Table of contents

Kalos: What is to be done with our World.
By Alfred de Grazia


PART FOUR: Militarism


Reducing chances of Nuclear War

The possibility of nuclear war can be lessened by the character of a world revolutionary movement even while the same movement posits dangers. Obviously a movement that proposes radical changes in attitudes and institutions forms a threat to existing regimes. The Kalotic Revolution defined here must posit threats to every existing society. This fact, in itself, instigates crisis. On the other hand, the conservatives of the Soviet Union and the United States will both be affected and their animosities towards each other lessened. Indeed, a world revolutionary movement, by its impartial injunctions to all existing regimes, can be, paradoxically, a force for preventing large-scale conflict.

The critical moment will occur, however, when the natural and logical phasing of change incorporates one set of regimes to be treated as the First Region-leaving out temporarily other potential regions of the world. The taxocratic regime of the Soviet Union, to be explicit, will be (only in the beginning) more difficult to change than the plutocratic regime of the United States. Therefore, precautionary steps have to be taken to persuade other regions of the world that the growing organization of kalotic cosmarchy is not a conspiracy of the kind that they have usually feared.

One such step, which is good in itself even under traditional premises, is to place increasing restrictions upon the employment of a nuclear arsenal. In the case of the United States, it is in every case useful to reorganize the control over the discharge of nuclear weapons so that the President no longer is the chief or even the important factor in that decision. The presidency will become a more flexible and helpful institution if the power to "press the button" is taken away from his office and lodged in the hands of an executive congressional watchdog committee. The chief executive can then be freed for many other activities and will sluff off the terrible imagery that he must otherwise possess and that is attributed to him by Americans, allied, and unfriendly peoples alike.1

In the second place, the ancient and often successful practice of exchange of hostages can form a barrier against both hysterical and calculated steps towards nuclear and large-scale conventional warfare. In most historical instances, hostages came from the families of the rulers, a small group from a very small part of the nation. In democratic and mass societies, the public that is activated is large; the politists of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and other nations with whom we are directly concerned, number about 3% of the population.2 Therefore, the number of hostages needed to de-fuse the provocative potential of such large numbers of people must be large, too. One out of three of the youth of the politist group, that is, about two to four million American and Soviet youths should be at any given time visiting,studying, or working in the other country.

A policy of hostages, or youth hostelling, is especially beneficial, because the ideas of the Revolution can be carried by young men and women from one country to another3 In addition hostelling is to be supplemented by the infiltration of revolutionary ideas throughout the fabric of world society. There is no office, party occupation, territory, or cell that is impermeable to the Kalists. When the day arrives that no group is without its Kalotic representative, it will be impossible to order and execute catastrophe.

It is true that reprisals against Kalists will be more severe in taxocracy and stratocracy. The Terror is by no means erased from politics.4 It works on the side both of authority and rebellion. The record of punitiveness against social rebels is grimmer in the Soviet Union and Fascist Spain than in the United States, Great Britain or France. But even today in the more repressive countries, one sees remarkable effects brought on directly or indirectly by unorganized, untutored, unideological, and undirected students, ethnic minorities, workers, and intellectuals, who have striven publicly to demonstrate their contempt for the behavior of the authorities.5 In the end, life must surrender to some cause, even the final cause. The choice of risking life in order to improve, rather than to worsen , the world is the ultimate freedom. Whether the freedom is kalotic is the relevant question these days, not whether the terroristic act is or is not good in itself.

Since conventional warfare no longer has as its goal the total destruction of another country-which would precipitate nuclear warfare-the chances are less today and in the next generation that conventional warfare will escalate into large-scale world warfare. We return to the 360 War-the type of conflict that is current and prospective. It is psychological, economic, and violent, but still limited war.

It is a war to be seized as an opportunity, for only a 360 universal, constructive movement can wage it successfully, and therefore, for once and for all, the struggle may be entered into by all peoples, in all social and skill strata and with whatever weapons they may command. In a maelstrom, the autonomous minds and wills can find their way.

