The Revolution drives towards a new order. On all levels of life, from one person to all mankind, effectual toparchies and a cosmarchy are to be prepared. A local, functional, or national order is a toparchy. I consists of the organization of businesses, churches, families, armies, unions, and agencies of all types, as well as of cites and nations. The topocracy is the governmental system when it is functioning in accord with goals, that predispose it to Kalotic Policies.
Institution are like cell-neurones of the brain in that they contain both the channels to goals and the achievements, or goals themselves. They combine their structures and goals properly when they are functioning in accord with their goals. Their "habits" then do not counteract their "desires."
Institutions, as goal-directed structures, are much more charged with purpose than people (and experts) believe. Primarily, this is because they readily become "habit" to the people in them. They are never neutral; "neutrality" itself is a designed behavior, as when certain kinds of courts plan and observe certain kinds of court plan and observe certain kinds of judicial "neutrality" in respect to parties in litigation.
Nor are structural designs unnecessary. It is risk to extrapolate good deeds from bad structures. "Good" deeds emerge from bad structures "so often" in history and politics because we are used to the absolute failure of institutions to produce what we want. This failure in turn is for lack of design and control. Also we have mistaken the ethical content of the process.
An example is available of the foregoing. Laissez-fair economists, over a period of 150 years, were believed to rest their case on the capacity of a randomly reacting non-structure (natural structure), amoral and even immoral, to create a production and distribution system that was superior to alternative proposed structures. In fact, the structure possessed certain unrealized virtues. These included the promotion of individual intelligence, as well as initiative, respect for economic rather than coercive means of accomplishing social ends, an aggressive desire for cooperation in factories, offices, markets, and industries, and an elimination of ethnic, class, ideological, religious, and other barriers to peaceful commerce. With many activities outside of officialdom, suppression of liberties became less possible. The virtues of the product thus were the virtues of its structure, as were its vices. There was no mysterious transmutation of good and evil, no marvel of the "invisible hand," no "fleurs du mal."
The main types of present day toparchy have already been described in some detail: dystrocracy, stratocracy, taxocracy, and plutocracy. The moving principle of each was designated in a negative sense: the lack of organization for modern consensus; the organization for internal and external violence; the organization for the sake of organization; and the organization for apparent wealth. Yet each has virtues mingled in its dominant vice; some of these were set forth.
Kalocracy is organization for moral well-being and therefore from the first must differ in structure from the others. Its morality and moral are futurist to a degree surpassing the other regimes. It differs from stratocracy in giving force as small a role as possible in human affairs; it is abundantly more flexible than taxocracy and it is faintly foreshadowed by the confused and incomplete plutocracy.
From all that has gone before here and that will come after, regarding both principle and structure, a Kalotic Constitution can be compacted. It is to serve all Kalocracies regardless of culture and historical regimes, now and into the next generation.
I. The constitution is law and the law is behavior.2
II. The law of the constitution is the superior law.
III. The constitutional authorities include the council, the executive collegially taken, the judiciary collegially taken, any specially organized constituency assemblage, and any council within whose jurisdiction the present constitutional group lies.
IV. The language and statements of the constitution can be validated, supplemented, or amended on the principle of triple replication: the action of any constitutional authority, thrice taken, or of three such agencies once taken, suffices to alter the constitution.
V. Every person is represented in every group to which he voluntarily belongs. For the purpose of obeying laws governing the aggregate,3 he is compelled to belong to a grouping whose statistical, aggregative form contains him.
VI. Every group is a representative structure (a republic).4
VII. Groups are coordinated by means of a representative structure that includes representatives from the topocracy and all other groups that have at least as much involvement in the class of issues as the next more general topocracy.
VIII. The representative structure of all groups is within the purview of their next more general and most closely related topocracy, which can at any time order a plebiscite in the group on the representativeness of its structure and, if indicated, compel the constitutional agencies of the group to reconstruct it.
IX. All official actions are explicitly justifies for promoting emos, pneumos, and/or dikeos,5 in reference to interlocking centennial, generational, decennial, and annual programs.
