CALENDAR     

July 3, 1967 Bangkok

Single actions of a generally predictable organization are not so foreseeable. And of course, the less "inevitable" the expected behavior (say "70% rather than 80% of the time" A does X) the greater the risk in the given case. I am trying to understand why the U.S. army does not take certain needed "imaginative" steps in the area of psychological operations in Vietnam. Obviously, the organization is structured and directed against flexible decisions that can be criticized for unorthodoxy. It is politically and bureaucratically dangerous for leaders of these aggregations to "make waves." So it would be facile to assert "nothing venturesome can be done, even though it is needed."

Yet, as Colonel Julian Turner described it to me when we breakfasted at AiRex in Saigon day before yesterday, major U. S. military forces were landed in VN in 1965 without bases and proper logistical support. Somebody, somehow, was reversing the normal order of events.

One should discipline himself both in science and action to avoid using a 70% or 90% probability as a 100% ground for decision unless no shred of evidence is available on the case coming up.

July 7, - 10 1967 Saigon

• Write seven prefaces for Martinson
• Write Steintz re Dictionary
• Write Kramer to get appraiser right away
• Send Renotte his card
• Write Nina; Stephanie; Vicki; Car; John; Carla
• Send in June 1-30 expenses
• Inquire of Ursula Breckness if my expenses and cheque for May was received
• Book return to Italy and States via Singapore.

July 11, 1967 Bangkok

For some years before the Vietnamese War, guerrilla warfare and limited warfare were discussed in military circles. Yet when the real event occurred, we were quite unprepared for it -- psychologically, organizationally, tactically.

All self-criticism is conditioned by the relative failure of Chinese, Soviet, and French policies. Each is more miserable than the other, De Gaulle has gone from la gloire to le jackal (in VN and Israel, e. g.)(. The SU is a criminal blunderer in the Near East. Red China resembles a man flaying his fists wildly while his trousers are slipping.

July 13, 1967 New York City

Business affairs (and I suppose that one should include all affairs in which one is directly engaged in life-gaming with others) drive out contemplative affairs. I am basically more interested in several theoretical concerns of my literary work than with the negotiations of Princeton Information Technology (the URS). Yet the latter drive out the intellectual memory and lucubrations, it cuts on the conscious level. It would be pleasant to believe that beneath the haggling surface was occurring a wrestling match with great ideas. I do not wish to denigrate the raw material of business experience -- or any other. It is the final form, the resting place in the notch of a general proposition, that is less eternal and aesthetic and exciting over the long haul.

July 13, 1967 Saigon

July 21, 1967

At lunch in Saigon July 21 were Ithiel Pool (MIT), Sam Huntington (Harvard), Goodman (S. H.'s assistant), John Donnell (Temple University), David Miller, Arthur Smithies (Harvard), Frederick Yu (Columbia), Shlafer, Fred Rockett and myself.

Same evening at 1 Tran Qui Khach were Pool, Trippe (Pan Am) Donnell, Miller, Smithies, Yu, Rockett, and Berle.

July 25, 1967 (Personal copy of AdeG)

To: Colonel Bruce Arnold

OSD - ARPA - RDFU - V

From: Alfred de Grazia, Simulmatics Corporation

Subject: Project Proposal "Renaissance": A strategic concept for a ten-mission, multi-force operation.

• Your consideration is invited to the following highly schematized and preliminary plan for combined political-pay/war-military-RD operations, tentatively referred to as Project "Renaissance".



• The Concept. Project "Renaissance" calls for a multi-force, multi-agency operation to evict 3,000 VC-NVM forces from a productive area "A"; to "rescue" 20,000 persons in a presently VC-NVN area "B," depriving enemy forces of resource-bases; to resettle the "refugees" in a prepared new urban-rural model community with agriculture and light industry; and to Chieu Hoi the abandoned VC to come over to their kinfolk in the model community.



• Force Requirements:


• Special FW Military Task Force for Area "A."
• Special Military Task Force for Area "B."
• Special Refugee Task Team (Mixed U. S. & RVN).
• Transport elements, preferably road convoys supplementing helicopters.
• CORDS Team.
• Special Psy Ops Team.
• U. S. non-government corporate and non-profit organization consortium under contract to design, plan, construct and engage in business in the new community. (Hypothetical participants: United Fruit Company, IBEC, NAM).

4. Time Required: 9 months (R1 to R9).

• Three months' planning, plus continuous operations planning throughout (R1-3)..
• Enemy "A" eviction phase (R4).
• Physical preparation of settlement (R5).
• Rescue of population in "B" area (R6).
• Resettlement of population "A" area (R6-9).
• Report and Planning of successive similar projects in other areas (R7-9).

• Mission of "Renaissance":
• Eliminate enemy in Area "A."
• Destroy enemy concentrations in "B."
• Open up "A" to cross traffic.
• Increase agricultural production of friendly areas.
• Destroy economic support base of enemy troops in "A"and "B."
• Destroy VC infrastructure in "A"and "B"..
• Effect a solution to a type of refugee problem, superior to most present solutions.
• Set up local industries for domestic and Free World in-country procurement, and export sales.
• Contribute to Revolutionary Development.
• Enlist voluntary groups in America in support of Vietnamese civil-military operations , for the present and future.