Armaments and Wars

Heavy armaments are not necessary to destructive wars and civil conflicts. Almost one million persons were killed in the communal riots between Hindus and Moslems in the early 1950's.6 The infamous Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs killed nearly one fifth of the number. Nor were the bombs less expensive to make and use; the nuclear systems took million of hours and billions of dollars to create, and required years of preparation.

Ancient armies put whole populations to the sword. Modern armies have suffered millions of casualties by small arms and old-fashioned cannon. If all armaments except shotguns and hand weapons were destroyed, if even all arms were given up except whatever might come to hand on occasion, wars and civil conflicts could still wreak dreadful tolls in human lives. Total disarmament is thus physically impossible.

Even if everyone in the world were deprived of all weaponry except tooth and nail, the aggressive mechanisms of economic and psychological manipulation would come into play. Hordes of people could be starved, countries could be looted, capitalists or workers could be severely (and unjustly) rooted out by many techniques.

The conclusions are several:

1. Total disarmament of man is an absurd policy.

2. Not arms, but man, is the object of peace policies.7

3. Disarmament of expensive weaponry is a wise policy for reasons having nothing to do with the quantity of slaughter being prevented.

4. Ultimate weapons, potentiated to kill most of humanity, are in a class by themselves. Their riddance would definitely enhance survival; possibilities, but this same threatening quality makes them a peace-weapon in certain respects and with certain disadvantages.

Pursuing disarmament, then, means first pursuing means to end the resort to violence. Second, it indicates reducing the costs of the weaponry that must be tolerated a) for policing advantages, b) for temporary political expediency, c) for Kalotic Revolution, and d) for warding off ultimate threats to peace. These four secondary purposes, intermingled in actuality, justify the maintenance of weaponry but at lowered costs.

The maintenance of armaments is justified in order to give police an advantage over criminal and subversive elements. In no conceivable case should the extent of the advantage given police forces extend far beyond the capabilities of disorderly forces, nor must the armaments available to the police be designed, or be usable or be employed as weapons of war. That is, in no nation should the police resemble in form of function an army. Police arms can thus be reduced as the population that it guards is disarmed.

Political expediency is a justification for armaments and armed forces of all types. No nation should be forced to surrender its armaments unless afforded guarantees against all assaults that are plausibly possible. The guarantees, of course, must be objectively assured, and not merely made of paper. Thus, the U.S.S.R. should not (and,naturally, will not) disarm unilaterally beyond such reductions as political expediency may suggest, so long as it has no guarantees against attack. Nor should Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, Indonesia, or any other nation. It must be granted, too, that what is taken from one nation must be the equivalent of what is taken from another; depriving the United States of the weapons it uses to counterbalance the heavy reliance of the Chinese upon infantry forces is not an equivalent reduction.

The general plan proposed by Charles E. Osgood for the "graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction" (GRIT) conforms well to Kalotic goals and methods.8 It recommends that the U.S.A. (it might be another country) launch genuine peace offensives, by giving up some significant weapons system or location, indicating at the same time by propaganda and diplomacy its intention to continue reducing its war potential provided that reciprocal moves of a similar type are made by potential opponents. Granted the problem of false perception ("Would the Kremlin believe us?"), a considerable reduction in war potential might be risked to test the Russian capacity for trust and reciprocation.The "overkill" potential of both the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. is dreadfully high; the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. could give up unilaterally half of their nuclear arms and a half of all conventional weapons and forces without losing their grisly confidence in destroying the other's civilization.

All of the nations, however, can participate in disarmament agreements to lower the cost of armed forces to each. A preoccupation of disarmament sponsors with great powers has kept many countries of the world from participating in regional disarmament pacts. The problem is especially poignant in dystrocratic areas having no possibility of resisting great powers. And the great powers are to be condemned for not compelling such countries to disarm relative to their possible opponents.They compound their nonfeasance by providing excessive armaments to them. Agreement among the U.S.A. France, Britain, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies on this policy is distinctly possible and the kalotic movement should agitate for it from the beginning.