X. Superior determinations of the operational meanings of the Kolotic elements are by the council.6
XI. Subordinate determinations are made in specific cases by personal courts and in general cases by conciliar courts.
XII. Uncontested or preliminary determinations are made by executives (administrative personnel).
XIII. Annually there is published an accounting of the Kalotic state of the population based upon intensive interviews of a sample.7
XIV. All expression is free and permits counter-expression.8
XV. All acquisition of power over persons and things is counter-weighted by the resignation of a like power by a reciprocal group voluntarily.9
XVI. Coercive power (as opposed to inducive power) is exercised only in direct encounters involving law and order.10
XVII. Except in personal or group catastrophe, no one is kept in spatial or functional confinement for more than two periods in his lifetime, which are before the age of 14 and for tow single years between 16 and 60 for the purpose of universal civic service.11
XVIII. There is only a single, direct, and equal per capita annual tax on all persons during their lifetime, and there are no other taxes or financial impositions on any person,group or activity.12
XIX. The most populous territorial toparchy of people having a standard emotic expectation establishes a social accounts system assuring its members of a lifetime draw able-repayable account for the necessities of life.
All of the power aggregates of the world need new constitutions. Their present ones are linguistically deficient, incomplete, too long, and inflexible; in most cases they are inapplicable and unapplied, in whole or in part; in other cases they are treacherous guides to ordinary people tempting them into traps and hypocrisy.
Few stop to ask why this should be. Cookbooks are not full of misleading recipes; when sugar is called for, salt will not do. Nor are doctors' prescriptions false and misleading. But when the Soviet Constitution prescribes federalism, when the American Constitution declares, that non-delegated rights shall reside in the people and states, and the English "unwritten constitution" says whatever it is said to say by the House of Commons, the only reasonable test is the behavior of people in these areas of concern, that is, the taste of the soup. But a numerous body of deluded or fradulent chefs is authorized to tell people that the soup is not how it tastes.
Words may be imprecise; social changes often cannot be foreseen; anxious interests seek to be over-explicit in their own interest; authorities do not like their handiwork to be altered; and demagogues write in fictions and unfulfillable promises. Therefore a constitution cannot be an exact recipe or a prescription. But it can be something much better than it typically is. This it can be if it is basically reconsidered for what it should be.
A constitution is because it should be. It is an artifact. It has a purpose. Putting aside whatever reasons may have inspired the constitutions of history, it should issue as a proclamation, legally enforceable, of what goals should be evident in the work of the officials of a toparchy, and a design of the procedures (structures, institutions, practices) that are being followed in pursuit of those goals. The Kalotic Constitution presented above uses"is" instead of "shall" or "should" to denote that its only meanings must be effective, that is, operational, It is itself the major Kalotic test of political reality.
Because existing constitutions have the listed defects to a smaller or greater degree, they should be put aside and new ones adopted. The American Constitution is now untranslatable in terms of current problems, and what is worse, the task of translation has been largely abandoned in favor of a masquerading personalized rewriting by judges. The Soviet Constitution is largely meaningless; it uses terms and names that refer to familiar offices, but the relations among offices, a far more important concern, are not accurately depicted. To elaborate the point by further references to South American, European, Chinese, or other constitutions is unnecessary. "The country with its constitution belongs to those who live in it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government they shall exercise their constitutional rights of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it". So said Abraham Lincoln.
The Kalotic Constitution obviously calls for representative government. The common view that representative government as such results in ineffectuality is wrong. The structure of representative elevates humble wishes to the highest plateaus of public policy. It actuates and motivates government.
Going beyond this phenomenon, which probably will be admitted, to another that is more generally doubted, we say that representative governments are as well-structured to make decisions as historical types that possess a securely stratified ruling group.13 Even observers who are otherwise shrewd will assert that too many voices at the top will bring a vacillation and quarrelsomeness to the making of decisions. But this belief is only a supposition buttressed by example. There is as much reason and as many examples (proportionate to the smaller historical universe of representative government) to support the belief that representative government can and does abide by the canons of scientific decision-making as well and as often as any other historical system does.
"Democratic centralism" has been offered by communists. It is the system whereby suggestions are passed up and orders are passed down the communist hierarchy. Stress is laid upon procedures for passing down commands. This stress is perverse. Institutions need to be built to move ideas and demands up, against gravity, so to speak. The orders going down possess their natural gravitational force. They need only be guided.
The representative principle is one of mankind's great inventions.14 Capable of infinite manipulation and design, it essentially announces a means for collecting certain characteristics of a group and projecting them variously into the operations of the group or its officers. It implies that a number of people are in communication with each other and certain communications should be stressed in internal relations and reflected in external activity.
