is based upon radioactivity which is affected by the kind of history that it claims to prove; that is, catastrophe destroys time even while time pretends to disprove catastrophe.

Psychology and anthropology include so many variations of methodology that discerning the supernatural in them is not difficult; only the naive can persistently believe that variant methods are independent of moral perspectives, simply grasping the struggling corpus by a toe instead of its nose. Every psychological or anthropological “school” is a

supernatural sect, whether it seeks to confront the supernatural or turn its back to it.

But, although moral and supernatural, science in itself is not capable of justifying human action; it cannot even justify its own. The myth that it can, which was exposed as soon as science was mature enough to bear the truth, lives on like any other supernatural belief, lending motivation, inflaming passions, claiming moral credits, inspiring lives, and narrowing thought and options. Probably, too, many scientific secularists labor in the hope that something marvelous and morally convincing will grow out of their work, as penicillin emerged serendipitously from a mold.

Willy-nilly all sciences, in their healthy vigor, are wrestling with the supernatural and contributing to its expansion thereby. In this sense, all sciences are addressing the foundations of religion and theology. The more scientific work that is performed, the more areas of uncontrollability and contradiction come upon the stage. Science itself is the biggest factory of the supernatural. It tears holes in the fabrics extending reality. It works all the while surrounded by amateurs of the supernatural and theologians, pelted by derision. Perhaps one might forecast the most esteemed and influential religion of the future by locating the contemporary cult that is closest to the anomalies and radical new interests of science.

Theology can be a science, whether it be formulated as pure or as applied science. As the latter, it can be called religious science, or, simply, religion, just as certain departments of political science in American universities call themselves departments of politics (New York University) or departments of government (Harvard University), both of these terms meaning applied political science. A proposition (hypothesis) in theology might then read: "All cultures denominate historical gods."

We suppose that this proposition, empirically tested, may eventuate with exceptions, such as the Buddhists or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and possibly several other totalitari-

an socialist regimes. Then, if we wish, we may restate the proposition, as some have, to include “pseudo--gods,” saying that “a god includes a figure with 3,4. .n attributes of which at least ‘x’ have to be present to permit the designation ‘god’ to be used.” Hence certain cultures have figures such as Lenin or Mao Tse Tung who possess at least ‘x’ attributes, while others have celestial figures that border upon gods such as Region ‘A’ in China where “Heaven” (Ti’en) is accorded at least ‘x’ traits of a god, and still others elevate masters and gurus to the stature of Mohamet.

We perceive that the pure proposition is heading in a certain direction and that by the manipulation of the definition of the term “god,” certain areas of empirical research are opened up, and, furthermore, that some hidden intent may even be present, such as to demonstrate the ineradicability of the worship of gods.

A related proposition in applied theology or religion can continue to illustrate the nature of theology and at the same time show how applied propositions formulate matters often more transparently, from the viewpoint of ideological research. Thus, one says: “To disestablish gods of traits ‘a...n’ including ‘g’ and ‘h’ it is necessary to establish a totalitarian regime with semidivine figures of traits ‘a...n’ less ‘g’ and ‘h’.”

So elementary an introduction will hardly persuade anyone of the profundity and possibilities of theology as a science. The reader may be justifiably impatient to hear what theology can do with propositions of the supernatural. He may be wanting to know whether the supernatural exists, for example, and how the science of theology proves this.

One ought not be evasive; nevertheless, it must be pointed out, in anticipation of the answer to this question, that no science pretends to answer impossible questions, even though these may be scientifically formulated and studied. Medicine has few researchers (perhaps one--ten thousandth of its energies?) given over to the long--term prolongation of human life, although this may be a strong interest of the public. Nor are many

astrophysicists preoccupied with voyages of a duration greater than a few seconds of a light--year. Nor are many political scientists or psychologists devoted to the attainment of utopias. That is, one can conceive of a flourishing science of theology that concerns itself hardly at all with proving hypotheses on the existence of the supernatural (and, indeed, may flourish for that very reason, just as chemistry flourished only after it stopped seeking for an Elixir of Life and to transmute lead into gold).

So warned, we can put forward a proposition that deals with the central interest that many people have in religion. One may hypothesize thus: "The spiritual, defined as any event contradicting existing laws of science relating to materiality, and probably nonreproducible by known scientific procedures does (or does not) exist." I see no objection to arguing that this statement is scientific. For instance, let us suppose that a person claims to achieve a certain vision, that no one else can see. ("No one" here means nobody in a large random sample of a population to which the visionary belongs.)

Suppose an adept in drug--use demonstrates that 'X' percent of the population, to whom a certain drug is administered, claim the same vision as 'A.' The vision is therefore proven to be possible, although not proven to deal with real objects. A scientific explanation of 'A' is not forthcoming, even though the state of 'A' is reproducible. Theology takes in consequence the position that the vision itself is actual, that 'A' and possibly some other rare persons are capable of it, and that many others can attain it upon taking the certain drug. Obviously we are not faced with a powerful proof of the existence of the supernatural.

But suppose that 'A' reports that this vision is of a vaguely defined human form who tells him "You shall see my power at Bunting Green Airport in 48 hours." Two days later a plane crashes at said airport. This has happened while a quarter of the large sample has been taking the drug and many of these had images predicting dire events at the same airport or some airport at roughly the same time. It would not require many cases of this sort to prove the validity of this type of supernaturalism (the type is very commonly asserted in legends,

mythology, and religious documents, as, e.g., when Yahweh tells Moses to fetch the Elders on the Holy Mountain to be near The Lord and they come and do see the Lord. (*Exodus 24*)

However, if one were a foundation grants officer he might give money to the “control group drug study” as described, but not in any expectation of a resulting byproduct such as the air crash prediction. For he would be warned by practically every alert and informed person that cases such as this occur only insofar as visionary figures make predictions and that the predicted events practically never occur. If you cannot expect definite and defensible results from it, you should not grant funds to a project. Never mind the appeal that to prove god at work once in a million projects is enough.

Suppose yet another type of proposal comes before the foundation. This asserts that, “Totemism in religion functions to repress human creativity, while anthropomorphism in religion increases it.” The applicant conjectures simply that if people imitate an animal, even in imaginary behaviors, they will not become very clever, whereas if they imitate an equally fictional superman, they will become more clever. “Imitation” is, of course, defined and measured operationally as part of religious totemism and anthropomorphism, as are the concepts “totemism,” “anthropomorphism,” and “creativity.”

Whatever the results of such an inquiry, which is highly relevant both to anthropology, where pre-existing theories of the origins of totemism amount to over forty, and to theology, where, whether or not one believes in the well-nigh universal anthropomorphism, it is useful to know how it functions in the social structure, they are relevant to main lines of investigation in these fields and *a priori* must be useful.

Our imagined foundation is not likely to look so kindly, however, upon another proposal which crosses its threshold proposing to show that A) Moses’ monotheism is anti-democratic and B) leads to politically harmful ideas of the supernatural among persons steeped in its learning. If government-financed and American, the foundation might

decide that support for the program might be liable to court action on grounds that it violated the constitutional guarantee against abridgment of the freedom of religion, even though the argument might be advanced that the Constitution has the right to discover and protect itself against potential enemies.

A private scientific foundation would probably decide that the study would bring in no valid or useful results. The probable pro-Moses trustees would also determine that such a study is not scientific, even if the word “harmful” were replaced by several categories of consequences, empirically verifiable and undeniably relevant, such as “proneness to belief in charismatic authority,” “totalitarian,” “highly ethnocentric,” and “highly aggressive and non--conciliatory.”

Perhaps the term “anti-democratic” might escape similar close scrutiny, although quite vague and usually meaningless as employed; here again, the proponents of the research would no doubt advance empirical indicators, such as scoring high in attitude test of tolerance, respect for discussion, consultation with others, compromise in decision-making, belief that opposing views may be right, and relative immunity from paranoia and hallucinations.

In sum, expertly espoused, the project could rebut all attacks against its scientificity, and certainly would transport scientific method into the core materials of theology. But it would be unlikely to win support. Generally speaking, scientific investigations have scarcely been employed in the field of theology proper. To the degree that theology in a given setting could be studied scientifically, it is deprived of the means, the intervening variable being indifference. This can be promptly and cheaply demonstrated by examining the articles in standard encyclopedias having to do with the field and those who have worked in it. What is to be observed, creeping into the area from its fringes, are studies in anthropology, ethnology, sociology, political sociology, and psychology, few of which ever gain entry except through works such as Mircea Eliade’s in the history of religion or works carrying a favorable attitude

(from the standpoint of the market in ideas) such as Henri Bergson's and Teilhard de Chardin's or Hans Kung's.