Glancing Ahead

As the Kalotic Revolution develops and succeeds, armaments should be reduced as the level of consensus and authority within each successive region rises; they should be further reduced as regions assemble into the cosmarchy; finally, when the ten regions are united, only police-levels need to be maintained. These would total perhaps a quarter of a million troops, appropriately equipped.

Armaments of the First Region need to be sufficient to ward off the attacks of the most hostile potential region or regions. The greatest step to disarmament would occur afterwards when the Region of Soviet Socialist Republics joins the cosmarchy. At that point the most hostile potential region will be Greater China and enough armaments of an appropriate type should be maintained not only to discourage and ward off attack but actually to add to the ordinary pressures of logic, economics, and politics.

All of these means of disarming the nations, are difficult and little cab be done in an absolute sense without a general kalotic settlement. First comes peace, then comes disarmament; the fact that great numbers of people chase exhaustingly after disarmament in the middle of a 360 war makes their conduct no less illogical and unempirical.

Indeed, the Region, once formed, should arm itself. The mode of recruitment and organization of the cosmarchic forces should follow the federal double-layer system, as it once thrived in the United States. A mobile land, sea, and air force, armed with medium-power weapons, should be recruited on a voluntary basis from the Regional population, directly by the Region's government. The forces should be increased when a second Region joins.

The Regional Force should continuously submit plans for the reduction and reorganization of the national armed forces. Nuclear armaments, if present within the First Region, should be retained by the nation until such time as a Second Region with a nuclear arsenal joins, at which moment the nuclear arms possessed by the two regional nations should be handed over to the armed forces of the cosmarchy.


Behind the shifting scenes of disarmament occurs the struggle of the Kalotic Movement against the systematic employment of violence. The union and proliferation of Kalotic Personalities in and among toparchies carry with them the reduction of the number of persons who are psychologically prone to initiate or support warfare. Moving into positions of power and, employing stoutly their instruments of skill, ideals, and decisiveness, the kalocrats can turn the policies of regimes away from violent actions or risks of violence.

There are ample people in any society of the world to support kalotic peace policy. Hypothetically this proportion may be construed to have the following composition:

Almost all mothers 15% Almost all young men of military age not officers 10% Other generally pacifistic persons 30% Sympathizers with the target of aggressive impulses (including minorities) 10% Kalists 5%

Against these are 10% who are psychologically destructive, nihilistic, aggressive or militaristic; 2% who are personally corrupted by the joys and profits of war; 13% who are antagonistic to the hypothetical target group; and 10% with miscellaneous destructive motives. In short, normally the peaceful outnumber the violent by 3 to 1.

Indeed, once a peace party dominates a nation and its media of communication, hostile behavior is unlikely. Thus a primary task is to place kalists in positions of decision-making. The problem then becomes changed to concern over whether they can act decisively concerning needed military actions and alliances.For, as we have shown, kalocracy does not mean pacifism (except as a temporary measure for propaganda of the movement).

Can a world movement for peace and disarmament succeed without the Kalotic Revolution? No. It will fail because it is sheerly based on a policy of pacifism. It will fail because systemic violence emerges from the conditions that the Kalotic Revolution seeks to control and change. It will fail because it is not iron-willed and radical; the kalists must be persuaded thoroughly, activistic, and tactically competent, and, as such, able to take the direct and heavy burdens of pushing for peace and all the kalotic formulas that guarantee peace.

But can the kalists bring peace? Yes, if it is understood that some violence, and warfare are likely to color the progress of the revolution.

The descalation of violence (here physical, but also psychological and economic in other spheres) cannot result from sheer pacifism.

1. Sheer pacifism results initially in a. Defencelessness. b. Negative selection of elites (masochism) c. Incitement of opposing aggressive forces (with both sadistic and calculatedly aggressive motives).

2. Natural pacifism is to be sought: It occurs when a person (or group) renounces readily and happily any inclination to injure or coerce others. This is the outcome of a kalotic personality.

3. A natural pacifist can, however, employ coercion under the following circumstances:

a. To prevent himself and others from indoctrination and organization into a morality of coerciveness.

b. To restrain the mentally deranged, including war aggressors.

c. To register with the greatest intensity a demand that is not being met by persons whose claim to office is that they are meeting them.