There is no other way to manage a large and complex community beneficially. Either the largeness or the complexity will otherwise have to give way. Wherever a group is sufficiently general in scope and voluminous in metabolic output, it requires specialized representations, the most typical of which are to be formed in the group formations known as the legislature, administration, and judiciary. As groups increasingly form from the increase in numbers and metabolism of the largest toparchy in which they are partially or wholly encased, they form subcommunities. The subcommunities in turn should generate, on the same principles, the three sub-formations just referred to. All sub-formations in an order should be subjected to the same standards as the larger order itself.
The legislature is responsible for general principles of social behavior and therefore is designed to represent the important social elements that will bring about the kalotic toparchy. Most geographical aggregates require a legislature largely apportioned among the equal-population constituencies where they dwell, supplemented by representation of large economic, professional, and spiritual aggregates, varying in proportion to the total as the modernity-complex increases in society, up to a maximum of one-half.15
The devices of representative government are complicated. Therefore, the next century of Kalotics will present groups with simpler and superior techniques for achieving the same intrinsic goals.
A future representative system will include these elements:
a. An original constituting authority.
b. Random (equal-probability) selection from the constituency of persons to recruit high-test personnel for representative roles in topocracy.
c. A battery of tests on these parameters;
(1) Ability to sense all grouping of the constituency.
(2) Motivation with regard to Kalos and its elements.
(3) Characterological freedom from obsession and destructiveness.
(4) Judgmental training.
(5) Characterological ability to make decisions in concrete cases.
(6) Technical training: applying information; methodological ability.
Future applications of this method may be distant, but an early task for Kalists is to invent such tests, and to begin to apply them.
Internal differentiating representation, or branches of government, as they are called in America, begins with a functional, not geographical, apportionment. American constitutionalists usually believe, and rightly so, that separate structures must be provided for the making of general policies about the toparchy, for the legal arbitration of disputes on particular matters between individuals and/or groups, and for the continuous performance of actions that the topocracy authorizes. Legislating, judging, and administering are the term applied to these processes.
In the past, each type of organ has had to do double and even triple duty-it has been ordered to perform its peculiar tasks, to perform additional tasks, and to be a counterweight to the other groups.
The judges have been charged with reconciling constitutional (special) and ordinary (legislative) law. This task should no longer be given them. The assembly should perform it. The judges have been asked to decide both individual cases and cases regarding corporations and governments; this function should now be divided into two, with one set of judges and courts specializing in cases involving individuals, another involving group, and a panel composed of both for cases involving both individuals and groups.
The courts of appeal should be composed invariably of panels of judges, who have been indirectly elected, for exclusive six-year terms, by an electoral college of specialists on the law (1/4), designees of the legislature (1/4), judges of the lower courts (1/4), and specialists in spiritual affairs (1/4) named by the ceremonial head of the toparchy. The judicial electoral college should be convened every two years to present a list of appointees. It may be specially convened by half of its membership for impeachment proceedings or because of the exhaustion of lists.
The pluralist principle embodied in the Kalotic Constitution states that all toparchic orders and suborders should be subdivided and representatively structured until their numbers and metabolism do not admit of organic specialization. One indication of how far this condition can go is to enumerate the associations that exist in a society where they may be freely formed; they will range form hundreds to hundreds of thousands. Among the major orders of modern society are the spiritual and benevolent, the educational, the military, the commercial, the industrial, the legal, the political, and the governmental. Only the governmental is to have physical coercion on matters of law and order in the kalotic scheme of things.
Each order breaks down into sub-orders and subdivisions of considerable diversity. Thus the spiritual and benevolent orders of a middle-sized or large nation will contain from one to a hundred nationwide sectarian groups, and an even greater number of charitable and fraternal groups; each of these will have functional or areal subdivisions. We speak already of hundreds of different organizations which have the problem of representative government internally, representative government among the subdivisions, and representative government between, on the one side, the order and its subdivisions, and, on the other side, the toparchy and other orders. To take a second example, the geographical toparchic order will typically be divided into town governments and other jurisdictional levels up to the national toparchy.