A group of scholars working in the area with an approach termed "creation science" have developed their own audience and market. Their efforts to correlate natural history with sacred scripture qualify for the field of theology, too, and there is nothing un-scientific about quoting words attributed to Elohim or anyone else as a hypothesis for testing human or natural history. One would not refuse as the hypothesis for the study of, say, American politics (1965--80), or of history generally, a quotation attributed to an historian, Harold Acton, "All power tends to corrupt; absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely." One would however have to assure himself of the usual criteria: that "power," "absolute" and "corrupt" are operationally defined, and empirical indicators or measures provided for them.

When certain scholars determine to test the veracity of the Bible by quoting therefrom "God said to Noah... I will bring down a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh in which is the breath of life from under heaven; everything that is on the earth shall die," and plan to adduce evidence from natural history of such a deluge, they are certainly proposing an ambitious project. And to qualify as scientists, they must clarify precisely, hypothetically, the extent of the destruction that is mentioned and its main instrument, a watery deluge, then validate by geological and ethnological evidence the occurrence of this particular flood (as distinct from a series of floods, etc.) And they would have to eschew any direct test of whether in fact the conversation took place between Elohim and Noah, because it is unverifiable. Most scientists would be logically compelled to accept a properly drafted study proposal of this type as belonging to the realm of scientific work.

Some scholars, gripped in the avoidance mechanism previously alluded to, would deny the relevance of any study whatsoever that would tend to confirm a scriptural statement. When one examines an encyclopedia such as the *Britannica* which assigns millions of words to theological matters and many more

millions to geology and ancient history, with only a dozen paragraphs treating the deluge issue, whether as an issue or as a disputable event, and when one considers that the deluge problem has agitated all generations of man everywhere since the beginning of history and before, one is inclined to ask, at least in this instance: “Who is the more biased against science: the creation scientists accepting scientific terms, or the editors of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* avoiding the subject unconsciously?”

Waiving the question, whose intent is obviously polemical, one may note once again how important is the matter of “interests” and the motives for such interests in science. The choice of subjects for hypothesis and study is obviously crucial in human culture and welfare, and yet has little to do with scientific method but much to do with the meaningfulness of science. And what is “meaning”? And who shall determine it?

“Meaning” is certainly among the most profound questions of philosophy and theology. “Why do we exist?” “What is our destiny?” If scientists choose to interest themselves, or are forced to occupy themselves with research on the advertising of commodities and with the perfection of weapons of destruction, to the extent say of ten thousand times the efforts put into the most meaningful questions of human existence, then they can hardly complain that the profound questions are overvalued.

One is led, therefore, to suggest that the supernatural is a proper and major concern for scientists, even if successes in the field come hard and require that they conduct humbling investigations of themselves. Perhaps a tithe of ten per cent of one’s scientific energies and resources to theology is in order, and a similar tithe to the basic needs of humanity in regard to a basic minimum material subsistence, a basic possibility of gaining life experience through free movement and education, and a basically equal access to disinterested justice in all situations of conflicts of desire or interest. For, in this latter regard, scientific effort is also hugely biased against giving itself over to just those problems that render mankind incapable of an adequate material substratum of meaningfulness.

It is from the basic desire for new experience that the interest in the supernatural emerges. To stunt it, by allowing it a meaningless diet according to the scientific method, is a form of deliberate, if unconscious, deprivation, just as much as to stunt it by forcing it into obsessive narrow ritual which has nothing to do with scientific method.

Under such circumstances, it becomes ironical indeed to speak of “meaningless” propositions, as many modern logical positivist philosophers call considerations of the supernatural, for it is precisely against their “meaningless” reductionism that religious man is rebelling. “Words” are important in thought, but to carve them down into nothingness except as they have rigid and narrow denotations is but an unconscious method of assuring that the thought that occurs is to be equally rigid and narrow.

The kind of person who is then to be fashioned out of the raw material of *homo sapiens schizotypus* comes to depend upon only very limited mechanisms of fear-control, to wit, obsessed and catatonic behavior according to scientific rules, with a limited capacity for displacement of the selves of a person, a limited ability to identify the selves with the larger human and natural world, a severely suppressed ambivalence turning back upon the self, and a general lack of animation of the psyche. Surely this is not the intent of science, which only hopes to use words instrumentally and to solve otherwise impossible problems by a sure-fire method; but it does tend to be the effect of science when science exceeds its logical limits, demands to be “pure,” and goes so far as to restrict its own method to areas guaranteed not to possess deep human meaning.

We can take up two attitudes in the face of the threat posed by many scientists to human development. One is that scientists are bound to fail in this method of coping with man’s essential madness. “Just be patient; the movement will collapse from its inherent weaknesses,” and indeed scientists do feel an overpowering weakness, and ensuing exasperation, when human cultures fail to embrace their interests and techniques or,

worse, fashion crazy worlds of science fiction to dwell in while waiting for science to solve all problems without the aid of politics or religion.

A second attitude, much to be preferred, is to encourage science in every way possible to examine itself and proceed to the examination of human nature, upon whose basic mechanisms science, politics, and religion must ultimately depend. What must this human being be fed to keep him creative and within bounds? The answer may be scientific theology. Bring together all that science is producing, half-consciously, in the way of theological findings and blend them into an integrated metaphysics, the whole of which addresses, not “mythical” or “rational” man, but the operative *homo sapiens schizotypus*.

I have examined human mental structure and operations in other works, so am permitted to relate here only the central relation of religion and science, and of this most clues are already familiar to the reader. Science emerges from the limited but most significant ability of the human mind to capture pragmatically, that is, to control, the connections between the person and an immense world of identifications and displacements. From his very beginnings, mankind has identified and sought to control the heavens and the gods, the mountains and oceans, the plants and animals. No other being on Earth is so ambitious; all others are confined to such rational activity as instinct requires for the purpose of survival and propagation.

The human mind, disordered by genesis and at birth, has the immense problem of extending pseudo-instinctive (that is, voluntary) controls over connections with existence that have very little to do with survival and propagation. The human, for instance, will sacrifice (both in the functional and symbolic senses) everything -- food, family, sex, lesser powers, safety -- in his efforts to command the skies.

Furthermore, besides the skies, there is many another realm of being that he is compelled by his mind to deal with, an infinite set of realms it seems, even though his mind, we must

remember, is assisted by only moderately competent sensory organs, so that he is encumbered in his ingesting, questing, and adjusting.

So the need to order one's head requires that the cosmos be set in order, and it is natural for one to apply the pragmatic(scientific)techniques that substitute for instinct in the obtaining of both very close necessities and the most faraway necessities, and hence the elaboration of science out of immediate pragmatism occurs on both the intimate material level and the cosmic level.

Science is a human activity and therefore can be characterized as such, no less than religion is a human activity. It has a history, a sociology, a sub-culture, a psychology. It exhibits struggle, cooperation, ambition, failure, success, inducements -- payoffs and penalties, a total range of material subjects to study, just as religion is subject of study, by the scientific method. It has religious and political aspects. It deals in authority, fictions, myths, claims, anomalies, rituals, and hypotheses, all of which are perilously reminiscent of religion and the supernatural. And, of course, to distinguish it especially from all other social activities, it is obsessed with the secular ritual of scientific method, and tends to extend the practice to all spheres of life.

The basic rite of scientific method is similar everywhere. But there come into being elaborations, embellishments, and variations of the basic rite. Some scientists like to think of the changes in naming, conceptualization, procedures, research interests, and so on as "progress" or at least "different ways of looking at the same thing." Other scientists know that they are in the grip of fashion and fads, whether in astronomy or geology, psychology or sociology. Magic, cultism, and other overtones, usually sounded and noticed in religious practice, can be heard in any science.

Every science must have a supernatural auxiliary. I would call it a suprascience, if such a term would not offend. I mean that the science itself consists of a stripped-down method and its find-

ings, and that there must form around it not only a halo or encrustation of fictions, hypotheses, and non-rically derived speculations, but also an attitudinal complex, rather like a system of illusions and delusions, or like a ruling formula (a term which Gaetano Mosca applied to the field of political science).

This auxiliary suprascience functions as a propaganda machine to make the science appear to its practitioners and public as continuously worthwhile, to tie it non--empirically into various problem areas of life, to act as a lightning rod (I will not argue whether lightning rods really are effective against lightning) to dissipate attacks gathering against the field, to give the field a history (much of it pseudo--history) and a future (much of the genre of science fiction).

As political science is impossible to consider without its ruling formulas (elites, democracy, kingship, laissez--faire, militarism, etc.), so astronomy cannot exist unaccompanied by schools of astrology, or geology without forms of uniformitarianism, or economics without models of "economic man," or literary analysis without fads and fashions, or medicine without magic and homeopathy, or chemistry without suprasciences, one or more for each of its numerous subdivisions such as diets alongside food chemistry, drug cultures alongside drugs, aesthetics alongside plastics, and so on.