4. Descalation of violence, then, in the modern world can occur from these non-perfect conditions of natural pacifism after

a. Most provocative expressions of aggression are suppressed or contained.

b. All opportunities are afforded to proposals for change.

Lessons from the Circumference

The conflicts throughout the world are produced by like causes, regardless of functional and geographical boundaries.9 They are brought on by a fatal imbalance or deficiency of the three basic needs-of subsistence (emos), of opportunity (pneumos), and of an effective system of law (dikeos) - and they are worsened by the weak and unscientific techniques used to meet them.

The numberless conflicts do not have simply a good side and a bad side. Nor does a people engaged in conflict necessarily know what it is doing and what the consequences of its actions must be. People around the world must search for and accept a universal language for the translation of their needs and accept the notion that what they desire has universal meaning. This and other shared sentiments and behavior may be shaped into a world consensus, and constitute the preliminary basis for the tactics of the revolution and the policies of the new order.

Some level of violence in a number of places in the world cannot be avoided in this generation. Violence is too reasonable a means of obtaining an advantage in a heads-on conflict in which at least one party does not have a disciplined pacific technique. A world revolution committed to wholly peaceful and beneficent goals cannot proceed without participating in some violent encounters. It will be provoked by force, if only in the extremities of self-defense. But, if so, its very shot must be an educated shot. It must be completely understandable,"a shot heard around the world".

A world revolutionary movement can and should restrict violence and should not believe that the escalation of violence in any case or in all cases is in any way related to the escalation of revolutionary effects. The peaceful evacuation of India by the British was a far more important event in the struggles of the contemporary world than the Hindu-Muslim riots that killed a million people in the following months. The Czech submission without bloodshed in a showdown with the Soviet Union over internal Czech liberalization in 196810 was an important to history as the suppression of Hungarian liberalization by the Soviet armed forcees a dozen years earlier.

The engagement in armed combat by Kalotic forces should be construed as a preliminary defeat. Wars are diversionary and costly. However, this "defeat" and its furstrations have to be converted immediately into an energetic mobilization of war effort.

The armed conflict should be made difficult for all of the population, so that no one will exalt and prolong it. Property should be sacrificed to save people; an economic war is an opportunity to speed up the Kalotic Revolution on both sides, and reduces the irrelevancy of the combat.

Psychological operations should be stresesed for the same reasons. Also it is the cheapest mode of warfare and the enemy is likely to be weak in its use.

Given its nature and the conditions under which the Kalotic Revolution must work in the contemporary world, a thousand sharp blows are to be preferred to a massive blow intended to crush the opposition.

Since armed warfare signifies a failure of peace, since inertia and habit are heavy burdens of bureaucratically organized armed forces, and since the military is often an element in the decision to go to war, the first act upon the outbreak of armed conflict should be the resignation and removal of all general officers, with the minimal exception of those directly involved in early operations. These should be replaced soon thereafter.

Every military engagement should be converted into a kalotic attack, for short-term and long-term victory.

Never lose a war; never surrender: ideas need never be lost nor conquered.

To avoid catastrophe, it should be understood, on the Kalotic side, from the beginning, that ultimata, "unconditional surrender" or "total defeat" should not and cannot be the goals of 360 conflict. The 360 war signifies total involvement, total transaction, total envelopment never total war or total defeat.First, as every chapter of this book implies, Kalos is not a treasure of any one party in the world today, Second, the terrible answer prompted by demands for total submission is desperate retaliation.

Unless the Russians commit genocide as they go, every mile of their advance reduces the ultimate ratio of their means and effects, domestically and internationally. The U.S.A. is also locked-in generally on a counter-revolutionary course. This lock must be broken.The Kalotic Movement has to be recognized everywhere in the world as free to choose the Kalotic side in every peaceful or violent confrontation. No government on earth today has a set of policies that can be supported; new directives have to be established practically everywhere.