• Costs of "Renaissance":
• Military: Casualties: Assumed formal for the type of operations planned in "A"and "B." All other: Assumed normal.
• Refugee Resettlement: Assumed normal for transporting 20,000 refugees from a combat zone to resettlement camps.
• Research and Development Contract: Variable
• Community planning and construction consortium contract: Variable.


• Pay-offs: Assuming that costs are normal and missions are achieved, the proposed operation "Renaissance" should be immensely profitable and productive in short-range and long-range terms.

The operation may also become a model method of depriving the VC-NVN of their total base of support in SVN and in promoting economic development into the post-conflict stage by means of an interlocking strategy.

Most of the four million people now providing the VC-NVN support base in SVN can be removed in operations of the suggested type. The total effort required (beyond the combat operations that may be necessary in any event) would be much less than the cost and effort involved in the Berlin Air Lift. Furthermore the price paid for the elimination of a considerable VC-NVN fighting force would be well below the present average cost per capita.

• Approval Required: Embassy

COMUSMACV

ASA [manuscript note in AdeG's hand:] Spoke to John Hart, Chief OSA, on July 25 and he gave me his frank and friendly first-reading criticisms. John believes that we are achieving the same general idea now without plan. He doubts the available air transport. I know that we are being flooded with (unplanned) migration, and uncoordinated military strikes are occurring. I explained how the big problem of this war is to get the enemy to hold still or to come to us. This plan might help produce the effect: when they see what is occurring, the VC-NVN will be goaded into furious reaction.]

RVN

CORDS

MACV J3

• Action Recommended:
• Informal discussion promptly.
• Approvals as indicated.
• Proceed thereafter as indicated.

/signed/ Alfred de Grazia

July 27, 1967 Saigon

From America the news is rioting in a dozen cities. Negroes, and a few whites, are destroying many millions' worth of property, scuffling with the police and firemen. The troops are called out. Press and leaders are trumpeting alarms. Many have been hurt, a few killed.

In this general alarm, no one appears aware of one fact: The deaths are extremely few. How is it that many thousands of Negroes, whites, police, firemen, and troops can go through such violent demonstrations, fill the street with surging struggles, destroy hundreds of millions of property, and all with so few casualties.

This fact should astonish us. Here in VN when two hundred men meet in conflict, one hundred die. In the Civil War Draft Riots of New York, hundreds were killed. In the Haymarket Riot many were killed. In early race riots more were killed. In European city riots, so common in the 19th century, many more were killed on the whole.

The conclusion seems inescapable -- if surprising -- if one stands off far enough to judge and neglects the tragedy of the few who are victimized in the demonstrations: Blacks don't really hate Whites. And Whites doesn't really hate Blacks.

If looked at in this light, certain things become plain: There is a widespread, well justified disdain among Negroes for their ugly environment.

There is a widespread sympathy among whites for the Negro position. Americans who are materialistic in some ways, have a low regard for property. They know how fast it can be created. Few are upset by the destruction and the pushing and shoving and shouting.

Only a few whites and Negroes make much of the whole affair and it is well to watch these few to see why they do. Riots are a form of voting, costlier, riskier, but more effective.

I hope that I may be excused for sounding an Olympian [torte] at a moment when everybody is putting on shock, terror, and indignation.

July 28, 1967 Saigon Propaganda Release

"The Americans in Vietnam are about to execute a unique and sweeping maneuver in the near future, inviting the wholesale transfer of people out of the support bases of the Viet Cong. The plan was originated by Alfred de Grazia, Professor at New York University and Senior Scientist for Simulmatics Corporation. It calls for an unparalleled combined [action] operations Free World elements -- civil and military to destroy a VC base, plan it as a settlement, drop into VC territory to pick up the population and settle them there and leave the enemy soldiers without any labor, farmers, women, or psychic support. It will be the biggest air carry feat since the Berlin Air Lift."

Note [?]

He shuffles around, chuckling, singing

I'm a big buck nigger

with a cock cocked trigger

and I fill em full of holes.

July 1967

Parable on Limited Warfare in Vietnam

Suppose you say to a man "I want you to walk up to the Castle."

"Very well," says the man. "I shall do so. Here I go, as fast as my feet will carry me." "Oh no," you say. "You will have to go on wheels. Here are some you'll get used to in a hurry."

"Very well," he says, enthusiastically. "I'll get there even faster."

"Sorry," you say. "You'll find the roads impassable for a while. But take good care of the wheels, and here . . . here are the grease, spare parts, a motor to drive them, and some tools, also a manual for training yourself, and a few other things."

"Well," says he, a little doubtfully, "thanks very much, but it'll take me a while. Do you have road-clearing equipment, too?"

"It happens that I have. And not only that, but I'd like you to carry along these wide-planed aluminum gadgets (you'll probably have to build a very wide road for them to pass. And here's something that looks like a rudder, and all kinds of straps and gadgets, even a load of old propeller blades, ... I guess you've quite a lot to carry."

"Carry!" he exclaimed. "It's impossible for me to move. I can't get through at all. It 'll be months before I reach the castle."

"I guess that's so," you say, perplexed.

"Do you think I can fly?" he said indignantly.

Before you can give an apologetic answer, his face lights up. "Why can't I fly?" he practically yelled at me.

And before you can even answer him he begins turning himself from a pack animal into an aviator. You leave him humming at his work. He'll get to the Castle one way or another.

Moral: If you can't win the war by the machines of war, try converting them for civic warfare.

July-August 1967 Purchases Sent or Carry