There is no fakery here; there is strict necessity; man lives in the skies as well as in his hovel; culture marches along all paths and all paths are psychically connected, even when, especially in a scientific and pragmatic age, they may be, by an effort of will, separated for specialized solutions.

Under these circumstances, man lives throughout the cosmos, effectively. He lives pragmatically in the cosmos that he can experience and command through sensory manipulation. He lives mentally (and, by ritual, pragmatically) in the cosmos that is beyond experiencing but which he can imagine and bring into order. We may fancy that Jesus of Nazareth would speak this parable:

A woman of the mountains saved her money to buy a rain cloak, for she was often wetted by the rains there, and when she had sufficient she ventured to Jerusalem to buy a cloak. But the cloak was so beautiful, that she would not wear it, so as to preserve it, and all her clothing became wet and damaged. Now I say unto you, wear your beautiful cloak of religion and all of your other clothing will be saved, and your Father in Heaven will replace your rain cloak with the raiment of angels.

Reason, many theologians and secularists pray, will serve religion, and show a person what is good and bad in religion. So, if there is bad religion, it is because men do not use their reason to find the good, or they exercise their free will to choose to do bad with religion.

Rationalism is thus used in two ways to damage religion. First, it becomes secular and refutes most or all religious pretension, as with Voltaire and Marx. Second, and more important here because it is a lesser known argument, rationalism erodes religion because it claims that mankind, possessed of the gift of telling what is “true” religion from what is “false” religion, only needs to be educated to distinguish “truth” in order to pursue true religion.

Thus the problems of religion can be said to be solved by the independent pursuit of the principles of reason with regard to supernatural beings and rituals. In this second situation, the rationalist theologians, counting here Saint Thomas Aquinas insofar as he is Aristotelian and rationalistic, lend themselves to the continuation of evil in the name of religion; for evil becomes the result of ignorance and neglect of reason.

Reason, as conceived in traditional and conventional philosophy and theology, presumes “free will.” Free will is considered as the endowment of human nature with the capacity to choose one out of two or more alternative options as the basis for action upon an issue. Thus, employing reason, a choice of good over evil is imposed by free will, and an opposite decision becomes a free choice of evil. It is this “free

will” which has been used in many cultures to explain the harsh effects of religion. Man is wicked and is therefore punished by his gods; by no means can the wickedness be blamed on the gods.

This argument would appear to constitute an imposing defense of traditional religion and may even explain why all other life activities are dealt with by the principles of rationalism and free will (rather than the other way around). If so, it is one more important indication of the extent to which the religious sphere permeates and dominates the structure and operations of the other seemingly separated spheres of life.

Actually, the belief in free will can be viewed as a primary obstacle to the improvement of religion. Not only does it make of man in his own eyes a wicked sinner, much more fearful of the gods, the authorities, and the people around him than he would otherwise be, hence aggravating his natural paranoia, ambivalence, and hostility to others. But it also makes it impossible for man to govern himself; for he believes that he has within him, quite divorced from the really essential set of mechanisms according to which he behaves, the ability at any time to change himself from good to bad and from bad from bad to good.

Furthermore, the “bad” and “good” are themselves applied in the religious sphere often quite apart from any connections which they might have with the other spheres of life. “Free will,” and rationalism as well, are fantastically individualistic fictions. They permit the dissociation of an individual decision from all that in fact determines, and should determine, the decision. Neither a balky donkey nor the gods themselves can prevent man’s exercising his will upon them to turn along his way.

By contrast, the theory of *homo schizo* holds that man derives his religion from the same set of mechanisms whence he derives all his religion, from the same set of mechanisms whence he derives all his other interests and activities. One cannot allow the concepts of free will and rationalism to enter.

All of human behavior considered as a mind transacting within himself and throughout the medium of his culture is of one piece, holistic.

Free will is no longer, if it ever was, a useful idea. The known and experienced deviations or range of choice available to us is large enough, whether determined or free, to allow for extremely diverse decisions.

Now see what this theory of *homo schizo* does to the status of the supernatural and of religion. It elevates their status, rather than depressing it. But, more than that, it makes sacred and religious man impregnable to separatistic assaults upon his religion. For he can say and he can prove, or others can do this for him, that even if his religious aspects are suppressed, he will be different only in those particulars where a transference occurs, from the prohibited areas of religion, to the permitted secular areas.

Religious man can further declare that the elimination of religion does not eliminate evil, but merely introduces more evil to other quarters of human behavior. And he can heap up evidence showing that secularized societies and secularized man have shown no noticeable improvement in conduct denominated as good.

Until we decide who we are and what we want to be, we are at fault in what we are and want to do. Unless we shut the doors against all unwanted conduct from all spheres of life, shutting the door against religion in the hope of stopping all unwanted conduct is futile; it will enter by the other doors. As well as saying that religion cannot be suppressed, and as well as stating that much of religion behavior is true both in itself and in reconciliation with science, we are now prepared to say that the suppression of religion will not consign evil beyond man's ken. For that great task, a reconstruction of human nature is required.

Such a reconstruction may well be impossible. We do not know enough yet to define the terms of reform. What we can do at this stage of our study is to argue for the incorporation into reli-

gion of our findings, both to prepare the ground for the possible coming reconstruction and to maintain the best possible, the least damaging, of religious as well as of all other systems.

The problem of absolute morality -- of the standards of good conduct and the means to practice it -- must go unsolved here. Absolute morality may be forever beyond human abilities to demonstrate. Short of this, we resort to what many philosophers before us have advocated, a natural law of human behavior: How people have always behaved and seem compelled to behave is restructured so that the consequences which people seem always to have wanted -- even when acting in contradiction -- will ensue.

Since we do not appeal to gods, reason, or secular authorities, nor to charism, faith, and revelation, it would appear best to label our natural law as hypothetical, tentative, and only so good as its consequences are acceptable to most people, whether educated or not, in all cultures. This might be called a natural moral consensus.

To summarize from suggestions offered in various passages of our work, we perceive four essential and general human demands: for freedom from fear, for material subsistence, for new experiences, and for a disinterested arbitration of human conflicts. Fearlessness; subsistence; experiencing; and justice: these words may be used also.

All of these require controls over the self (selves), others, and nature. Control requires skills (considering even brute force as a kind of skill at leverage, if nothing else), and mankind is obsessively driven to elaborate his internal and external control system to a stage where he has obtained what he can regard as minimal and sufficient guarantees of his several needs.

The overall problem of a culture is, unconsciously or consciously, to provide a network of practices that will supply its people with excellent chances of obtaining these guarantees. And so we proceed to human relations, technology, politics, religion -- family government, world government, cosmic

government -- and science, which acts to supply better ways for cultures to fulfill these needs.

CHAPTER TWELVE

NEW PROOFS OF GOD

Ideas of quantavolution -- of sudden great changes -- attract the attention of historians of religion in especially two regards: religion was, and must remain in whatsoever guise, the companion of the newly born, traumatized, self-aware human mind; and the earliest religious voices, still speaking through the sacred documents of ancient times, were telling many truths, even literal truths about natural events, human nature, and human institutions -- truths that bespeak quantavolutions.

Yet quantavolution also presents a distressing problem to those who believe that, if once they could approach closer to the earliest days, when "the gods walked on earth" they would be inspired, ennobled, and reinforced in their faith. This is not the case and they may become downhearted and skeptical.

They should realize that even before quantavolution was assembled as a body of theories, those theologians, mystics and millennialists who ventured into the great first days of creation had to feel the terror and suffering that comes with "looking upon the face of god." Hence, indeed, most religions have calibrated the approaches to the sacred, so that only the well-prepared and thoroughly-warned would attempt the journey. That is, long before quantavolutionism, it was fully known that only the hardest of souls could cope with the revelations of the first ages, could endure the historicity of the apocalypse.

It is possible to absorb the theories of quantavolution solely in the form of science, eschewing all contact with the religious experience as truth, while pursuing every avenue to religious experience as sociological and psychological fact. That is, quantavolution would only ask of its students that they exercise

its hypotheses and evidence according to the current general methodology of science. This would be the more comfortable and easier choice.

Alternatively, however, one may confront the issue of the religious truth contained in this body of revolutionary theories, probing, inquiring whether perchance there is inherent in them something that those seeking a truth that is religious will recognize as valuable. The road is hard, and lined with the philosophical tombstones of many catastrophists and uniformitarians who have gone before, trying each in turn to transport a body of science into the realms of religious truth. Nevertheless I shall aim at the same goal.