The Kalotic Revolution for cosmarchy must be also a revolution for toparchy,Kalotic local and functional government. The Revolution should not, even if it could, draw a line between external and internal affairs of a nation. All events are grist for its mills. The distinction between inner and outer is proclaimed for the purposes of maintaining the status quo, and is usually the accompaniment of deeds of suppression. Mayor Daley and the police leaders of Chicago,among other like-minded types who supported the presence of half a million American troops in Vietnam, were dismayed that American demonstrators whom the police beat up in Chicago in August, 1968, came from such "far away" places as New York, Michigan and California, as well as from Chicago.10a

The freeing of the social order within the Soviet Union is a necessary phase in the creation of world government. An earlier, even preliminary step in world order, is the speedy consumption of a social and governmental revolution in America. Without internal social and political reorganization neither regime is capable of performing a useful permanent role in the world community.

Putting the Military Capability to Kalotic Use

Thus far, the disadvantages to toparchy and cosmarchy of stratocracies have been asserted. The military as an organized group presents certain advantages as well. Several of these are clear already; they are available in demilitarized form as well as in organized military units. The skills of the military and associated civilians are often useful in every type of society as engineers and builders of character and tenacity in the pursuit of assigned goals. Especially in dystrocracies, they are technically advanced practitioners of good sanitation and health practices, as creators of all-important infrastructures-roads, canals, harbors, airports, railroads-and as expediters of a number of functions ordinarily very poorly performed, such as the postal services, power facilities, navigational aids, traffic control, licensing, mechanized distribution, and so forth.11

Over the next generation, in one after another country, the military should be disarmed and transformed into agencies of social reconstruction.12 Let it not be said that resentment at being deprived of manly and traditional functions will sweep through the ranks. No revolution can ignore the imbeciles, atavists, and blockheads that abound in every organization, especially when these are perilously bound up with chauvinistic elements, and in a situation where misconduct can be rationalized in the name of national glory. Still every army in the world contains officers who are disillusioned by the impotency of their conventional armaments in the face of super-power intervention, who are aware of the change of function that is required, and who would be eager to cooperate in the transition from dystrocracy (whether stratocratic or not) to plutocracy or taxocracy.

All ranks of the military need to be reeducated by the Tutors to value highly constructive as opposed to destructive or repressive civil functions. They need incentives to dislike entering upon war and to quit warfare as soon as possible. Since most of them are remote from the firing line, peaceful life in the services is usually boring, and since the leaders are careerists, too many will wish for continual crisis and violence. They need the Cincinnatus psychology, that there are alternative and superior peaceful pursuits that would have to be put off and picked up again.

Consider, too, the rank and file, the humble conscripts of every land; it is an error to believe that only the soldier of a rich land counts the days of his ordinary service like a prisoner; the Vietnamese, the Greek, the Turkish, the Irish, the Algerian, the Chinese do likewise. Only in those areas where a popular struggle is occurring, or where military imprisonment would have to be exchanged for the prison of starvation and unemployment, would the common soldier nor hasten to employ himself in peaceful and civilian tasks, and in no case would he refuse a task whose constructive end he might see with his own eyes.13

Speak of colonial exploitation; speak of turning one's back on the poor! What is worse than the policies of the organized countries-whether plutocratic or taxocratic-of replenishing regularly the armaments and encouraging the fighting effectiveness of dystrocracies and stratocracies.

As systems of government, stratocracies of poor countries are not to be condemned off-hand. In some countries where the military is or has recently been dominant in the ruling class, as for instance in Greece, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, an actual progressive surge in certain domestic policies is apparent. The influence of the American army can be detected in each case;officers have experienced relations with respected counterparts who have demonstrated by the way they manage armies and reflect a system of representative government that military behaviour is not synonymous with social statics.

The Soviet army has not had the same effect upon the armies which it has controlled or influenced directly, despite the comradely slogans about human relations among military ranks that featured the communist revolution. The Czech coup de force of 1968 proved this. The technique of revolution by the armed forces in Argentina has been attuned so well to the social reception system that "the interplay of various tendencies without the armed forces gave a semblance of representative government."14

Simply because the frame of government may be termed "representative" and the protestations of all contending political fashions are "democratic" does not prove that dynamic policies tending towards plutocracy and taxocracy are occurring, much less that Kalos is being promoted. Men are to be judged by their actions.