A person should have as many voices as he has memberships. The symbol and steering effect of voice is found in the vote, among other places. How his vote is assembled, weighted, and ultimately cast in the collective decision is matter for determination within the group. The basic requirement of all groups, subject to a system of review and determination, will be a reasonable set of representative practices. The most important practice is that major decisions of the group be made by a representative assembly and that the basis for the assembly be a qualified voting public of at least half the membership of the total group population. The minimum deviant weighting among individuals casting their vote, as a sum of discriminations in appointment, qualifications for office, and counting the vote should not normally exceed 300%.
This `figure' of 300% deviation from `pure' democracy is designed to allow every order to possess its suitable kind of representative structure and to permit some measure of deviation by accident or design from Kalotic philosophy; but it is principally intended to guarantee a kind of representative government in corporations, labor unions, universities, and administrative areas of life that has rarely been practiced before.64
Imagine, for example, a one-party, plebiscitary democracy, which is really a life-long autocracy or oligarchy, with large powers of government in its own sphere, and its only limits resting in the fear of destroying its source of income, the employers: such are many labor unions. The unions are scarcely ideal republics: they lend dignity to their member-workers, but not to work, or to manager, or to customers, or to those who would like to work. They block some distasteful and unjust management decisions. They sometimes raise wages. They give some aid, comfort, and sense of equality en masse to their members.
But unions usually prevent very high wages being given to especially efficient workers. They also cause unemployment by their restrictions upon membership and their support of government minimum wage laws. When they have direct, large political powers, over a ruling regime or party as in Britain, they constitute a conservative drag on the government and bureaucracy. That is, in many respects, union policies and powers are dystrocratic. This dystrocratic nature comes partly from a dystrocratic union governing structure, which must be corrected through a kalocratic constitution. In addition, workers should participate in the ownership of industry, as ordinary shareholders. As part of their wages, they should receive shares, just as the top officers of a great many companies now do.
Labor unions should continue to provide advice and counsel on grievances of workers. They should maintain benevolent activities. They may agitate and offer candidates for directorships of companies. But a single union should not directly cast the workers' vote. Individual workers should vote as shareholders do for members of boards of directors, and benefit too from the proposed reform of the latter.
Political parties should play a role of incumbency and opposition as they do in plutocracies now, and may be internally organized on the same general principles as other orders. There will long be a need for such non-sovereign and non-cohesive groups to mobilize opinion and activities for the general good, as focused in the the toparchic councils. It is not to be expected or desired of them that they monopolize governmental power, or that they formulate and lead revolutionary change. They should be porous vessels, open to the ebb and flow of political tides. They are furthermore useful as organizers of internal government in the legislatures.
The large force for social change in this and succeeding generations has to be independent of routine representative frameworks, even while permeating and influencing them. In the age that we have just passed through, and to all appearances are still in, "interests" are supposed to be the guiding principle of public policy and control of government.17 This concept, which even today seems to most political observers and students to be very modern and which is not even yet accepted by all as moral, has now to be assigned to its limited role in the conduct of business-as-usual. For government by interests, it is clear cannot solve the problems of toparchy and cosmarchy, no more than can the authoritarian principle or legalist principle which preceded it.
On top of all these principles is the principle of a revolutionary elite that is neither confined to an interest or conglomerate of interests, nor is authoritarian or legalist. It is equally apparent that the great body of people themselves cannot formulate a revolution, nor even compel one unless educated and directed. It is also apparent that the new elite cannot be discredited by merger with, nor emerge from, the present pluralist interest structure of the western texocracies, plutocracies, and stratocracies. It must be a new main force.
Within contemporary taxocracies and plutocracies, several competitive formulations of the political future are present. They can be examined inasmuch as they may be postulated in one form or another as alternatives to the kalotic toparchy.
The first is the executive dictatorship formula. Next to the "other-worldly life" and the military hero, this formula is the direst threat to kalocracy. It combines taxocracy with charisma. It gives hierarchic centralized rule in detail and leaders who through control of the mass media, direct the emotions of the masses. It can emerge in the aftermath of a true revolution, or it can come about gradually and with the aid of recurrent crises.18 The Roman High Empire, the Ataturk Revolution in Turkey, the Fascist period in Italy, the two Napoleons in France, the Peron regime in Argentina, Franco rule in Spain, and De Gaulle's second presidency in France are examples.
A related formulation, "the managerial revolution," is but part of the transitional style of the way to executive dictatorship. The managers are assimilated to the state bureaucracy.