I shall try to reach my goal in several steps. A metaphor of a box is used throughout. The human mind is inextricably contained within a physiologically limited box of perceptive possibilities and cyclical redundant logic.

The truths of religion are not within this box. Yet the existence of the box is proof of the supernatural, this being what is outside the box, which, we must admit, has an outside.

It is well that religious truths are not within this box, for the box limits and shapes its contents, and therefore disciplines the fields of knowledge that it holds.

The box nevertheless is indefinitely expansible. Its resources and limits have not been fully tested or strained. (This differs from the expansion mentioned above, which was only communicative expansion.)

In whatever direction the box expands, it is not likely to be limited. Hence the supernatural is not bounded by the accomplished full testing of any of its facets.

The simplicity and complexity of things are subjectively perceived or operationally invented. Things in themselves cannot be defined as absolutely simple or complex. The same is true of the concepts of space (size), time, past, and future.

The same is true of “life” or “animism.” It is subjective percept or operational invention, not defined other than by the human mind.

Now, if god is whatever is beyond the box (i.e. limitless), god must be also what is in the box, inasmuch as what is in the box is speculating upon what is outside of it, as we here.

Therefore, all that we sense and think in ourselves and our perceptible and thinkable world is part of the supernatural. If the supernatural and god are joined, we are pantheists.

Putting god into an animistic metaphor, god is our judge; god has already judged us. We already are composed and function according to god’s cosmic spirit, by intelligence, and necessity.

The very nature of our ignorance, then, cribbed and confined in our cosmic box, constitutes a proof of the existence of gods. The agreement of extended ignorance from the crypto-blind bio-box probably stands up better under modern scrutiny than the traditional arguments for the proof of god that we mentioned in an earlier chapter. Furthermore, a second modern proof may tend to confirm the existence of gods, and support the proof from the cosmic box.

The universe is presently thought to be some billions of years old, probably finite, although the boundaries are not clear, and populated by many billions of stars. Many stars, if not most of them, are believed to have spawned planets. Planets will have had ample occasion to acquire atmospheres and “the building blocks of life,” as we like to say from inside our cosmic box. We are also forced to admit that life as we know it is defined from inside our box, and “intelligence,” as we might conceive it without actually knowing it, may be a product of other means of manufacture and assembly.

Even if we have to conjecture the birth of gods from the elements of the atomic table, the combinations and permutations of this, plus the practically unlimited conditions of

time, space, temperature, and pressure can provide the substance and form of a god whom even scientific materialists, even Karl Marx, must recognize as authentic and in being.

In the creation of all things, we must contend with the principle of entropy, a term invented by Clausius in 1865 to refer to the state in which thermal energy is no longer available for mechanical work. Later, and especially with Norbert Wiener, the term was broadened to describe “the running down of the universe.” Clausius himself had written “the entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.” (Thus the idea merely subsisted until a century of history changed the optimistic mid-nineteenth to the pessimistic mid-twentieth century intellectual climate.)

Given even a time of short duration, or of a conventional dozen billion solar years, the number of occasions for “phenomena” or “phenomenal intelligence” to appear in the universe is extremely large. Cases of “negative entropy,” that is, of existence moving toward creation rather than desuetude, must be very numerous.

There is no reason to use life on earth as the archetype of the universe. As the *Encyclopedia Britannica* reports, “all the organisms of the earth are extremely closely related, despite superficial differences. The fundamental ground pattern, both in form and flesh, of all life on earth is essentially identical.” Nor ought we take mankind as the measure of the product of potential habitats of intelligence. In some proportion of them, something much more than *homo sapiens schizotypus* must have emerged. There should exist planets or complexes where beings of much greater intelligence and competence than ourselves exist. There must be a range of such superior intelligences from superman to gods.

Whether individuals, conglomerates, complexes, spirits, physiological aggregations unknown to us, or even creatures suggesting ourselves, these will all have many times our abilities. Perhaps some will have supernatural capacities (for we cannot understand them) a billion times our own. Perhaps one of the beings may have generated power to move the universe

itself; for, as the second law of thermodynamics maintains that the universe and all matter within it is running down, but an exception is made in the case of life which is negatively entropic, so there is an excellent chance that somewhere in the universe in an intelligent being, of which we can conceive but which we cannot become, whose powers are such that it is in control of the universe moving in the direction of intelligence and progress as we conceive of it: this being certainly must be called god. It would then be for all practical purposes omniscient and omnipotent. That it would be all-caring, omnibenevolent, may also be presumed, for to take care of itself it would have to take care of the universe in some part, as a case of "enlightened selfishness," in our limited human terminology.

Thus the traditional concept of god is exercised with a new proof involving the probability of supreme negative entropy. God is created by the universe, working in opposition to the principle of entropy with the equally universal principle of creation. The creative principle, arising like the phoenix from its ashes of entropy, must naturally turn to controlling the universe.

If this god is not already a fact, still, in the aeons of time to come, it must become a certainty. As the local gods of the solar system were born and died in succession, there may have been many temporary or quasi-omnipotent gods in times and spaces beyond all solar system experience. The universe offers billions of chances for a supreme god to arise in the future. Sooner or later, the universe will create its supreme master, just as the earth, this indescribably minute place, has created its locally supreme master, the human. Whereupon truly the universe would be intelligently ordered, as contrasted with the present chaos, and the far--flung parts, including our own, would be irresistibly induced to cooperate.

Let us proceed to discuss this theory of divine actual or potential existence at greater length.

To establish a new religion on solid grounds requires that the history of religion as the history of the true god be rejected. If

one relies upon the scientific history of religion, one would be led to the conclusion that gods do not exist. Luckily for those who yearn for gods, one can go beyond the history of religion, to psychology and philosophy. There they will learn that the human mind is basically limited. Its perceptions and condition are structurally bounded. To exceed this structure they must rely only upon corollaries of the cosmic proof: 1) extension of some hitherto neglected remote recesses of the structure of mind and body and 2) a type of reasoning that proceeds on an “if...then” basis which says: This is desirable; the question is open; the desirable is therefore not foreclosed. If god exists or gods, and is as we think god ought to be, then we are happier and can seek progress. Since the “if” cannot be foreclosed by any known means, the “then” is always possible.

What is greater than the self can only be known anthropomorphically, that is, by extensions of the self as it is known to one. Hence, if the universe has dimensions that are quite divorced from human traits (or their extensions), we can never know them. But the premise that more exists, which we cannot possibly know, is itself a proof of the existence of gods, even though we cannot know them in any other way than in this paltry manner. Moreover, it is possible that dimensions of the universe hitherto unknowable to us will make themselves known, whether because they change so as to be comprehensible (“God makes himself known,”) or we change ourselves structurally by genetic accident or manipulation.

If the universe has only those qualities which we now possess or may in the future possess, or if the universe changes its qualities, then we can come to a knowledge of the gods that we, in our limited way, know must be there.

Are these possibilities of knowledge additive? can we say that our full knowing potential *plus* the potential of the unknown gives us virtual certainty that gods exist? Like the lost sailor, we know that land lies in every direction. Also we know that land may be far away if we go in some directions. Can we determine in what direction the divine land lies?

A wee mouse, five centimeters long, is in many ways superior to the human. In proportion to size, he can run 20 times as fast, jump fifty times as high, scale walls, swim naturally well, has senses superior to those of men, and trains readily for reactive tasks. His brain and his organs are marvels of miniaturization, relative to ourselves. The outstanding difference is that homo is schizotypical, that is, self--aware and all that flows from this fact.

We know nothing about any species that has the equivalent of schizotypicality and what this affords us. We can conjecture how many species in all the universe might be schizotypical or have other systems capable of performing operations that we designate as being along the parameter of the human-as-divine up to the exceedingly divine, that is, the full god.

Moses and his followers claimed that Yahweh could see and punish malefactors and delinquents. The Christian religion says that God can know the minds of all persons. Paranoids will sometimes say that they can tell what all minds in a crowd are thinking and single out individual minds, too. A body containing 10^{20} cells can pass a signal to most or perhaps all cells in a brief time so that they are all reacting consonantly. The number of Jews is 10^7 +, of Christians 10^9 , of humans 4×10^9 . The coordination of "nature" exceeds that of gods, so to say, in some respects, and goes far beyond the most paranoid human mind. (Indeed, many humans are content to control one other person, such as a spouse or child.) Coordination means two things: *communication and control*.

Thus far, the shocking modern revelation of the numberless stars and vast extent of the universe has been converted into constructive thought regarding the possibility of there being other intelligent beings in the universe, with whom we might possibly communicate. Inevitably the thought has been elaborated into contentions that at some time in the past, astronauts have settled upon our planet, assimilating biologically with lesser breeds, or constituting the human race itself. The thought has also moved, theoretically, to the contention that more intelligent or hostile or flagrantly

incompatible beings might be confronted, to our embarrassment, should we be successful in communicating with exoterrestrials.