A Voluntary Base and Generalized Top Echelon

In plutocratic countries, only the smallest possible proportion of the population should be in uniform. This change is less possible in taxocracies where conditions of rank and official distinctions carry heavy weight; still the reform should be agitated. At least a million Americans could be taken out of uniform without injuring the fighting effectiveness of the armed forces. The wearing of uniforms by veterans, reservists,and pensioners should be discouraged, as also the wearing of uniforms off-duty.

The use of the military in police roles has worsened many domestic conflicts. Knowing that their position on issues will be backed not only by their police forces but by the army as well encourages inflexibility and a violent spirit among domestic authorities. It also politicizes the military mind.

A volunteer army for both plutocracies and taxocracies can be instituted. This truly increases the militaristic character of the army by strengthening the professional self-image of a specialized warrior group. Therefore the practice must be offset by recruitment from all classes. Seventy percent of Spanish officers today are sons of army men; the optimum should be less than ten percent; obviously the dystrocratic circumstances of Spain, which has a regime composed almost equally of the four basic types of regimes, are at fault.Even in the U.S.A., nepotism is a problem in the armed forces. The U.S.S.R situation is unknown. The weakened Indian caste system that used to produce as warriors only the descendents of the Kshattriya caste is worst of all for modern and especially for kalotic societies.

In countries that have a high rate of horizontal and vertical mobility, notably today the plutocracies, and in the future the kalocracies, the military that forms is not only to be recruited widely but is also to be allowed an open-ended culmination of careers in civil service.

Modern military officers, without exception among countries, are typically as broadly educated in the materials and sources of Kalotic society as their counterparts in the Department of State or the Foreign Ministry, even though their social class origins were generally inferior. They are as likely to be broadly useful on matters of foreign policy, negotiations with foreign leadership, economic affairs, and propaganda.15 The same is true of non-military officials with regard to strategic problems.

The United States high civil service leadership forms an exemplary case. Under present circumstances, with numerous exceptions that not only prove the rule but show the disadvantages of not fashioning a new system, the propaganda, economic, military, and diplomatic functions are separated from bottom to top. As a result, interservice rivalries on the largest scale occur in the determination and execution of policies throughout the numerous U.S. missions abroad and in the home offices at Washington.The State Department Foreign Service has little regard for, no responsibility or accountability for, and no control over the other types of officers operating practically on the same level. The other services work in an equally isolated, erratic, incompatible, and discontinuous manner with the Foreign Service.

What is needed, not alone in the United States, is a unification in a single top foreign service of all general officers. The individual leader should be moved out of his agency of government at a high point, usually about fifteen years after he has begun his specialized service, in order to be educated into his new position as a General Foreign Service Officer. Then, regardless of his career origins as a diplomat, soldier, propagandist, or economist, he should be enabled to occupy any position up to the very top of the civil service in any branch dealing with foreign affairs and on any mission connected therewith. Only in this way can we avoid the imbalance and uncoordination of the present mode of representation of a country abroad and of the work on foreign affairs conducted in home offices.

If this plan is put into effect, one of the most prolific sources of political rivalries and stratocratic coups will be sterilized. A homogenized top government elite for all foreign operations will naturally, too, make the task of kalotic development easier. For, one of the premises of behavioral science on which the kalotic philosophy depends is that a merging of elite perspectives will produce not only greater efficiency in the narrow sense on any task,domestic or foreign, but will promote the formation of open-minded, value-sharing, full-perspective views-in short, the kalotic personality.