In large, complex, modern countries, the stratocratic elements cannot revolt or rule by themselves. But they can, since they are entranced by personalismo and hierarchial notions, furnish an executive dictatorship with the means to power and the immediate extension of power over 3600 of society.
A second possible configuration of the new elite is the bureaucratized workingclass, or the socialist revolution, so- called, as has been experienced to a degree in Weimar Germany, pre-1937 Austria, pre-Civil War Spain, Sweden, and Britain. It is instructive that these revolutions tend to abort or succumb to violent reaction from charismatic or communist movements.
Union leaders, representing an increasing proportion of the population, finding that they cannot accomplish more than temporary successes of limited scope through collective bargaining and strikes, gain increased control over work conditions, a voice in management, a main role in a labor or socialist party and finally the direction of a liberal-socialist government. However, the elite is of a socially limited quality, and does not posses the skills of other necessary components of the general political elite. Nor does it succeed in getting their cooperation.
The "Revolutionary Workingclass" gives yet another competitor. here the notion is that union leaders are transformed from bureaucrats into flaming agitators. Wracked by material shortages, plutocracy will be split into the monopoly capitalists, who have driven the middle classes out of the key economic and political roles, and the proletariat, infused by a consciousness of its identity and historical mission.
With the same certainty with which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced, with than same certainty can we deduce the social revolution from the existing social conditions and the principles of political economy.19
Rightly do the communists believe that plutocracy will not be overturned except by revolution. The violence to which communist revolutions regularly are given over is a function of the barbarous and psychopathic origins of leading elements of the proletariat and the terror-filled reactive forces. In every communist party that has taken over the state, the delirium of seizure has conquered the programmatics.
The destruction of the nation's stock of organized production and useful skills is invariably great. It is a profound irony that the movement calling itself "scientific" should be so bereft of understanding of what keeps the wheels of industry turning. It takes very little time, too, for the communist revolution to bureaucratize itself. A taxocracy, subject to explosive purges, quickly evolves, and life for the individual citizen and for the very society itself becomes a prolonged and exhausting struggle against official inertia.
A representative Kalocracy in its early stages finds its chief opponents in the communists. And it is indeed doubtful whether the plutocracies of our time are invulnerable to "revolutions of the working class," to use the absurd historical term.
In itself, "old liberalism" presents a possible free way of organizing toparchy and is worth analysis, but it cannot compete with the disruptive subversion and external threats of communist taxocracy. For old liberalism depends upon a competitive and individualistic doctrine better suited to lend a vision of a free public than as a description of how plutocratic economies really work.
To it we owe the origins of part of the theory of kalocracy. The ideas of freely operating and choosing citizens, intelligent and informed, voluntarily organizing into every manner of association, limiting the state to functions as close to peacekeeping as possible, devices of representative government, free information, free bargaining, free speech, free press, the maintenance of "unfrozen" interests in the economy and social order, and the submergence of the role of the military-all of these ideas have made their way into the new revolution. They cannot easily be seen and the kalocracy's configuration will leave little of the old liberalism in evidence, but the sources are present-in structure, practices, and elites.
Besides setting up barriers to alternative constitutional forms and regimes, the Kalotic Constitution seeks to avoid various evils of historical societies: the confusion between private and public interests, hero worship and crowd domination, and the enlargement of coercive state action. These are partly problems of attitude and partly of structure. Both attitude and structure have to be reformed to counteract the evils.
The conflict between private and public interests is a deeply ingrown attitude complex, especially developed out of two universal historical forces. One is the imposition of rule from on high, whereby society is divided into the rulers and the ruled, which become from the perspective of each side, the "we" and the "they". The "we" is all that affects us and can be cared for by us, whereas the "they" turns out to be the uncared for, or the uncarable, of the ego interests, or selfish interests, of each person. A volte face is required in attitude, for this is a slave psychology of the public: the "we" and the "they" will never unite but will seek to suppress each other.
The other source of the conflict is the definition that economic theory of the past two centuries has imposed upon politics; private is defined as what government does not or may not do, and the rest is public. In the discussion of property, we have already denounced such a distinction. It precludes the logical and philosophical ordering of tasks and responsibilities. Far from creating limits of government, it merely sets up tempting objects of demolition through appeals to mass opinion, of attrition by activist powerholders, of ethical denigration by the philosophies of socialism, and of ridicule by intellectuals owing to the inherent errors of the distinction itself. For the kalotic toparchy "public" is whatever substantially affects the lives and kalotic state of the members of a toparchy and those outsiders who are affected by the toparchy.