These discussions employ formulas not essentially different from what we employ here. We take up estimates of 10^{11} galaxies of 10^{11} stars each, without counting dark stars or clouds, reaching thus 10^{22} stars. We count 10^{22} dark stars and dark clouds as having theogonic possibilities ("darkness" is our problem). Gods take time to develop, but we may assume that the average body has had enough of such time, billions of years. Whether, for instance, the Earth has subsisted for 4×10^9 or 10^6 years, it has had at least a $1/10^{44}$ possibility of generating a god. Of the total source bodies, some 10^{11} (plus dark stars and clouds) would exist in our galaxy alone. We are not counting the separate planets or comets, that would multiply these several stellar figures by 2, 5, 500, 1000 or some other multiple not known, but depending on the average number of planets per star.

Suppose that science on Earth expands its capabilities ten times, a figure not in excess of many predictions from various fields. Suppose the human achieves an IQ of 160, lives to be 200, and can travel to the neighboring star cluster of Arcturus. Suppose the human is even morally set upon acting as god. The human will probably not be a god, but he will show that gods are possible somewhere. That is, it does not take too much more than man can be in order to define a god or demigod.

If there also are and have been 5×10^{11} centers for realizing divine beings in the galaxy and this over a period of time -- in fact, why not infinity? -- then the chance that one or more gods have developed is certain. Probabilistically, at least one is certain; let us say five are highly probable; 5000 are likely; 5 million are at least 50% probable; and some 50 million gods are possible, this in our galaxy alone. In the universe as a whole, these figures would be multiplied by 10^{22} . At 5000 per galaxy, the gods would number 5×10^{25} , too many by far to crowd into Valhalla.

If gods should die (speaking of the *götterdämmerung*), that is, lose some or all of their capabilities, one would halve the number of gods in the confines of the stipulated universe.

Among all of the probable godships, should not many have evolved to a multi--galactic god, and at least one to supreme god of the universe? An interesting feature of the results here is that there appear to have been more gods than the conventional formulas claim there to be planets with intelligent life forms. This paradox occurs because one does not constrain estimates by looking for something close to man, to technical civilization, or intelligent life as we know it. Further the requirements of an environment similar to man's can be waived; the gods need not be limited by humanly severe temperatures, or the presence of a long string of prior primitive life forms called for by nonquantavolutionary evolution.

Thus, as soon as less conservative considerations than are customary are set for intelligent forms in the universe, the number quickly exceeds the number of gods estimated here. Ordinary calculations of life spans are irrelevant, too; the occurrence of gods presumptively reduces time constraints; the possibility of divine viability stretching over much, most or all of the age of the universe adds to the probability that gods are active now.

In sum, of the terms of the formula used in many discussions of communication with extraterrestrial intelligence (CETI) only the gross number of celestial bodies is usable in estimating the likelihood of the existence of gods. To find the number of extant technical civilizations in the galaxy, by the "Green Bank formula" of F.D. Drake, N , one multiplies R^* (the average rate of star formation over the lifetime of the galaxy), by f_p (the fraction of stars with planetary systems), by n_o (the mean number of planets per star that are ecologically suitable for the origin of life as we know it), by f_e (the fraction of such planets on which life in fact has arisen), by f_i (the fraction of such planets on which intelligent life has evolved), by f_c (the fraction of such planets on which a technical civilization such as our own has developed) and by L (the average life of a technical

civilization). That is, $N = R^* (f_p)(n_o)(f_e)(f_i)(f_c)(L)$. [Product of these factors.]

Results, depending upon the estimates fed into the formula, have ranged from one to millions of technical civilizations in the galaxy. Our own technical civilization capable of interstellar radio communication is only a single generation old. The 1000-foot-diameter telescope at Arecibo Observatory in Puerto Rico, existing transmitters and receivers, and a presumption of the same type of equipment on another planet would provide a communication medium of 1000 light-year diameter, providing 10^6 stars. Space travel and laser transmission are technically near availability to extend somewhat the range. There is therefore some chance of a communication exchange now.

But how have we defined a god that gods should be so numerous? By god is meant a coordinated divine activity such that 1) it can endure or reproduce or replicate itself indefinitely under highly varying ambient conditions, that 2) it can act so as to expand communication pathways and thus its influence at an exponentially increasing rate, that 3) its proven scope and domain of intervention is extensive within a galaxy or is multigalactic, and contains no inherent limits, that 4) it provably (in human terms) acts so as to increase the aptitude and appropriate behaviors of the most promising existences (including humans) with the end in mind of reducing entropy and establishing theotropy as the dominating principle of the universe.

How do these qualities, if applied to the human condition, reduce fear, war, and famine, while increasing love and knowledge? I have mentioned but a few of such moral connections in these pages. Their deduction from the principles of godship do not appear to present problems in excess of those traditionally and successfully solved by theologians such as Saint Thomas Aquinas when deducing human moral behavior from the qualities of gods.

Theotropy can be considered from the standpoint of gods and of humans. Regarding gods, the achievement of influence is by

means and in terms that we understand or cannot understand. So far as we can understand, gods must extend themselves either immediately or by a succession of moves.

Insofar as our world is governed by no intelligent divine influence -- at least no sufficiently powerful and satisfactory influence -- then no "great" god has even in our short-time view extended itself over us, whereupon we can probably more correctly imagine that any god occupying itself with humans is proceeding by a succession of moves, that is, by growth. Both may be occurring, a onetime immediate assumption of our world and a succession of moves to change us.

A reader who has pursued our works on quantavolution knows how we believe man to have acquired his nature and how the world as we know it has come about. Thereupon he may ask: "Why does man need a god, considering all the troubles gods have appeared to cause?" Worse, "What legitimate reason has man for seeking god?" Worse of all, "What can any god do for man that is good for man?"

First of all, none of these questions can destroy the gods if they do indeed exist. No more than one can dispose of tax collectors who are troublesome, unwanted, and useless. From a homocentric point of view, however, we can be more cooperative in responding.

We need all the help we can get, plainly and simply. We are inadequate to our dearest wishes for the universe: that it be controlled and beneficent to ourselves and the posterity with which we identify.

We need help of a quality that is beyond the ability of everything whose qualities we know directly. Our faithful dog, Shep, is not up to the task. Nor are even our most trusted friends and allies. If there is a god, we need him.

The third question gives us pause. If the price exacted by seeking, finding and cooperating with god is our most priceless gifts, we may prefer our troubles, death, entropy, and oblivion.

This leads abruptly to the question which we seem to confront at every turn of the way. What does, what ought, the human wish to be? If he wishes to be like the gods, and the gods are likely to be so indulgent, then all is well and good, and we should search eternally, if necessary, for the gods.

One's purpose on Earth will then be answered from the divine point of view: the human is created for the divine task of helping to save the universe. He, and all developing and positive matter, are assigned this overall function. The universe has bred the human as a way to its own survival, as a challenge to its death, as an antibody against the death and dissolution foretold by the second law of thermodynamics.

Elsewhere we have written of man's basic needs, to fearlessly subsist, experience and live justly. If the gods are theotropic, we have nothing to fear from them except the loss of that element in us which is self--destructive and entropic.

What might this element be? Let us call it the diabolic, because it will turn out to be that often highly attractive mixture of uncertainty, fear, hatred, spite, lies, greed and egotism that goes into some of the most wonderful human creations. Will not the gods take from man the taste of evil for which he slavers? Or will the gods, like certain historical gods, allow man the gift of diabolism with all that it does for his music, dance, art, inventions, and politics?

This is one question; another question, equally important, is related: will the gods take away self--government, self--rule, decentralization of decisions, whether large or small? There is indeed an argument, posed as, "Let every man go to hell in the own way." The felt uniqueness, the exultation, the happiness of determining one's way are not to be given over, even to the gods, one senses -- and we can hear the most stupid as well as the most brilliant of humans saying so.

Perhaps the gods will be indifferent to such trivialities, perhaps they work sloppily, letting as much as we know of life pursue

itself along their general guidelines. Or perhaps it will happen that in their intense pursuit of godliness, humans will get their fill of risks, conflicts, imagination, and autonomy. In any event, this crisis is far down the line of theotropy, whereas man's decline and destruction are always close at hand. We prefer to think therefore that, in the pursuit of the divine, humanity will have all that it will want of symbolism, diversity, and excitement.