1. This proposal of the author was first publicized in 1967. He urged that a Force Committee of the Congress, with few other duties, assume the watchdog and discharge function. See Congress and the Presidency: Their Role in Modern Times, by Arthur. M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Alfred de Grazia (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for public policy Research, 1967), P.65, 186-9. Saul Friedman wrote in the event of accidental or deliberate attack, because of the required speed of deployment.
2. See the author's Element of Political Science (1952,1962) for estimates of the politically active; 1st ed., Chapter 3; 2nd ed., Vol. I, Chapter 3. Lester W. Milbrath, political participation (chicago: Rand McNally, 1965),P.21et passim.
3. The French and German governments have had an exchange program involving 200,000 youths within two years of the signing of a pact on February 12, 1963. A 1967 poll showed a large increase in mutual interest between the two countries. Why not now between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., Pakistan and India, Argentina and Britain, Japan and China, Indonesia and the Philippines, Brazil and Egypt?
4. Cf.Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1960); Jay Mallin, Terror in Viet Nam (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966); Thorton, in Harry Eckstein, ed. Internal war, (New york: Free PRESS, 1964). The U.s. Army in Viernam has maintained a scoreboard of terrorist action for several years. Incidents number in the thousands annually. In 18 months after the brief June 196 7 war, Israel sources counted 1288 acts of sabotaged and border incidents (New York Times, February 13,1969).
5. William J. Pomeroy cites World Marxist Review (January 1965, P.36) as estimating that "between 1944 and 1949 there were 5,371 guerrilla operations carried out in Spain" but "in 1948 the Spanish communist party decided on a change of tactics, and has since then helped to promote successfully the board many- sided struggle that has produced a democrecretic upsurge in spain..." Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism (New York: International publishers,1968), P. 24 Dzyuba op cit., P. 221, mentions examples of recent demonstration in kiev in 1964 and 1965. Katherine Chorlev describes historical cases of fraternizing between soldiers and insurgents, pp. 153 ff in armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and FAber, 1943).
6. Khushwant Singh, The New York Times Magazine (September 19965), P. 27.
7. The Kalotic stress upon the man, not the arms, is unusual. More typical are arguments such as Emile Benoit's, that "The real reason for disarmament is not that modern armaments are so expensive but that they are so dangerous-that the classic unilateral defense system no longer can provide the basic security that was its only possible justification and that a collective-security system under enforceable international law would better preserve our physical security and our essential international law would better preserve our physical security and our essential freedoms." ("The Economic Impact of Disarmament in the United States," Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics, Seymour Melman, ed. [The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, 1962], pp. 134-157).
8. An Alternative to War and Surrender (Urban, III: University of Illinois Press, 1962).
9. Cf. Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Reports, 13, 19, 28, 47 and 57 (New York, 1950-1964), on major problems of international tensions and war. An excellent bibliography and summary is offered by Frederic W. Ilfeld, Jr., in "Overview of the Causes and Prevention of Violence," XX Archives of General Psychiatry (June, 1969), pp. 675-689; also, Ted Gurr, op. cit.
10. Cf. Harry Schwartz's Prague's 200 Days (New York: Praeger, 1969).
10a. Cf. Report of Task Force on the Chicago Democratic Party Convention Riots of the President's Commission on Violence, 1969.
11. The military has helped to develop the industrial state and its tools as well as vice versa. Cf. Louis Mumford, Technics and civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), pp. 85-94; Leonard C. Leurin, Report from Iran Mountain (New York: Dail, 1967), pp.53-4 et passim. The cost of such help has been unconsiconable and certainly not to be measured in deaths alone.
12. See Janowitz, op, cit., pp. 75-80, 23-31; Hugh Banning, "Army's [U.K.] Civilian Role now Accepted," Manchester Guardian, September 5, 1968, p.5
13. Hugh Tucker in Ballot Boxes and Bayonets asserts that the Asian peasantry often have favourable attitudes to the soldiery. in extreme poverty, the soldier's lot is acceptable. There is often some chance to rise above one's born social station by means of the army. The volunteer or professional army has unquestionably more prestige in the more dystrocratic countries, least in plutocracies.
14. Scobie, Argentina: A city and a Nation, p. 219.
15. See B. Sapin, R.C. Snyder and H.W. Bruck, An Appropriate Role for the military in American Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note (Princeton: N.J.: Foreign Policy Analysis Project, 1954), whose questions of similar character have incited all too few direct researches.


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