A very large area becomes then public, but nothing is presumed concerning its organization. Logically, everything may be public even while nothing is done by the governmental topocracy. What organizational form the public should assume is a matter of kalotic principles of structure.
A second evil that history has transmitted to kalocracies of today is hero-worship. Some call it charisma; Khrushchev, following Lenin, labeled it the "cult of personality" and pinned the label on Josef Stalin. Just as creativity, which is the essence of intellectual motion, can destroy science, which is the organization and processes of intellectual movements, so leadership, which invents ways of manipulating governmental process, can destroy kalocracy, which must depend upon principled and planned progress. Government, and especially revolutions of government, depend for their execution upon personalities. And it is exceedingly difficult to delineate the personality traits vital to kalocracy without moving over into types of character who are predisposed to crowd psyches, to appeal to the limbic system of crowd psyches, and to disrupt, deter, and detour the group, whether or not in process of revolution, from its arranged priorities, training, and procedures.
Whether or not they exist, the god and the devil in man become objects of fascination to men, women, and children, who are willing and even eager to throw over all arrangements and no-arrangements-that is, all accepted and emerging procedures-out of attraction for a person who fastens their gaze upon a tempting social image. Early historical kings were considered to be gods, although in pre-history they may not have been. Later kings, more sophisticated, were considered as adjutants of god; leaders not anointed spiritually nevertheless acquired the magical aura of power. Nothing however, suggests that, except for the salvage of some moments of time or of a given historical situation, the success of a leader who speaks out of his messianism can equal or better the kalotic effects of an organized toparchy that speaks out of its constitution.
How can the best men give their best efforts without destroying principled rule, giving the lie to the constitution, and inciting people to ecstatic following and to suppress thought and sobriety? They can do so only if a kalotic science of leadership is developed, drawing upon case histories such as Cincinnatus and George Washington, and more directly upon experimental and clinical science. History needs to be rewritten; education needs to be revised; the processes of change need to be made flexible; a corps of leaders who are primus inter pares in an elite of heroes has to be idealized. Let us explain.
The historian. Thomas Carlyle, meant to write a history of peoples, but faced with lack of information about the laws of collective behavior wrote History as the Lives of Heroes. He thereby contributed to a largely degenerate impression which people receive as true history-that if they lay back, if they pray, if they adulate at appropriate moments, then gods who walk the earth will dispose benignly of their fate.20 So children are weaned nearly everywhere on government and social change as miraculous, and therefore mysterious, and therefore unconnected and personally unrelated events. It never occurs to them that their mother who draws a net over their cradle or their father who swats a fly near their plate are performing actions as "public" as the assigning of their pittance of property over to an unknown tax collector, or as heroic as the signing of a declaration of war. Raised blindly, no matter how high or low their caste, they can rarely segregate their early visceral training in the strangeness and awfulness of power and pomp from the day-to-day, rational conduct of large affairs coordinating the actions of themselves and their fellows.
Now if even one generation of young historians were disengaged from their academic leaders and loosed upon the materials of man-as-he-was-according-to-his-masters, this single generation could tell us how futurist man has been all along all that he should be. They millions of true heroes and heroines to rehabilitate.
Let them heed King Mahendra of Nepal, who, when asked about the traditional Nepalese brief that the King is an incarnation of the god Vishnu, replied, "Personally speaking, I don't believe in all those things. First of all, I am a human being. And whatever I am, I must serve my country."21
Education generally is history badly arranged for the tasks of the present. Whether we speak of the history of kings, or of structural engineering, or of poetry, we confront subjects handled by educational bureaucracies in a way to incriminate reason and bury solutions among the ashes of past failures and expiatory routines. The bare beginnings of the science of leadership and group dynamics are scarcely known to educators or ruling circles.
It is a grave risk, under such circumstances, to raise a first generation that does not behave in fear of the devil and in search of gods who walk the earth. For men dread the insecurities of brotherly trust and of unencapsulated solutions; they wish notrums from the cups of divine doctors. "Every sentence by Chairman Mao is truth and carries more weight than 10,000 ordinary sentences."22 We must contend not only that every baby has a sceptre in her swaddling, that "every man is a king within his own circuite and compasse," and that "every common soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack," but also that these instruments of rule are exercised when a man is digging a ditch, addressing his leader, or cremating his parent.