From the human standpoint, gods are to be awaited and solicited. If they are awaited, the presumption is that the gods are interested in expansion for its own sake. Any part to the universe will do. This is probably an unsafe assumption because it implies a certain kind of god. But god is more than a mere "land--grabber," we reason. He is interested in his own development; he is maximizing his opportunities of theotropy and not interested in entropic refuse. Therefore, gods are to be invited. For some lucky mystics, gods may indeed already have been entertained. I cannot understand the means, hence cannot confirm the encounters.

But what are the occasions for conflict among potential and actual gods in the galaxy and universe prior to the universal achievement of a single supreme god? Will there not occur what even mankind has experienced on its low level of achievement, a set of squabbling barons, a battle of the gods? Then the gods themselves will do what it is now widely believed that man will do -- destroy themselves and contribute to the entropy of the universe?

As they move out to order and exalt the universe what will determine their jurisdictions and, as implied in their aims, will merge them into one? Let us look once again at the traits of the divine bodies. They excel in expansiveness, in sensitivity to domains of potential theotropic existence, and in promoting theotropism (countering entropy). It is this last that determines outcomes. The theotropism or divinity that competes most effectively to eliminate entropy will merge with other divinities to the degree that they operate in the same way. It is to their interest to behave in this way. In the end it will be the

constructive principle of the universe that will influence and absorb all potential theotropy in the universe. Creation will triumph over destruction. This is the aim of the universe, the greatest of natural laws, and is the ultimate good.

A second objection occurs. If, as has been asserted in this work, man is not a rational animal in any usual sense of the term “reason,” and if sublimation is employed to move him from his great fear of himself and the world into large intellectual, imaginative and real worlds far beyond himself, then why is this proof of the existence of divinity not another sublimatory consideration? Is this all “mere” sublimation?

The answer is that sublimation is not unreal, even though it may refuse to treat directly with its origins in human nature. Its rationalizations are testable by rules of reality, logic, consensus, pragmatism, and evidence; this, too, we have said earlier and will discuss later as well. Granted this, the theotropic proof must contend with all other assertions about divinity on the basis of which ones best fit the state of the world as we barely know it and of whatever provides the best consequences for the human condition. *Homo sapiens schizotypus* is released from his fearful bind and contradictions by this view of the supernatural and is directed to employ his energies constructively -- theotropically rather than entropically.

If the principle of entropy exists -- and we think that this is so out of our material perceptions -- then its opposite principle may exist because, first, the world is not fully entropic, next, there is an anti--entropism observed, and, third, entropism must originate from something that decays. In this last case, the something that decays must have been non--entropic, possibly anti--entropic, that is, theotropic.

The entropy and theotropy can co--exist: they do so under our eyes. It may appear that the theotropic is declining, but this may be false. Our narrow perspective may be giving false measures, and we are better conditioned to detect entropy than theotropy. Especially with our present confidence in materialism, that is,

our indifference to theotropy and our desire to emulate the ideal instinctive animal, we may be today underestimating theotropy.

But is not the theotropic also material? It can properly be conceived as such, but only if we realize that most of what we call material is the refuse of theotropic materialism. As to what composes theotropic processes, we submit that theotropy is composed of what is tangibly material, of some extremes of the knowably material (particles, waves, light, etc.) of material potentially known to us but not yet known, and of material unknowable to us. I only call it material for fear of erecting barriers between the “material” and “immaterial.”

Under the regime of theotropy, it appears that mankind is to be more of an observer, thinker and admirer of the abstract than the active being who is acted upon. How can he behave religiously otherwise, and how can his morals connect with this religion?

First, one who possesses this religion will be occupied with the future, as historical man has first sought a heavenly salvation and lately has sought salvation in the future also but in a more scientific and technological way.

Second he will be more objectively self--searching and theological than historically he has been. He is looking for a different kind of divinity; this affects the quality of the search.

Thirdly, he has to consider the question: Do I wish to attract gods? Do I wish to be adopted by gods, lightning-struck so to speak; do I wish to become chosen by the gods? Do I wish to be embraced by a larger theotropy than I have means of becoming in myself??

Surprisingly the answer to all of these questions will be a strong affirmative. (I say surprisingly for I feel personally that we have no right to expect such definite answers to questions that we have formulated with such difficulty and hesitation.)

Behind the banners of entropism stands a sad, scientoid diabolism. We do want to live in theotropy, in the future, in the realms of the gods.

Then the question becomes : How do we attract the gods? Do we do so with signals, search parties on vehicles, sending care packages of our little technical tricks into outer space?

Or do we go seeking the gods with a message that we think will have meaning for them? What could such a message be ?

Our best message, our invitation to the gods, is our ability to take care of our own world and its surroundings. It stands to reason that the gods, if they have already reached us actually or potentially, or if they were to come upon us in their expanding operations in the universe, would either embrace us or dismiss us by indifference or destruction.

What would achieve their embrace? Obviously, they would embrace theotropy, for that is their essence. What are the signs of theotropy, which in our older language we might call blessedness? They would have to be signs of which we are capable. These signs are not negligible; they are signs of godliness.

Theotropy is the trend of existence to achieve divine influence. Inasmuch as humans may be capable of it, it calls for an expansion of the influence of life over death and of mind over matter. Thus, it appears that the very principles that we have ascribed to the theotropy of the gods are principles that reverberate down the corridors of human time and thought.

If these principles go unattended or are unsuccessfully pursued by mankind, the gods will not punish us; the gods have more important matters on their more universal "minds." They will ignore us, and let us continue in the predictable shortness of our forever to suffer both from our own behavior and being god-forsaken, which must mean the loss of our hopes, of our development, and of our future.

There are a great many people who believe that god may exist but always has reason to punish people, so much so that it is useless to attempt even a decent peaceful and material subsistence for mankind. Famine, plague, flood or war are seen to be inevitable divine visitations. Such apathy and fatalism go along with the succession of gods who could hardly allow mankind to recover from one catastrophe before bringing down another upon it.

At the other extreme of materialism stands the vanguard of the technical achievers. So flushed are they with the successes of empirical science, that they predict a never-ending invigoration of life and conquest of vast reaches of outer space. Among these are the ones who would fill capsules with gimcracks to fire into far space.

The fatal flaw in their vision and plans is a misperception of human limits. The human race stands at a crisis of will and belief, of world disintegration and warfare, even as vehicles hurtle into outer space. Humans have not solved their basic issues of life over death, and mind over matter. They may be incapable of doing so without the help of a great achievement, is to invite the gods for help on matters of life and mind. This the technocrats and military operators of the political economy and outer space are of no mind to do, whether they by acting in the name of mosaism or atheism. In their arrogance, they see no need to invite the gods to their feast. Or they try to beckon to them by exercises paralleling the long history of sacrificed beings and the destruction of nations.

We conclude that gods -- or god, if you will -- exist. They do not exist in fear; fear is human alone. They exist in our mind as the mind tests the limits of reality and invents, while integrating these limits, a special kind of reality in the supernatural -- the area of the divine. Gods exist outside the mind with as much probability as the universe that we contemplate is real. In these two senses, god is reality.

Granted reality, the divine must be our most important reality. This may seem to be skating on the thin ice of scholasticism.

“Tell it to a starving man.” But it is a statistical reality and in the final analysis it is statistics that compose reality of all kinds. The divine is the most important because it is the only distinction that is uniquely human; it comes straight out of the awful realization of one’s divided soul, two or more material contradictions, ineradicable and oppositionally creative.

Climactically a reconciliation takes place in philosophy and science. To know oneself is to know more than oneself; it is to know the divine. Here is the reason for the failure of historical religions, which damaged the soul in order to force it to hold delusions about “hard reality” and external gods at the same time.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CATECHISM

A catechism can summarize the fundamental facts and doctrines of religion from our perspective. The word “catechism”, which now broadly means an elementary instruction manual in a given field, has for seventeen hundred years meant, more precisely, exercises for instructing Christian neophytes. Before the word achieved popularity in its Latinized Greek form, it may have come from the combined words “tying down”, connoting a binding divine covenant. Less religiously, it recalls a metaphorical American usage of the same words, as when we “tie down” a matter so as to put it in form for easy handling. Our catechism here intends to tie down in a well-known format the basic facts and doctrines of religion deriving from our study.

Setting forth a catechism exposes to a pitiless light our beliefs concerning religion. The onus of proselytism comes with it, for a catechism must tell people what they should believe. There are health and strength in such an exercise.

1. *How was the universe created?*

The world has always existed in some of its infinitely possible manifestations, and is being created in some others today, and so it will go on.

2. *How long will this Earth endure?*

The Earth will endure for an inestimable time, depending upon mostly unpredictable natural, and divine human events.

3. *How much can a person know about the world?*

One can know more than one can learn and much less than what exists.

4. *Can one know oneself?*

One can know oneself within the limits of one's abilities to know oneself.