If change becomes non-mysterious and participatory, then leaders become replaceable individuals. No man should hold a governmental position in any and all grades for more than fifteen years in his lifetime, and for the top positions he should be constitutionally limited to six years.23 If either the public or its rulers plead for more than this, they reveal that the society is still dystrocratic or is withering as its roots.
There shall be no public mourning on the death of heroes. There are more heroes than can be mourned. Furthermore, inspirations born of death are dangerous to enjoy and project into policy. To argue that this goes against human impulse is only to prove the point: kalotic government should be a regulator of impulses.
Crowd-domination of the mood and policies of the toparchy is equally to be feared. It is often the opposite side of the coin of hero-worship: the crowd and the adulated leader are in love and all that comes in between is swept away. Manifestations of crowd domination of a society are to be avoided; social morale must come from many sources, but less from this one.
The majority principle, though useful as a positive expedient in myriad circumstances, is to be drained of its magic. This can be accomplished largely by a reduction of and control of the circumstances where it is used; otherwise, it ignites the inflammable psychological structures that are designed to carry human groupings to their assigned goals. To the degree that a revolution can be carried through without charismatic masters and exhilarated crowds, it can move into its continuous stable course more successfully.
The equal-sum activity formula is a means of fighting the taxocratic tendency. In our treatment of taxocracy, this principle has already been asserted. For every activity assumed by the principle toparchies, another equivalent activity must be ceased, delegated, or let out to another group to perform. These words must not be misconstrued: the excluded activity must not be kept under the same degree of stated domination while only its organization is moved out; there must be a marked reduction of direct stated power in connection with the activity.
The reasons for the principle are several: there is no limit to what contemporary governments propose to undertake as such, but there are grave limits with respect to costs, oversight, concealment of operations, deflation of independent initiatives, contamination of the most pacific activities by the germs of sheer coercion, rigidifying of the whole toparchy, politization of the total toparchy.
The ability to enforce equal-sum activity intelligently depends upon information about what goes on in government. Means are now becoming available to inventory and bring under observation mechanically every activity of government. Priorities can be established and activities for extrusion kept in continuous view. Given governments such as the United States federal government, where over 7,000 discrete activities go on,24 the number of candidates for extrusion are very many.
The most difficult theoretical problem is to judge the present level of activity of a particular government. Where and when should the principle be applied? Unfortunately one cannot discover a government today where it does not apply, except the cosmarchy; there an infusion of power is certainly necessary before the formula can reasonably be undertaken. The strictness or literalness with which the formula can be applied depends upon the information and instruments available in a given toparchy. Most activities, moreover, are not to be eliminated from all toparchies within the governmental toparchy but only from the government.
The tribunate principle is a means of systematically fighting censorship, abuses of expression, and self-serving reporting and public relations of social institutions. It declares that every social institution, including all government agencies, must provide facilities and access for freedom of expression of members and outsiders, and for annual reports of "Devil's Advocates" or Countervalors on their operations. The cost is to be borne by the institutions, but the organization, training, and discipline of the professional staff employed as Devil's Advocates are to be the responsibility of a special Division of Social Accounting of the legislature.
The classical view of freedom of expression has been emphatically curtailed by the groth of government and large social institutions capable of swamping any opponents within or without who may seek to raise voice publicly against their practices. This curtailment of the possibility of man-to-man confrontation at work, at play, at church, and at the political forum must be countered by an equal facility. An old philosophy whose theories can no longer apply, if ever they did, provides no such facility.
Similarly, the technique of regular, systematic criticism of the structure, operations, and financing of all social institutions is required by the gross failure of ancient supervisory methods of government. Only professionally trained public agents, with compulsory access to institutional behavior, and a commission to exercise themselves oppositely to the developing pattern of the institutions they are observing, can allow the public and its officers to pass judgment upon institutions.