5. *Are the limits of these abilities known and achievable?*

The limits of the abilities to know oneself are unknown but more extensive than the abilities anyone has shown.

6. *What should a person know of oneself?*

One should appreciate one's operative complex of self-controls.

7. *Does a person have free will?*

One acts in accord with one's nature and circumstances; free will as action in ignorance of one's nature and circumstances can exist, but is not characteristic of an autonomous rational person.

8. *What is known absolutely?*

Nothing that matters. The absolute should be ignored because its main function is to promote absolute fear.

9. *What is absolutely clear?*

Nothing, and tolerance of ambiguity should be a religious principle, both to combat fear and to express the supernatural.

10. *What is science?*

Science may be usefully defined as the method of choosing the largest chance of certainty in solving problems whose conditions and objectives are known.

11. *How should science relate to religion?*

Science should solve an increasingly large number of the indefinitely large number of problems of religion, while religion expresses some of the directives and limits of science.

12. *How should we express our relation to cosmos?*

We should relate to the cosmos by understanding it and celebrating it.

MORALS

13. *What needs has one?*

One's needs are fearlessly to subsist, to experience, and to be treated justly.

14. *What duties has one?*

One's duties are to help others fearlessly to subsist, to experience, and to be justly treated.

15. *Who is divine among people?*

Whoever studies and expresses the divine is divine.

16. *What differences exist between means and ends?*

A means is a process of action that contributes to a more general process of action; it is rational according to how it works; it is deemed good or bad in its own effects and therefore contributes more or less good or bad to the end process.

17. *Is good rewarded?*

Insofar as the religious and secular realms are consonant, good action is rewarded in both; the rewards of religion should be in its practice and in the health of character that it fosters.

18. *Should evil be punished?*

Evil should be compensated for, personally and socially, not punished; it should be treated as a problem of coping with natural forces.

19. *Do right and wrong belong in the realm of the gods?*

Yes, they belong where the human and divine realms interact.

20. *Can a person distinguish right and wrong?*

Yes, by exercising himself in the fringes of the supernatural realm where the mundane realm fashions its judgments.

21. *What is right or wrong?*

Right is a determination of consistency in the consequences of an action with the divine aspect of a person.

22. *By what rules should a person act?*

A person should act by the rules of one's nature adjusted to the related ordinances of a consensus of like-minded others.

23. *How should a person behave toward oneself?*

One should accommodate consistently one's divine and mundane character.

24. *How should a person behave towards others?*

One should act towards others as to a differently shaped development of oneself, hence part of oneself, hence considerately, hence helpfully.

25. *How should a person behave toward plants and animals?*

One should behave toward plants and animals as toward others, while recognizing in them an acute differentiation from oneself in the tragic divine need to derive instinctive gratification from their exploitation.

26. *How should a person behave toward natural objects?*

As toward animals and plants, in descending series of their divinity.

27. *How should a person behave toward the supernatural?*

One should practice an understanding of its potential.

28. *What morality is devoid of religious significance?*

All morality should be religiously and politically promoted.

29. *What morality should be religiously and politically promoted?*

Morality should be promoted which comes from a constitution that is based upon consensus and offering procedures that among other effects tend to establish the dominion of divinity in humans.

30. *Is a person without religion bound to be wrong and evil?*

His views are narrow and he may not understand his own religiousness, but his actions may neither err nor have bad consequences.

31. *What function does a person serve in the world?*

The person represents and takes part in universal manifestations.

THE SUPERNATURAL AND DIVINE

32. *Is there a supernatural part of the world?*

What one cannot perceive and what one cannot understand, even if he learns something about it is the supernatural.

33. *Is the supernatural divine?*

The supernatural is divine insofar as it is meaningfully integrated into human mentation, but divinity implies no superiority over the pragmatically knowable.

34. *What is the divine on Earth?*

The divine on Earth is a uniquely human way of looking upon oneself and the world.

35. *How does one worship the divine?*

The rituals for worshipping the divine are whatever exercises are useful to achieve it.

36. *What is sacred?*

Everything viewed in its supernatural and divine manifestations is sacred.

37. *What is faith?*

Faith is positive morale, a conviction of meaningfulness about what one is thinking and doing, which when related to the divine is religious faith.

38. *What is revelation?*

Revelation is the recognition by an internal or external stimulus of an important pattern to existence, not previously

experienced, to which if a divine element is present, the term “religious” can be attached.

39. *What is discovery?*

Discovery is a revelation purposefully brought about, whose applications are readily apparent and available to others.

40. *What should authority be?*

Authority should be the legitimate power of one person over another, which may be religious; it should receive its legitimacy by the consensus of those ruled and should lose its legitimacy to the extent to which it is physically and mentally coercive.

41. *How should we behave toward the sacred?*

As toward the mundane, although, as with mundane varieties, we should act toward the sacred appropriately in accord with its distinctions.

42. *How much of our energies should be given to the divine?*

As much as necessary in order to receive divine energies in return, from ourselves, others, the world and gods.

43. *What is divine energy?*

Divine energy is the morale that comes from developing relations with the supernatural.

44. *Is there a sacred community?*

Yes, the community of those whose understanding of the divine is similar in forms, scope and intensity.

45. *Will the cosmos ever be divine?*

The theotropic universe will ultimately dominate the entropic universe.

46. *Is the divine also god?*

Yes, insofar as its mental integration functions as a presentation of the human mind, the divine is godly.

47. *To what futures should a person relate?*

A person chooses and lives partially in whatever futures one wants and is capable of participating in, except that upon death one's future is resolved into the cosmos and reconstructed beyond personal minding and control.

GODS

48. *Is it proper to expect gods?*

It is proper to expect gods, as it is to expect enlightenment.

49. *What is a god?*

A god is a generalized and immanent being, manifesting itself in material ways and through a demonstrable external cosmic spirit, operating in the human mind as the repository of the supernatural.

50. *Is god material existence?*

All material is effective: insofar as the divine is effective existence, and existence is all material, the divine is material, and so is god.

51. *Where is god?*

The god is wherever it can be and acts so as to be.

52. *Is there one god or many?*

There are both one and many gods, depending upon how the mind assembles the divine facets in its behavior.

53. *Do gods behave like humans?*

Yes, but only as the human in its universal and supernatural aspects.

54. *How many gods exists?*

We have not discovered how many, if any, gods exist on Earth, while in the universe myriad gods exist.

55. *What proofs do we have that there exists a supernatural, a divine, and a god?*

That divine beings exist is known by the logical extension of our ignorance and limitations into areas where divinity must being and exist.

56. *Do all gods have the same traits and behavior?*

Traits and behavior are limited ideas and actions to which the gods cannot be bound.

57. *Where is god in relation to the human?*

The god is where the human mind is affected by the supernatural and the divine, or may ultimately be in conscious contact with it.

58. *How is a person related to god?*

Personally, as to an aspect of oneself, socially as to a joint aspect of oneself and others.

59. *Does a person elect god?*

A person chooses god but his election is jointly with others to the extent that the gods of others permit a joint representation.

60. *Can I will against gods?*

One can will against gods entropically for self or universally, including reductionism to greater instinctive animality.

61. *Can all historical gods be attributed to catastrophes and other natural causes?*

All historical gods are in at least some of their manifestations catastrophic.

62. *Are gods historical?*

Historical gods have been the outcome of persons interacting with events, and, though probably non--existent, persist in some of their earlier manifestations, so that all are partly gone and partly present.

63. *Should a person obey historical gods in their original ascribed apparitions?*

The gods of the past are to be treated as hypothetical models to avoid and imitate as they reflect upon the present and future and satisfy today's conditions of existence.

64. *Are the gods rational and welcome?*

Insofar as they are theotropic rather than entropic, the gods are rational and welcome, and are to be preferred.

RELIGION

65. *Can society hold together without religion?*

Society cannot be conceived without religion and therefore cannot hold together without it.

66. *Should two persons have the same religion?*

No two persons can have or should have the same religion; all religion is therefore personal.

67. *How are persons united by religion?*

Persons sharing significant religious perspectives identify with each other and constitute a church if they recognize their mutual identity.

68. *How should we regard existing religions.?*

We should regard existing religions as in large part historically invalidated in terms of the ongoing and future historical process of religion, and encourage their voluntary assimilation and development into current standards of validation.

69. *Should there be priests?*

Priesthood as religious leadership must exist, and should be practiced ideally by all when they can, and by the fewest possible full time forever.

70. *What gifts should religion bring?*

Religion should bring joy of thought, wonderful awe, a divine community, and freedom from fear.

71. *What gifts should be made to religion?*

One should give to others by devotion, rituals, and cooperation the intelligence afforded by religion.

72. What does religion offer to human suffering of body and mind?

Religion offers to the suffering body and mind the knowledge of self, morale, scientific pragmatic support, and a cosmic sense of proportion.

73. What symbols should be sacred?

Symbols that retain the least historical implications and represent the major points of this catechism should be created and promoted and become subjects of admiration and stimulation; present sacred symbols should be reduced in significance and intensity.

74. What are sacred scriptures?

All graphic and written material that was ever sacred is still sacred and worthy of wonder and study, but at a reduced level of psychic investment, while new contributions intended as sacred scriptures should be no more sacred than any other sacrally intended or scientific or literary work for which merit is claimed.

75. Should our rites be simple or elaborate?

Rituals should be as elaborate as necessary to learn the purpose of the ritual, as stressed as necessary to enjoy its reassurances, as simple as the available energies would afford, and should be productive of other goods aesthetically and otherwise.

76. What is the educative task of religion?

Religion should educate people theotropically, which is the constructive life force.

77. What is the task of politics?

The task of politics is the same as religion morally, but politics contends largely with the pragmatic problems issuing from theotropism.

78. To what extent should we be bound by our religion?

We should be bound to our religion to the extent and so long as it helps us fulfill our obligations to ourselves and the world.

79. How long will it be before humanity becomes religious?

Mankind will become religious when it discovers the existence of gods on experiential principles without delusion.

CONCLUSION

THE DIVINE AND HUMAN

Having begun with a pessimistic understanding of the divine succession, I have concluded with an optimistic belief that the search for the supernatural is a virtuous, healthy, and constructive activity. The divine exists and can be achieved to a significant degree by all who properly seek it. It is probable that the divine extends to the existence of gods, regarding whom the question of one or many is probably nonsense and should certainly not be sloganized.

Religion is the system of relations sought for and maintained among the humans and the divine, the divine being more extensive than the human. Religion or religiousness is morally effective and can often change secular behavior with beneficial effects upon human life and the satisfaction of human needs. Rituals are exercises of the human character and are beneficial in the context of a proper religion.

The search for religion is the most civilizing and lofty human experience; the claim to have found religion has been usually a disaster. Religion came with the first kit of mankind, mentally and physically. Religion covered all existence and does so even today and will do so. Neither the purely secular nor the purely sacral type of person is suited either to study or to maintain the divine search.

Secularism has never been fully accomplished because it contradicts itself when it reaches its psychic and moral origins. As the method of secularism, science can help greatly sacral man achieve the divine, provided that it accepts the help of theology.

Historical religions, based upon the terrible power of natural forces, limited strictly the extent to which humanity could

pursue divinity. The gods were born as disastrous natural occurrences playing upon the existential fear of the self-aware human.

The theory of quantavolution explains, thus, substantially the history of religion and culture. It strengthens the scientific basis of religion by cutting off the claims of traditional religion to authorize personal miracles and to arrange divine intervention. Quantavolution furthermore discerns and pursues the consistent delusional schizoid syndrome of human nature from its beginnings. It explains the unbreakable connection between the sacred and secular.

Still, varieties of historical religions, such as Platonism, Stoicism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Bahai, have often approached the divine by the same routes as we have ourselves. They enlarged the human perspective and performed experiments; they organized social and intellectual infrastructures for launches into the future.

The goal of religious practice is the revelation of the divine through the human, and the integration of the human with the universally divine. This aim, which may be infinite and unachievable, promotes operations extending beyond the blinded box in which the human mind must work and seeks to establish relations with divine probabilities wherever they may exist and be sensed.

The world of entropy is the dying universe of the second law of thermodynamics, and of the dying mind. Entropy is confronted and contradicted by theotropy, no less valid, nor less empirical, which is diffused through the universe as creation and life. Many glimpses of the universal titanic effort of the forces of light against the darkness have been afforded by historical religions operating at their best, and many unconventional and scattered secular and religious voices presently sound a call for a new religiousness that can use all that the scientific and secular might afford. Under such circumstances, religion need not depend upon its past. It can become a new kind of divine procession into the future.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

If we were to scan all of the written, graphic, and artistic works of mankind prior to the second World War, we should discover that religion was their chief topic, with political--military subjects a poor second, and commercial records ranking a close third. This fact, significant in itself, daunts whosoever wishes to delve into the literature of religion, or to advise others about doing so.

My direct references are imbedded in the text. To assemble my general sources is an exercise in self--searching that may not profit others. As is the case generally with the humanities and sciences, the ideal reader and critic may have read few of my sources but instead "something else," as good or better, or may have shared few of my experiences that made my sources meaningful, but may have been a keen critic of the language and practices of religion as observed from childhood to old age in his or her own social settings and have read little but thought much, so that he would review his religious materials like Marcel Proust and Thomas Wolfe and James Joyce reworked their lost pasts in their autobiographical novels, making of the past a rich and elegant library.

There are, of course, encyclopedias about religion and philosophy, and a general encyclopedia, excepting the Soviet, will offer perhaps a fourth of its articles as entries related to religion. James G. Frazer's *Golden Bough* (13 vols.) is itself an encyclopedia of the anthropology of religion. Also creations of Robert Graves and Joseph Campbell pertain here.

Almost encyclopedic, yet entering boldly upon the analytic and systematic, are the studies of Mircea Eliade. His *Patterns in Comparative Religions*, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, *Myth and Reality*, *Images et Symboles*, and other books are as indispensable as any particular writings can be in an age when hundreds of books and articles descend upon every subject. It

may not be too early to alert the reader to the multi--volume encyclopedia that is being prepared under the editorship of Dr. Eliade through the auspices of Macmillan Publishing Company. [This work is now available]

Every country has had its religious wars, every religion its heretics and apostates, and political history is loaded with religious conflicts. Bibliographies about them can be initially retrieved through encyclopedias and card catalogues. Too, every sect has its sacred scriptures and polemical masters, readily accessed through its leader's name--Paul, Augustine, Calvin, Wesley, *et al*, as for instance, one proceeds along a particular Protestant Christian line of thought.

Should not one begin with philosophy, to avoid trivia and a waste of time? Would that such were the case. A careless saunter into the woods of theology and philosophy may end up in the oven of a seminarian. Plato is recommended but not without Aristotle, nor Aquinas without Eckhart, nor Loyola without Kirkegaard, nor Hegel without Marx, and so on.

The sociology of religion seems to me to be continually useful and I am sure that some of the trails of my mind pass through Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Hans Vaihinger, Benjamin Nelson, and the pragmatists with philosophical links, such as William James and John Dewey. From here it is but a step to the commentators upon science, such as Percy Bridgman and Alfred North Whitehead. In 1873 John W. Draper published *a History of the Conflict of Religion and Science*, but today one seeks out also various works on the conflict of science itself within science. Among the best of these might be Owen Barfield's *Saving the Appearances*, David Bohm's *Causality and Chance in Modern Physics*, D.G. Garan's *The Key to the Sciences of Man*, and Roger S. Jones' *Physics as Metaphor*. Norbert Wiener's famous works on communication science are supplemented by *God and Golem, Inc.: A Comment of Certain Points Where Cybernetics Impinges on Religion*. Roger Shinn and Paul Albrecht have edited a two volume collection on *Faith and Science in an Unjust World*. Among several dozen journals, *Zygon: Journal*

of *Religion and Science*, occurs in this connection. E.A. Shneour and E.A. Olteson have compiled writings and bibliography on *Extraterrestrial Life*.

Psychoanalysis provides a systematic awareness of the subconscious interaction of religious material with the sexual, familial and symbolic. Sigmund Freud's relevant writings are indexed and readily available. One might read Carl Jung more selectively. As in other fields, an occasional perusal of major journals is called for. Most names in this note are of famous men, and fame breeds fame, so that, as here, lesser luminaries are discriminated against erroneously.

Much is made of catastrophe and quantavolution in this work. The reader will have noticed that a background thereto is contained in other books of the author's "Quantavolution Series;" thus, for the physical evidence of quantavolution and disaster, *Chaos and Creation, The Lately Tortured Earth*, and *Solaria Binaria*; for the anthropological and mythological ambiance of religion, *Homo Schizo I, God's Fire*, and *The Disastrous Love Affair of Moon and Mars*; for the psychological, *Homo Schizo II*, as well as the foregoing.

My exposition adopts the format of ordinary language, the structure of whose utterances must be systematic and conventional. Hence the form of communication renders obscure the meanings of mystics, already beset by the problem in their own turn when they write. Such is the case with Meister Eckhart, St. Theresa of Avila, or of Vedanta, Gnosticism, Quakerism, Zen Buddhism, or Sufism; or of the pure symbolists and the occult. Still, laid in the depth psychology of the present work and concealed by its positivistic style are paths that a mystic might perhaps follow in exploring the divine within oneself.

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End of

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