|1.||"What are called structures are slow processes of long duration, functions are quick processes of short duration. If we say that a function such as the contraction of a muscle is performed by a structure, it means that a quick and short process-wave is superimposed on a long-lasting and slowly running wave." (L. van Bertalanffy, Problems of Life [New York: Harper, 1952], p. 134. See also, on institution as habit, Alfred de Grazia, The Science and Values of Administration [1960, Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill Reprints].)|
|2.||Cf. A. de Grazia, "Law and Behavior," III American Behavioral Scientist (PROD), 1960, pp. 3.7, on the relation between these two concepts. What the law prescribes is very highly correlated with how people behave.|
|3.||Law governs aggregates or groupings of the population, defining their parameters, prescribing their behavior and penalties for non-performance.|
|4.||There is no need to place the remaining monarchies of the world outside the scope of "republic," provided that they are representative.|
|5.||This is need to block unscientific, hypocritical, vengeful, fadist, and narrowly-viewed legislative activity, and to expose its motives and rationale.|
|6.||It may be called an assembly, legislature, or parliament as well. Cr. Charles E. Merriam, Systematic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 194), on the unsuppressibility of conciliar bodies.|
|7.||Cf. the new literature on social accounts and social indicators, cited on pages 178-9; also Donald N. Michael, "On coping with Complexity: Planning and Politics," 97 Daedalus (Fall, 1968), p. 1179, esp. pp. 1185-6.|
|8.||That is, when a position or evaluation is taken on any issue within the toparchy, any contrary sentiment would be permitted a rebuttal.|
|9.||That is to block the tendency of all groups successively and simultaneously to expand their powers over people, ending in a totalitarian confusion of pulling and pushing or, worse, an efficient totalitarian monolith. See below p. 349.|
|10.||This is to prevent people being seductively or indirectly imprisoned. No restraint is to be enforced unless it is an explicit, direct law or order.|
|11.||See chapter 17 above. The UCS would consist of service o\in one or more of such groups as the armed forces (voluntary); technical, labor, and agricultural conservation groups; the international system of exchange of hostages (see page 149, above); religious social service groups, foreign or domestic; and any other action group, operating at the subsistence level of the clientele group and offering some kind of socio-therapy.|
|12.||See pages 000-0 below.|
|13.||Cf. Stevens J. Brams, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political System," LXII American Political Science Review (1968), pp. 461-75, p. 474; Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment (New York: Macmillan/Free Preess, 1965).|
|14.||Cf. A. de Grazia, Public and Republic (New York: A Knopf. 1950) and Republic in Crisis: Congress against the Executive Force (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1965).|
|15.||Cf. Alfred de Grazia, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger, 1964).|
|16.|| The churches, it may be deduced, are not exceptions to the representative principle. The Roman Catholic Church is presently suffering the transformation of hierarchy into representative government. Cf. e.g., the dispute in 1968-69 between Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle and priests who urged mediation and arbitration in cases involving church discipline. (Baltimore Sun, Nov. 13, 1968, among other dispatches.) On corporations, see The Government of Corporations, by Richard Ells (New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1962). On The Community Development Process: The Rediscovery of Local Initiative (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965).
...Thorough consideration has to be given representative structure for armed forces. Nor must even hospitals be excluded (cf. the discussion of milieu therapy in K. L. Artiss, Mileu Therapy in Schizophrenia [New York: Grune and Stratton, 1962]; A. J. Spadoni and J. A. Smith, "Milieu Therapy in Schizophrenia," 20 Arch Gen Psychiatry [May 1969], p. 547). Also, Eliot Freidson, ed., The Hospital in Modern Society, New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1963.
|17.||Bentley, The Process of Government; David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Alfred de Grazia, "Nature and prospects of Political Interests Groups," 319 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1958), pp. 113-122.|
|18.||Cf. J. L. Talmon's The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker and Warburg, 1955) which delineates the Jacobin and Bavouvian phases of the French Revolution.|
|19.||Engels, (quoted) page xvi, "Introduction," Capital (Modern Library Edition).|
|20.||Cf. Geoffrey Gorer, The People of Great Russia (1949; New York: Norton, 1962).|
|21.||New York Times, October 6, 1967, p. 12.|
|22.||The Liberation Army Daily of Peking, quoted by Thomas Hughes of the U.S. State Department in a 1968 speech.|
|23.||It is notable that a successful and iconoclastic businessman, Robert Townsend, has urged such as limitation (and others of a revolutionary nature), Up the Organization, New York: Knopf, 1970.|
|24.||Alfred de Grazia, A Computarized Inventory of Federal Government Activities (Washington, D.C.; Amer, Institute for Public Policy Research. 1968), a report.|